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Abstract (English) 
 
The present Ph.D. dissertation deals with the analysis of Iran’s foreign policy 
towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. The main purpose is to understand and explain 
the motives for Iran’s contradictory behavior and actions with regard to its neighbouring 
country Afghanistan. The main research question is: “What is the nature of Iran’s foreign 
policy towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014?” Conceptually, Iran’s foreign policy is 
interpreted in the study from the realism (Hans Morgenthau; John Mearsheimer) 
perspective. This is done in a format that provides an overview of the history of Iran-
Afghanistan relations, presents an in-depth analysis of the formal power structure of Iran, 
singles out four main visions of Iran’s government which help to interpret the interplay of 
the three major foreign policy interests Iran has: security, political and economic interests. 
This is a qualitative study which makes use of historical reconstruction, content analysis, 
and the analysis of the semi-structured interviews, conducted in Iran and in Afghanistan 
as part of the field trip research. The analysis of the primary and secondary sources has 
enabled the answer of the research question on the nature of Iran’s FP towards 
Afghanistan and revealed the contradictory policies of Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The 
realism approach was assessed as an appropriate approach that adequately addressed 
Iran’s three major foreign policy interests: security, political and economic and it 
provided explanations for the contradictory character of Iran’s foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, realism was not able to fully unfold the peculiarities of the Iranian 
government’s geographical and cultural vision (the Shia factor). Towards this end, the 
suggestion for further studies would be to focus on this area in order to elucidate the 
cultural factor in Iran’s FP towards Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Iran, Afghanistan, foreign policy, realism, national interests, pragmatism, 
Sunni-Shia divide, Iran-U.S. competition, Taliban, Islamic revolution, domestic sources 
of foreign policy. 
 
   
 
iv 
Abstract (German) 
 
 Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit der Analyse der iranischen 
Außenpolitik gegenüber Afghanistan von 2001 bis 2014 mit dem Ziel, die Motive für das 
widersprüchliche Verhalten und Handeln des Iran in Bezug auf sein Nachbarland 
Afghanistan zu verstehen und zu erklären. Die hauptsächliche Forschungsfrage lautet: 
„Was ist das Wesen der iranischen Außenpolitik gegenüber Afghanistan von 2001 bis 
2014?“ Konzeptionell wird Irans Außenpolitik aus der Perspektive des Realismus (Hans 
Morgenthau; John Mearsheimer) interpretiert. Die Dissertation umfasst einen Überblick 
über die Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Iran und Afghanistan und eine detaillierte 
Analyse der formellen Machtstruktur des Iran. Sie identifiziert vier langfristige Strategien 
der iranischen Regierung, die das Wechselspiel der drei wichtigsten außenpolitischen 
Interessen Irans erklären können: Sicherheit, politische und wirtschaftliche Interessen. 
Dies ist eine qualitative Studie, die historische Rekonstruktion, Inhaltsanalyse und die 
Analyse semi-strukturierter Interviews, durchgeführt im Rahmen der 
Feldforschungsforschung im Iran und in Afghanistan, nutzt. Die Analyse der Primär- und 
Sekundärquellen hat die Beantwortung der Forschungsfrage zum Wesen der iranischen 
Außenpolitik gegenüber Afghanistan ermöglicht und die widersprüchliche Politik des 
Iran gegenüber Afghanistan aufgezeigt. Der Ansatz des Realismus hat sich als 
angemessener Ansatz erwiesen, um die drei wichtigsten außenpolitischen Interessen des 
Iran (Sicherheit, politische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte) angemessen zu analysieren und 
den widersprüchlichen Charakter der iranischen Außenpolitik zu erklären. Dennoch 
konnte der Realismus die Besonderheiten der geographischen und kulturellen Strategie 
der iranischen Regierung (schiitischer Faktor) nicht vollständig erfassen. Zukünftige 
Forschungen könnten sich auf diesen Bereich konzentrieren, um den kulturellen Faktor in 
Irans Außenpolitik gegenüber Afghanistan aufzuzeigen. 
 
 
Schlüsselwörter: Iran, Afghanistan, Außenpolitik, Realismus, nationale Interessen, 
Pragmatismus, sunnitisch-schiitische Teilung, Iran-USA Konkurrenz, Taliban, islamische 
Revolution, innenpolitische Faktoren der Außenpolitik.
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Preface 
 
This work I lay before you today is a result of many interesting and enriching 
meetings with excellent people in very contrasting environments. It is my attempt to 
contribute to the body of academic research, whereby I can make use of my previous 
knowledge but at the same time distance myself from what I have experienced in the past, 
being born and raised in the country called Afghanistan. 
 There are distinct advantages and disadvantages in writing about the country of 
your origin. On the one hand, it equips you with the tools the foreigners might never get a 
chance to use: the first–hand knowledge about events, proficiency in the local languages 
(Dari, Farsi, Pashto), and most importantly, the inner emotional urge to write something 
that may someday make the lives of the people in your homeland better. On the other 
hand, though, it requires the constant effort of remaining impartial about the context and 
ensuring your judgments are free from the influences of your past. In the particular case 
of Afghanistan and Iran, such research was also coupled with sensitive field research in 
life-endangering areas, where there were real risks for personal security. 
 I am very grateful that despite all these hurdles and obstacles on the way, this 
research was completed and represents the first research done by the local researchers 
from the region of the study on the Foreign Policy of Iran towards Afghanistan.  
 I am grateful to so many people who made this academic endeavour and my 
personal growth as a researcher both in Afghanistan and in Germany a reality. 
 I thank my extended family in different countries, for without their moral support, 
I would never be able to fulfil all the plans and steps necessary for completion of this 
project.  
 My greatest gratitude and regard goes to my “Doktorvater”, my principal 
supervisor Professor Dr. Klaus Schlichte, an exemplary German scholar, Professor of 
International Relations: Politics in World Society at the University of Bremen, for 
accepting me as a PhD student at the stage when this project did not even have stable 
financing and for guiding me as a torch and illuminating for me the unknown corridors of 
political science, for encouraging me and for being very patient in many regards. You are 
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the best academic supervisor one could dream of, it is to you I owe the finalization of this 
project. 
 I am blessed that my research has received the attention of Professor Dr. Mushtaq 
Kaw, a renowned Indian scholar, Head of the Department of History at Maulana Azad 
National Urdu University (MANUU) in Hyderabad, India. I am grateful for the honor to 
get to know him personally and for agreeing to step into the process as a second 
supervisor. His outstanding expertise and pert opinions expressed with regards to this 
study have brought a fresh impulse into my thinking and contributed greatly to the 
finalization of this project. 
I thank Mrs. Marit Rasmussen, J.D., the former Country Director of the American 
Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) in Tajikistan for her interest to read 
this study and to help proof-read the final version. 
I thank my dear friend Jan Voigt for his continuous support throughout all these 
years. I thank my friend Suhail, for his sincere help in reading the early versions of these 
chapters and for his encouragement. My gratitude for friendship goes to Dr. Rebin Fard, a 
talented young scholar and a great listener. 
I thank my niece Hilola for her technical support that brought this piece of writing 
into the reader-friendly form, for her jokes and positive attitude. 
 I thank the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for the financial 
support of this research and for making my research stay in Germany comfortable in 
every respect, which allowed for concentration on this research. 
 I thank all the interview-partners in Afghanistan and Iran for the empirical 
knowledge, which has enriched the analytical chapters if this study. 
 Thank you to all, whom I could not mention here for the scarcity of space or for 
other reasons, but who know I value them and imply them here. 
 The thoughts presented herein are the product of my own analysis, the ideas of 
others that influenced the study were properly referenced. I hope that this work will be 
interesting to read not only for those coming from the political science background but 
also for the general public interested in the affairs of the region.  
Farid Muttaqi, 
Bremen, October 15, 2018  
Table of Contents 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
vii 
Table of Contents 
Abstract (English) ............................................................................................................ iii 
Abstract (German) ............................................................................................................ iv 
Preface ................................................................................................................................. v 
List of Tables and Figures ................................................................................................. x 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ xi 
Glossary .......................................................................................................................... xiii 
Political Map of Afghanistan ......................................................................................... xiv 
Political Map of Iran ........................................................................................................ xv 
Chapter 1. Introduction and Research outline................................................................ 1 
1.1 Research Statement ................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Literature review on Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan ........................... 4 
1.3 Research Question ................................................................................................ 16 
1.4 Timeframe of the study ........................................................................................ 17 
1.5 Relevance of the present study ............................................................................. 18 
1.6 Research Methodology ......................................................................................... 19 
1.7 Theoretical Framework of the present study ........................................................ 21 
1.8 Iran-Afghan Relations within international Relations Paradigms ........................ 28 
1.9 Thesis Structure .................................................................................................... 32 
Chapter 2. Iran-Afghanistan Relations: A Historical Overview ................................. 34 
2.1 Independence of Afghanistan from the British Empire in 1919 .......................... 35 
2.2 Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran ................ 38 
2.3 Soviet troops pull-out (1989): Civil war (from 1991) and the Taliban  
(from 1994) ................................................................................................................. 41 
2.4 Iran’s involvement in the post-2001 Afghanistan ................................................ 44 
2.5 The shift in Iran’s foreign policy .......................................................................... 46 
2.6 The Cultural Aspect of Iran-Afghanistan relations .............................................. 49 
2.7 Summary .............................................................................................................. 51 
Chapter 3. Formal Power Structure of Iran ................................................................. 53 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 53 
3.2 Fundamentals of the Political Structure within Iran’s Constitution ..................... 55 
3.3 Supreme Leader .................................................................................................... 59 
3.4 The Assembly of Experts ..................................................................................... 62 
3.5 The Executive Branch .......................................................................................... 63 
Table of Contents 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
viii 
3.6 Legislature ............................................................................................................ 67 
3.7 The Judiciary ........................................................................................................ 70 
3.8 Informal foreign policy institutions ...................................................................... 72 
3.9 Individual Actors and Associations ...................................................................... 74 
3.10 Summary ............................................................................................................ 75 
Chapter 4. Iran’s Foreign Policy Review: three presidents, four visions ................... 77 
4.1 Islamic revolution: a paradigm shift for Iranian foreign policy objectives .......... 79 
4.2 The four major visions of Iran’s government regarding Afghanistan .................. 83 
4.3 Overview of the Post-Revolution Iranian Foreign Policy Motives ...................... 87 
4.4 Important Elements in Iranian Foreign Policy ..................................................... 91 
4.5 Iran's Foreign Policy Objectives .......................................................................... 98 
4.6 Summary ............................................................................................................ 100 
Chapter 5. Iranian Foreign Policy Interests in Afghanistan ...................................... 103 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 103 
5.2 Security Interests ................................................................................................ 107 
5.3 Economic Interests ............................................................................................. 113 
5.4 Iran’s Political Interests ...................................................................................... 115 
5.5 Iranian local non-governmental partners and partner-individuals in  
Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 117 
5.6 Shia factor........................................................................................................... 121 
5.7 Iran and the Taliban ............................................................................................ 126 
5.8 Summary ............................................................................................................ 131 
Chapter 6. Iran’s policy in relation to Afghanistan:  security and political aspects 133 
6.1 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) ...................................................... 135 
6.2 Ansar Base of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps .................................... 141 
6.3 Clerical Establishment in Qom........................................................................... 142 
6.4 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security .......................................................... 146 
6.5 Charity Organizations (Imam Khomeini Relief Committee: IKRC) ................. 146 
6.6 Council on Afghanistan in the Office of the Supreme Leader ........................... 149 
6.7 Iranian diplomatic missions................................................................................ 150 
6.8 Summary ............................................................................................................ 151 
Chapter 7. Iran’s Economic Policy in Relation to Afghanistan................................. 153 
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 153 
7.2 Iran’s Economic policy towards Afghanistan: General description ................... 155 
7.3 Road infrastructure ............................................................................................. 164 
Table of Contents 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ix 
7.4 Railway Projects ................................................................................................. 167 
7.5 Iran’s Development Aid to Post-Taliban Afghanistan ....................................... 169 
7.6 Iran’s Trade relationship with Afghanistan’s western region (Herat, Farah and 
Nimroz provinces) .................................................................................................... 171 
7.7 Challenges for the local Afghan traders at the ground level .............................. 180 
7.8 Summary ............................................................................................................ 183 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 185 
Restatement of the argument and the main findings: recap ..................................... 185 
Self-critical reflections ............................................................................................. 190 
Realism theory in retrospect: the empirical contribution ......................................... 193 
Suggestions for further research ............................................................................... 195 
The future prospects ................................................................................................. 195 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 198 
Annex A List of Interviews............................................................................................ 226 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
x 
List of Tables and Figures  
 
 
Table 1. Iran’s trade with Afghanistan (in USD Millions) .............................................. 160 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Drainage Map of Afghanistan ............................................................................ 38 
Figure 2. FDI and GDP of Afghanistan ........................................................................... 156 
Figure 3. Afghanistan - Foreign Direct Investment (billion USD) .................................. 156 
Figure 4. Afghanistan Imports by Year (2008-2016) (in USD Millions) ........................ 157 
Figure 5. Afghanistan Imports by Country (2008-2016) (in USD Millions) ................... 158 
Figure 6. Afghanistan Exports by Country (2008-2016) (in USD Millions) ................... 159 
Figure 7. Afghanistan Exports (in USD Millions) ........................................................... 162 
Figure 8. Indo-Iranian Trade Routes ................................................................................ 165 
Figure 9. Afghanistan Ring Road – Laman to Qeysar ..................................................... 166 
Figure 10. Chabahar and Gwadar Ports ........................................................................... 167 
Figure 11. Map of border provinces between Afghanistan and Iran ............................... 172 
Figure 12. Islam Qala border point in Herat Province ..................................................... 173 
 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
xi 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ACCI Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries  
ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces  
CA Central Asia 
CAS The Caucasus and the Central Asia States  
CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor  
CVI Iran Veterinary Organization 
EU European Union  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FP Foreign Policy 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HS Harmonized System  
ICRO Islamic Culture and Relations Organization 
IKRC Imam Khomeini Relief Committee  
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPI Iran-Pakistan-India  
IR International Relations  
IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
IRI Islamic Republic of Iran  
ISIL/ ISIS/ IS The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  
LON League of Nation  
MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security 
NA Northern Alliance 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NSC National Security Council  
List of Abbreviations 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
xii 
OEC Observatory of Economic Complexity  
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India  
UK United Kingdom  
UN United Nations  
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
USA/ U.S. United States of America  
USD United States Dollar  
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
 
Glossary 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
xiii 
Glossary 
 
Artesh Army 
Faqih The term describing the religious role of the Supreme Leader as an 
individual 
Imam The spiritual and political successors to the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad 
Imam Joma Friday Prayer Leaders 
Imamat The Leadership of the Worshipers  
Madrasa Islamic School 
Majles Parliament  
Mazhab School of thought within Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence)  
Muhajireen Muslim immigrant 
Mujahideen People who are involved in Jihad 
Rahbar 
Sayed 
Leader 
Successor of the Prophet Muhammad in Islam 
Sepah-e Pasdaran  
(also Sepah) 
Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution 
Sunni A branch of Islam 
Ummah Community of Believers 
Velayat-e faqih Guardianship of the jurist 
 
 
 
Political Map of Afghanistan 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
xiv 
Political Map of Afghanistan 
 
Source: One World - Nations Online Project, (n.d.a).  
 
 
 
Political Map of Iran 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
xv 
Political Map of Iran 
 
Source: One World - Nations Online Project, (n.d.b).  
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
xvi 
Introduction and Research outline 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1 
Chapter 1. Introduction and Research outline 
 
This section pertains to the focus, relevance and the underlying objectives of the 
present study on Iran’s Afghanistan Policy. It also profiles the theoretical narrative and its 
application to the subject on the basis of historical and empirical studies. In addition, it 
gives a brief account of different chapters and the methodology used.  
1.1 Research Statement 
The relationship between Iran and Afghanistan has always been very dynamic and 
interdependent since time immemorial. Apart from an adjacent geographical proximity, 
the two countries share a lot in common dominated by culture and language, and a large 
part of common but porous border alongside the western provinces of Afghanistan 
(Herat, Farah and Nimroz). Any threat or vulnerability to either country creates a 
predicament for the other, especially the threat posed by Afghanistan in contemporary 
times, since it is the weaker and more vulnerable of the two states in terms of security. 
Iran’s role in the state of affairs of Afghanistan has always been inevitable, especially 
during the times of crisis of the latter, be it the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when Iran 
provided active assistance in the form of monetary and other logistic help to the erstwhile 
Mujahideen, or be it the mediator role played by Iran in the Afghan–Pakistan relations 
(Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies, 2017). Referring to the dynamism of the 
relations between the two, there has been a paradigm shift since 2001 and the relationship 
has become increasingly interdependent especially from the point of view of Iranian 
national interests. Firstly, a massive number of Afghan refugees have fled Afghanistan to 
Iran (as per the reports of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR, 
there are almost nine hundred thousand registered Afghan refugees as of 2016, add to that 
non-registered refugees as well, and the number was unsurprisingly higher when the civil 
war in Afghanistan was at its peak). Secondly, the increased presence of both military 
and diplomatic intervention by the west in Afghanistan, especially the USA, has 
interested Iran more in both the domestic as well as the foreign policy of Afghanistan 
which advertently or not seems to be dominated by the western diktat. Thirdly, the 
economic dimension also has a very significant role to play in the interdependence of the 
two countries; Iran is an indispensable transit as well as a trade route for Afghanistan and 
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similarly, Afghanistan is also a part of some of the economically significant projects like 
the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. The development and 
sophistication of the famous Chabahar port in south-eastern Iran which serves as Iran’s 
only oceanic port, and is thus an important element of the economic development of Iran, 
also depends a lot on the security environment in Afghanistan.  
This study focuses on Iran’s Afghanistan policy after the fall of the Taliban in 
2001, as that was the time that marked a new beginning in the modern history of 
Afghanistan vis-à-vis restructuring and re-establishment of the political and economic 
structures across Afghanistan. The study’s main focus is the period from 2001 to 2014, 
but in some instances - beyond, if the events after 2014 are particularly relevant to the 
study period. The historical, cultural and economic influence within the political sphere 
of Afghanistan always characterized Iran as a significant player in Afghanistan’s state of 
affairs. The aim of the study, therefore, is to view Iran’s Afghanistan policy through 
political, economic, and security paradigms not only in connection with a highly 
interdependent nature of the bilateral relationship between the two but also their mutual 
association and its importance for the regional political, security and economic network 
that also reflects a high level of interdependence. The relations between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (IRI) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have been more 
interactive since 2001, not only on the basis of certain positive and mutually interested 
fronts, like the economic development of both in general and Afghanistan in particular 
(given the moral obligation of international as well as regional actors to rebuild a post-
conflict Afghanistan), but also on the basis of antagonistic stands and discourses on 
certain issues like the hydro-political issue pertaining to the Helmand river. 
The study reflects the significance of various internal aspects of the religious-
political factor vis-à-vis the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan, which is 
predominated by the consolidation and proliferation of the Shia school of thought not 
only across Afghanistan but through the whole of South Asia and the Middle East. 
Subsequently, the foreign policy of Iran has over the period of time both overtly and 
covertly focused on both the diplomatic and non-diplomatic assistance to the minority 
Shia ethnicity especially Hazaras. This support was done across the parliamentary and 
other economic institutions within Afghanistan. The idea behind that was to strengthen 
both their quantitative as well as qualitative representation within the socio-political as 
well as the socio-economic sphere of Afghanistan. As already mentioned, U.S. 
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involvement in Afghanistan both militarily as well as diplomatically has been another 
instigating factor to diversify the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan, due to 
decades-long US-Iran rivalry, which, despite some instances (e.g. Iran nuclear deal 
during the Obama administration that softened the US-Iran relations) seems to be getting 
ever more deeply entrenched. Even if the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan 
looks convincing and explicit from an outside perspective there are, nonetheless, certain 
dimensions that not only confuse regional commentators and analysts but also create a 
sense of ambiguity across certain fronts. For example, the intermittent Iranian assistance 
to Taliban factions has emanated over a period of time, irrespective of concrete evidence 
that the Taliban have committed atrocities on more than several occasions on ethnic 
minorities, more specifically the Hazaras (Shia ethnic minority). 
The overall central argument this study intends to convey, based on the thorough 
study of the literature and on the empirical study is that: Iran’s foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan in the time frame from 2001 to 2014 is contradictory. It is influenced by 
various factors of security, political and economic nature. All these factors are of course 
inseparable, but in order to analyze them, this study defines their characteristics for the 
sake of convenience. Thus, under security and political factors, I imply the political 
internal changes in Afghanistan, such as the presence of the U.S. in this country and the 
unstable security situation there manifested, among others, in insurgency and drug 
trafficking. Under the economic factors, I understand Iran’s rather regional approach 
towards the economic issues, whereby it does not center its attention solely and 
exclusively on Afghanistan. Notwithstanding this, Iran does use economic moves as a 
tool to be involved in Afghanistan, and as leverage for the influence over the political 
situation in its neighbor-state. Although historical patterns of relations between the two 
countries (chapter 2) must be taken into account for understanding the way Iran makes 
use of cultural affinity and Shia factor for implementation of its foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan, it is not the most important element in its external policy shaping. This 
study, thus, considers the pragmatic realist approach in Iran’s foreign policy to be 
significantly more important than its ideological considerations. It is equally important to 
understand what contributes to the implementation of its often-contradictory policies 
towards Afghanistan. Towards this end, the study provides a thorough analysis of the 
main motivators of Iran’s FP: the paradoxical institutional structure: both formal and 
informal (chapter 3), pragmatic aspects, with ingrained ideological moves, contained in 
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Iran’s policy objectives and the complexities of Iran’s foreign policy (chapter 4), Iranian 
national interest in Afghanistan in consideration of Iran-Taliban nexus and Shia factor 
(chapter 5), political and security interests as observed in implementation of the foreign 
policy by various Iranian institutions (chapter 6) and economic interests, as can be better 
observed in Iran-Afghanistan trade relations and Iran’s economic involvement in 
Afghanistan (chapter 7). 
1.2 Literature review on Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan 
For the purpose of explaining the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan 
between 2001 and 2014, this study operationalizes assumptions of the Realism school of 
thought in international relations. While the theoretical underpinning of this dissertation is 
elaborated in the subchapter 1.9 (theoretical framework of the present study), here I 
review the existing corpus of publications (in the time frame between 2001 and 2017) 
relevant to the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan. 
There is a wide range of literature on the Iran-Afghanistan relations in general and 
on Iran’s foreign policy with respect to certain countries. However, there has been, so far, 
no thorough foreign policy analysis of what constitutes the power politics (Realpolitik
1
) 
of Iran in its foreign relations with its neighboring country – Afghanistan - that would 
consider all domestic factors in Iran and assess their role vis-à-vis Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, there are excellent studies one has to consider as relevant for the 
current analysis, as there have been scientific attempts to understand the nature of the 
regime in Iran, which is crucial for explaining its foreign policy in general. There are 
authors who have highlighted the fact that despite the theocratic political regime in Iran, 
its foreign policy is far from being sectarian (Byman et al., 2001; Milani, 2006; 2009; 
Toscano, 2012; and Ostovar, 2016), i.e. resulting from the differences between different 
religions (particularly analyzed in Ostovar, 2016), but on the contrary, is based on the 
arguments of Realpolitik (namely national security interests and economic interests). 
Some scholars, like Posch (2013) believe that ideology and pragmatism in Iranian foreign 
policy are inseparable and should be analyzed in their interplay. Wastnidge (2014) also 
analyzes Iran’s pragmatism combined with ideological instruments, the cultural initiatives 
                                                 
1
 The term Realpolitik was coined by Ludwig von Rochau and is widely used in the international relations 
literature in this work. It is understood as the politics of the country that gives preferences to the particular 
circumstances and factors over ideology/religion. 
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with regards to the Central Asian (CA) region. He analyzes, namely, how Iran’s cultural 
strategy is implemented in Persian-speaking Tajikistan and to some extent in Afghanistan 
to ensure its pragmatic goals are achieved, in particular, its ultimate goal – of increasing 
its influence in the region. The tendency of strengthening cultural ties with CA states and 
Afghanistan can be observed most prominently during the presidency of Khatami (1997-
2005) but is also evident during the presidency of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). The article 
demonstrates how pragmatism is manifested through the particular use of the so-called 
revolutionary rhetoric. It becomes evident from the above study that one of the conduits 
of Iran’s pragmatic diplomacy is, among others, the cultural sector, namely activities of 
the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO) of Iran. Another interesting 
tendency that can be distilled from it is that Iran’s cultural moves in CA coincided with 
the tensions Iran was having/has with the West. Provided these relations improve in the 
future, Iran may find those cultural activities in Central Asia and Afghanistan no longer 
important. This idea is echoed by other scholars, like Salehzadeh (2013) who have 
studied Iran’s foreign policy through the lenses of the cultural and ethnicity issues and in 
light of the nuclear deal.
2
 The interdependency between Iran’s cultural initiatives in the 
region and Iran’s negotiations with the West on its nuclear program that can be derived 
from these two studies is an interesting one and is considered in the present study.  
The studies on Iran’s foreign policy are still very often preoccupied with religious 
rhetoric, namely, I imply here relations of Iran with U.S. and Israel, although their authors 
recognize that it is by no means purely sectarian (see for example Byman et al., 2001; 
Parsi, 2007). The goal of this study, however, is to specifically focus on the factors such 
as economy and national interests (as there is still much to be done towards their 
analysis), by addressing the domestic factors in the Iranian politics, such as economy, 
security, formal and informal structures in Iran and the main institutions, implementing 
the FP of Iran towards Afghanistan in order to see the broader picture. 
Iran’s position in the Middle East region is influenced by the presence of the U.S. 
and Iran-Saudi Arabia competition regarding the dominance in the region. The 
competition concerns most importantly the energy sector and was much affected by the 
Iranian revolution that brought into existence a Shia state, thus creating a major Shia-
Sunni clash in the region (Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013). The Iranian revolution has also 
                                                 
2
 The nuclear negotiations and relevant domestic policies are researched in particular details by Seyedamir 
Hossein Mahdavi (2014).  
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become a cornerstone of the difficult US-Iran relations, which worsened after the Iran 
hostage crises. There are several recent studies on Iran’s foreign policy in general that 
describe Iran’s position in the region, that consider Iran-Saudi Arabia competition and 
dynamics of US-Iran relations. Before reviewing the relevant studies related to Iran’s 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan, which is the focus of this study, it is worth 
mentioning a few that are concerned with Iran’s foreign policy more generally. 
 Kenneth Katzman a specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs provides a good overview 
of Iran’s foreign and defense policies as influenced by the combination of four different 
factors, whereby these factors, as shown in some examples, do at times collide. He, thus, 
mentions national interests, ideology (rooted in Islamic revolution), the individual 
perceptions of Iranian leadership (most notably of Iran’s Supreme Leader) on perceived 
threats to Iran’s regime (threat perception) and other factional interests in Iran. Katzman 
labels them as “Iran’s Policy Motivators” (Katzman, 2018). One of his notable 
observations is that Iran (as perceived by this U.S. analyst) regards the U.S. as the main 
financial contributor and supporter of the Islamic State and other terrorist groups of Sunni 
doctrine, as well as Sunni Arab regimes in general. The latter explains the dynamics of 
difficult US-Iran relations from America’s perspective. The lesson that can be learned 
from the analysis is that both U.S. and Iran are most likely going to continue the relations 
in the same manner of animosity, which makes Iran’s foreign policy logic between 2001 
and 2014 more comprehensible to the thorough analysis this study undertook. 
 Farideh Farhi (2015), the American scholar of Iranian origin, provides an 
overview of Iran’s position in the region from what is assumed to be the Iranian 
viewpoint. Iran’s regional role is discussed in consideration of the situation in Iraq and 
Syria and in light of its obvious objectives to attain regional influence. These objectives, 
according to Farhi, are largely based on Iran’s 20-year perspective document3, the 
embodiment of Iran’s foreign policy (see more on economic development, regional power 
and foreign policy planning in Sajjadpour and Nourian, 2011) on various issues of 
national concern, among which are the economic, political, security and cultural 
objectives that will supposedly ensure Iran’s influence in the region by 2025. To assess 
Iran’s position in the Middle East, Farhi’s article draws attention to certain internal 
                                                 
3
 See more on these objectives in the “20-Year National Vision Plan (2005-2025)” at the website of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of IRI, see also Dr. Jahangir Amuzegar, the former Minister of 
Finance of IRI (2009) on “promises and pitfalls” of this 20-year plan. 
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dynamics that determine the role of this country in the region. Thus, for instance, it draws 
attention to the internal institutional problems within Iran that are greatly the result of the 
settings that Iran has been forced into by, inter alia, the imposition of the sanctions on it, 
and the political as well as economic consequences thereof. The article reveals clear 
interconnection between Iran’s domestic politics, namely the role of its various 
institutions, and Iran’s regional political influence. This gives an important message for 
the present study as well: one should not underestimate Iran’s domestic institution’s role 
in shaping Iran’s foreign policy towards the countries of the region. 
 Sara Bazoobandi (2014) analyzes Iran’s regional policy, whereby she also 
emphasizes the importance of the influence of the foreign forces military presence on the 
dynamics of internal institutional changes within Iran. According to her this consequently 
contributes largely to shaping Iran’s foreign policy towards its neighbors in the region, 
which is full of controversies. The lesson that can be learned from this analysis, as well as 
all analyses on Iran’s foreign policy in general, for the present study is that Iran’s regional 
strategy is focused on enhancing its influence in the neighboring countries, but not at the 
expense of its own national security considerations, which are preoccupied with the U.S. 
presence in the region.  
The state of the art relevant for the present analysis is represented by two thematic 
focuses of the previous research dedicated to (1) the analysis of Iran’s foreign policy 
towards Afghanistan in general and (2) the impact of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan 
and the dynamic of the US-Iran relations on the Iranian foreign policy towards its Afghan 
neighbor. Below I organize the review of the existing literature according to the year of 
publication. 
As it was mentioned above, this literature review does not cover publications on 
Iran’s foreign policy before 2001, though various studies followed the Islamic revolution 
of 1979 (e.g. Hunter, 1990), as Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan is analyzed in 
the present study from 2001 onwards. Thus, one of the first publications right after the 
U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 is a co-authored article by Allison et al. (2001) 
entitled “Living with Afghanistan”. This article is an attempt to provide the most 
important highlights on Afghanistan in light of the world affairs of 2001. The length of 
the article does not allow it to be regarded as a thorough analysis, nevertheless, it should 
be mentioned here as opening the discussion on Afghanistan from the new perspective. 
The new perspective on Afghanistan from Iran after 2001, according to the article, is 
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concerned with the increased flow of refugees, drug trafficking and gun smuggling over 
the Iran-Afghanistan border into Iran. Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan immediately 
after 2001 evolved around these threats, coming from its neighbor, but also around the 
U.S. presence – perhaps Iran’s biggest concern. The article gives an overview of the 
security situation in the region around Iran and the US-Iran relations that are affected, on 
the one hand by the situation in Afghanistan, and on the other, by the ongoing conflict on 
the Israel-Lebanon border and Iran’s support to Hezbollah in the conflict. It reveals that 
Iran has very different positions on the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, in the U.S. 
and on what is done by the liberation movements in the region as two things of very 
different order. Despite the resentment of Iranians of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
an interesting fact is highlighted in this report of the Royal Institute of the International 
Affairs, namely, that there is no common agreement in Iran on the connection of Osama 
Bin Laden’s network to these terrorist acts. This explains the reaction of Iran to the U.S. 
intervention in Afghanistan, which was regarded by the former as not proper in the given 
circumstances. The report makes very clear that despite Iran’s concern with the Taliban, 
Iran is much more concerned with having U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and in 
Central Asian states. This is because Iran believes the U.S. has a secret plan of encircling 
Iran so as to cut off its communication with the CA states and thus controlling oil transfer 
routes and preventing its transfer via Iran. The report, thus, communicates an important 
message, that will reappear across many subsequent publications on Iran-Afghanistan 
relations beyond 2001: Iran regards the U.S. presence in Afghanistan not only as a 
military threat to itself but also as a threat to Iran’s economy. 
In the period between 2001 and 2008, there was no thorough study on Iran’s 
policy/activity in Afghanistan. This silence was interrupted in 2008 by the American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research when it published a report, “Iranian 
influence in the Levant, Iraq, and Afghanistan” (Kagan, Kagan and Pletka, 2008). The 
report describes the involvement of Iran in the economic, social and cultural spheres, 
rather than analysis of the foreign policy of Iran, but its data, inter alia, regarding the 
support Iran provided to the Afghan refugees and labor migrants in its own country and 
the support of the insurgents can instigate future research on Iran’s activities in 
Afghanistan. The report fails to identify Iran’s strategy in Afghanistan and the de facto 
situation of Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan (though it does describe the internal events 
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in Afghanistan, as an outcome of Iran’s FP) that sometimes goes in contravention of its 
stated foreign policy goals and leaves open the question open of its actual goals. 
The first foreign policy analysis of the “structural patterns” of the Iranian moves 
in Afghanistan is produced by Andreas Wilde (2009). In his article, Wilde emphasizes the 
necessity to shift the focus of the research on Iran’s foreign policy from its nuclear 
program discourse to other factors, neglected in the Western media. He does so by 
discussing the structural patterns of the Iranian foreign policy in its neighboring 
Afghanistan. His work indeed provides much deeper understanding of the Iran-
Afghanistan relations (which are at the focus of his paper) by, inter alia, drawing lines 
between several time periods in Afghanistan’s history, among which are the time before 
the Afghan conflict began, the Taliban regime and the period after the fall of the Taliban. 
He argues that the fusion of outside and inside (domestic) factors were always crucial for 
the relationship between the two countries throughout the modern history of Afghanistan 
and Iran. He particularly describes these relations around the water and refugee’s issues 
and Taliban. He highlights the role of the external actors (US, Pakistan) as important for 
Iran’s engagement in Afghanistan. In analyzing Iran’s foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan, Wilde’s study, however, does not occupy itself with Iran’s regime nature 
and the analysis of Iran’s state policy-makers as contributing to the course of this 
country’s activities with regards to Afghanistan. 
Iran’s interests in Afghanistan are explored by Stephen Carter in his article, 
published in the International Journal of Canada (Carter, 2010). The article does not 
analyze the foreign policy of Iran in all its dimensions but rather is aimed at 
understanding the impact of the NATO activities in Afghanistan and before all – 
Canada’s role in the possible future discussions on Afghanistan with Iran back in 2010. It 
makes a historical excursion to the initial short Iran-US cooperation against the Taliban, 
then later the U.S. placing Iran on the “axis of evil” (Bush, 2002) and announcing it as 
sponsoring terrorism, while at the same time inevitability of the necessity to have Iran 
participating in all possible future discussions about Afghanistan, due to the contradictory 
involvement of Iran in Afghanistan such as among other – Iran’s backing insurgents in 
Afghanistan fighting against NATO personnel. The article highlights the main elements 
of Iran’s interests in Afghanistan: energy corridors (and associated with this competition 
with Pakistan, China and India), slowing down the NATO’s activities and undermining 
the democratic process in Afghanistan. Carter discusses these elements in connection with 
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the questions he poses: what factors are crucial for Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan in 
2010 and what does this all entail for Canada’s activities in Kabul and Kandahar and for 
the NATO’s overall objectives? He leaves the questions open, though he stresses that Iran 
is an important regional actor and should, by all means, be involved in all discussions on 
Afghanistan. 
Iran’s policy as reflected in its balancing strategy towards the U.S. moves on the 
one hand and towards the Pakistan and Saudi Arabia activities in the region of 
Afghanistan and in its neighborhood – on the other hand, are explored by Alireza Nader 
and Joya Laha in the policy paper aimed at understanding the Iranian policy and interests 
in Afghanistan and what do they mean for the U.S. forces in this country (Nader and 
Laha, 2011). The paper’s focus and main concern U.S. has with regards to Iran and the 
backing of the Taliban by the later as a countermeasure to the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 
The paper reveals contradictory policies Iran pursues in Afghanistan, evidenced by 
backing Taliban, while at the same time providing support to the ethnic groups (Tajik and 
Shia Hazara) that are in extreme opposition to the Taliban. Nader and Laha explain it 
partially by the fact that the U.S. supports Baluchi insurgency within Iran. The authors 
conclude that by undermining U.S. activities in Afghanistan, Iran attempts to demonstrate 
to the U.S. the consequences which will always follow, should the U.S. try to undertake 
any hostile act against Iran. One may say, that the paper is in the end about U.S. relations 
with Iran, that take place in Iran and Afghanistan. 
In 2012, there has been just one analysis of the Iranian foreign policy, inter alia, 
towards Afghanistan. The report represents the refined version of the paper published in 
2008 on the same subject (Kagan, Kagan and Pletka, 2008) but includes new data and 
observations on the matter (Kagan et al., 2012). This new report by the American 
Enterprise Institute for the Study of War also includes the case study on Egypt and has 
expanded the section on the economic sphere of Iranian influence in Afghanistan (in 
comparison to the 2008 report). The religious assistance by Iran, as well as support of the 
insurgency in Afghanistan (including Iran’s involvement in the espionage activities in the 
three bordering with Afghanistan provinces: Herat, Nimroz and Farah), are also more 
deeply explored. The new report focus is shifted from the labor migration to the situation 
with the illegal immigrants from Afghanistan coming and living in Iran. Last but not 
least, the earlier report had considerably more questions, than explanations. On contrary, 
the authors of the new report are coming to the concrete outcomes in understanding the 
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main characteristics of the Iranian foreign policy and influence, among other neighboring 
countries, in Afghanistan. The essence of the outcome is that Iranian foreign policy is 
unquestionably inconsistent. The authors come to this conclusion by describing Iran’s 
very contradictory moves in Afghanistan, ranging from fighting the Taliban, because Iran 
clearly sees them as a threat to its national security, to supporting Taliban, because the 
U.S. presence in Afghanistan is still perceived as a greater threat. 
Closer to the Afghan presidential elections (of 2014) a publication of the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies in 2013, demonstrates the concern of the U.S. 
government with Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan in light of the then planned ISAF 
forces withdrawal (Shelala II, Kasting and Cordesman, 2013). In the report, Robert M. 
Shelala II, Nori Kasting, and Anthony H. Cordesman (2013) describe Afghanistan’s 
(among other countries) impact for the strategic competition of Iran and the United States, 
inter alia, in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is chosen as one case study, where the interests of 
the two countries have been constantly clashing in recent years. The paper, before all, 
communicates the concern Americans have regarding Iran’s ties with the Taliban. In this 
regard, the authors discuss possible challenges that may arise after the presidential 
elections and withdrawal of the U.S. and allied ISAF forces in 2014, in particular in the 
economic and in social spheres (considering high rate of unemployment among Afghan 
youth). In making assumptions, the authors largely rely on the data of the World Bank 
and CIA reports. With regards to the analysis of Iran’s current relations with Afghanistan, 
the report insists that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan has made this country more 
strategically important to Iran than it has ever been. The authors briefly describe the ties 
of Iran with the Taliban and various insurgents in Afghanistan, inter alia ethnic minority 
Hazara as well as other ethnic groups, in particular in western Afghanistan. The report 
touches upon the water issues and trade, narcotics and border security as well as 
migration, though does so very superficially, without deeper analysis. The outcome 
statement of the research is that Iran is interested in having a strong central government in 
Afghanistan, with which it can cooperate in the economic sphere and with regards to the 
border issues. The report further makes recommendations on how the U.S. should 
perceive this information in it further relations with Iran, in light of Iran’s nuclear 
program. This work is information-rich, however, is very much US-centered and thus 
only superficially allows one to understand Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. 
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One of the first in-depth analytical papers on Iran’s foreign policy with regards to 
Afghanistan belongs to Bruce Koepke (2013). Of particular interest is his analysis of the 
pragmatic strategic approach that Iran pursues with regards to its neighbor. To come to 
this conclusion Koepke makes a three-decade-long excursion into relations of these two 
countries. He divides the analysis into three time frames (also covering near future): from 
the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran to the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001; 
from the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 to the withdrawal in 2014; and tries to 
forecast the post-2014 events in Afghanistan, including foreign engagement. With regards 
to the post-2014 scenarios, Koepke highlights the importance of the outcome of the 2014 
presidential elections in Afghanistan and Iran’s consequent post-transitory foreign policy 
towards its neighbor. Understanding the main elements of Iran’s Afghanistan strategy 
according to the author can have a very practical contribution towards dialogue between 
Afghanistan and the countries of its neighborhood which can foster cooperation on 
security issues.  
This is an excellent, thorough analysis that highlights the most important trends in 
Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan with a focus on its ideology, shaped by 
Khomeini and is founded on Islamic solidarity while at the same time very rational and 
pragmatic and thus multifaceted and sophisticated. The paper makes an effort to forecast 
the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan after the then planned withdrawal of the 
foreign troops in 2014 and under the newly elected president in Iran, Hassan Rouhani. 
Rouhani’s presidency is expected, according to the paper, to differ from his predecessor 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad under whom Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan was 
mostly concentrated more on undermining the activity of the foreign military there, rather 
than supporting stabilization or democratization (as it was under President Mohammad 
Khatami).
4
 The author of the paper comes to the conclusion that Iran will continue its 
influence in Afghanistan and in fact, will try to strengthen it in all spheres (political, 
cultural, economic and social) with the main purpose in mind to ensure its national 
interests (inter alia, national security) and its geopolitical position. Koepke expects Iran to 
strive for more cooperation with Afghanistan because such cooperation will allow Iran’s 
wider engagement in the political issues discussed internationally in its neighborhood. 
The main contribution of the paper is its recommendation to the U.S. that it includes all of 
                                                 
4
 See more on analysis of Hassan Rouhani views in the thorough study of Steven Ditto (2013) and on the 
foreign policy under Rouhani as presented by its Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (2014). 
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Afghanistan’s neighboring countries (and most importantly Iran) in the U.S. long-term 
strategy towards Afghanistan thus highlighting that the role of Iran in all discussions on 
Afghanistan is crucial and should not be neglected. Iran can and should be a partner in 
such discussions, according to Koepke, despite its measures against the US, because 
Iran’s policy remains quite realistic and pragmatic and its strategy remains the same 
during these many years: to avoid and prevent where possible, civil war in Afghanistan. 
The implications of Iran’s influence in Afghanistan for the reduction in the 
presence of the U.S. forces in this country are explored by Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, 
Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart and Leila Mahnad (2014). The focus of the 
report is rather the U.S. than Iran itself, as Iran’s Foreign policy is analyzed against the 
U.S. influence in the region. The article makes the assumption that Iran will enhance its 
influence after the U.S. drawdown in 2014. It explores implications of Iran’s greater 
presence in Afghanistan for Iran’s position in the nuclear dispute, foreseeing greater 
cooperation between Iran and the U.S. with Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s president. The 
report discusses Iran’s long-term interests in Afghanistan by exploring political and 
ideological, as well as the economic and cultural aspects of Iran’s influence. The new 
cooperation with India, Russia and Pakistan, which such influence opens for Iran, is also 
analyzed as significant for the United States. 
In the European Institute for Security Studies, Walter Posch defines Iran’s foreign 
policy with regards to Afghanistan by highlighting the three main goals Iran has: keeping 
good terms with Afghanistan, prevent any possibility of civil war and to prevent 
Afghanistan from serving as a bridgehead for any foreign aggression towards Iran (Posch, 
2014). These goals are seen as everlasting ones to ensure Iran’s presence in the affairs of 
its neighbor. This alert paper emphasizes the complicacy of the foreign policy Iran 
pursues in Afghanistan, whereby it acts both as a donor of multiple development projects 
in Afghanistan and at the same time undermines many economic efforts of Afghanistan to 
become independent that can have adverse effects on Iran’s own economy. Last, but not 
least, Posch does not foresee intensification of cooperation between Iran and the West, or 
at least that such cooperation can be no longer built on the mere existence of the global 
jihadist threats or internal instable situation in Afghanistan.  
The means taken by Iran to ensure the fulfillment of its continuing aims are 
explored by Sumitha Narayanan Kutty (2014). The analysis emphasizes that Iran has 
more in common with the U.S. than the later does with Pakistan (the U.S. partner in the 
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war led in Afghanistan). Kutty also explains why by exploring the continuing interests of 
Iran as compared to those of Pakistan. While Afghanistan – Iran relations are at the focus 
of the article, Kutty analyzes them against Iran’s goals (whereby the main remains to 
ensure a pro-Iranian democratic government in Kabul) and the means to pursue them, 
most importantly by the military and economic involvement, as well as in the ethno-
religious sector. Although the article begins with recollection of Iran’s involvement in 
supporting anti-Taliban operations led by the U.S. after the 9/11 and consequent Bonn 
Process that shaped new Afghan constitutional law, it also concludes that the situation 
became more complicated between the U.S. and Iran over the fissile materials, and the 
atmosphere of suspicion will assumedly remain, if not escalate under President Rouhani. 
The confrontation of Iran with U.S. and Israel may result in the shifts in its foreign policy 
in Afghanistan. Kutty plants a seed for speculation on the prospects of Iran-India 
cooperation in Afghanistan that should instigate new research directions. 
Iran’s status as the most important neighbor of Afghanistan is explored by Henner 
Fürtig in his article on the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan, alongside foreign 
policies of Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Fürtig, 2014). In his article, Fürtig demonstrates 
how Iran has been making efforts to ensure a strong central power in Kabul, contributing 
to stability in its neighboring Afghanistan after the ISAF withdrawal, as compared to the 
measures taken with regards to this country by Turkey and Saudi Arabia (countries 
regarded as pro-Western in their policies towards Afghanistan). This article explores 
relations between Afghanistan and Iran after the 1979 revolution by conducting a 
historical examination and addressing the changes this revolution has brought. It 
discusses the consequences of Iran’s support to the Afghan Shias. In this regard, it 
analyzes the new directions of the foreign policy of Iran demanding it to first fight against 
and later provide support to the Sunni Taliban fighters in Afghanistan (due to the 
changing international environment). The article explores the relations within the so-
called “Afghanistan-Iran-US triangle” which helps to understand the shifts in the foreign 
policy of Iran towards Afghanistan and the multifaceted nature of this policy. The article 
touches upon the competition for superiority between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as 
explains Turkey’s policy towards Afghanistan. The study concludes with the assessment 
of the positive and negative sides of the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan from the 
Iranian perspective, with an emphasis on the importance of having stable ran on the 
international arena, if one aims for the stability in Afghanistan. 
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One of the recent studies on Iran’s post-Taliban policy towards Afghanistan 
belongs to Kayhan Barzegar (2014). In his article Barzegar bases his argument on the fact 
that the foreign policy of Iran was historically evolving in the two directions ever since 
the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. On the one hand, Iran has been 
supporting stability and, thus, the central government, on the other hand, it has been 
preventing and undermining foreign military presence in Afghanistan. In the post - 2016 
phase, the article tries to draw perspective conclusions on Iran’s involvement in 
Afghanistan. It does assume that even under the pragmatic leadership of Hassan Rouhani, 
much will remain the same and the policy of Iran will be a balancing between its “rivalry” 
with the U.S. and Pakistan on the one hand and its “cooperation” with these countries on 
the other. Iran’s interests in Afghanistan are explored in light of the Iranian “Look East” 
grand strategy, which this country pursues by cultural, economic and political-security 
measures of involvement. As with authors before him, Barzegar once again emphasizes 
the stability incentives of Iran in Afghanistan, especially in the bordering provinces. The 
article re-states that Iran sees the U.S. presence in Afghanistan as a threat to its own 
security, though under pragmatic-centrist Rouhani as the president of Iran, the danger of 
an imminent clash between Iran and the U.S. will most likely be avoided. Barzegar 
further discusses possible ISAF post-withdrawal developments with regards to relations 
between Iran and the Taliban, Iran and Pakistan and Iran and the United States. The 
article draws quite realistic conclusions, that despite common incentives of Iran and the 
U.S. to contribute to the stability of Afghanistan, the differences in the national interests 
of these two countries do not likely allow for any relationship between the two rivals. 
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Mohammad Fazeli discuss the foreign policy of Iran 
with regards to Afghanistan “after the nuclear deal” and the prospects for constructive 
cooperation between these two countries (Tadjbakhsh and Fazeli, 2016). The policy paper 
they co-author is aimed at aiding policy-makers in enhancing the relationship between 
Iran and Afghanistan. The paper discusses the relations in light of the lifted sanctions 
against Iran and how the nuclear agreement may enable it to bring alterations in its 
affairs, both domestically and internationally. The authors analyze how the new 
pragmatic governance of the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, different from the 
previous ideological rhetoric, will allow for better cooperation with Afghanistan. The 
paper further discusses the prospects of economic cooperation and the necessity to find 
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solutions for water-sharing, enhancing cultural and educational exchange as well as re-
building cooperation with the world outside.  
The brief summary of the literature presented above provides one with an 
overview of the most prominent studies, relevant for the present analysis. The above 
excellent studies have already done a great deal to come closer to understanding what 
Iran’s foreign policy is in general and with regards to Afghanistan in particular. An 
important observation that one can make from the above studies is that most of the 
authors put a lot of emphasis on Iran-US-relations as an important factor shaping Iran’s 
FP towards Afghanistan. The present analysis takes this observation into account.  
It is evident that the nature of the Iranian domestic agenda and how that agenda 
affects Iran’s relations with Afghanistan remains insufficiently examined in the literature. 
The present dissertation aims to fill in the gaps of the previous studies by delving deeper 
into the nature of Iranian foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the border region 
between the two countries. I hope to achieve this objective by taking into account the 
first-hand information that I have accessed and collected from primary sources and 
analyzed in this study. 
1.3 Research Question 
The overarching central research question of this thesis is: “What is the nature of 
Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014?” This overall research 
question comes from the thorough preliminary research of the relevant literature on Iran-
Afghanistan relations from both before and after 2001. It allows one to assume that the 
foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan has been inspired by different motives in 
different periods of the relationship between these two countries. This study reveals these 
motives and thoroughly analyzes them in the subsequent chapters. It does so by looking 
to answer the following sub-questions:  
1. In what ways has the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan changed over 
the period of time due to the changing internal dynamics within Afghanistan 
and also due to the external regional and global dynamics? 
2. What is the formal power structure of Iran and how do the informal foreign 
policy institutions function? 
3. How is the foreign policy of Iran implemented in Afghanistan? 
Introduction and Research outline 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17 
4. What are the main foreign policy interests of Iran in Afghanistan? 
5. What constitutes Iran’s economic policy towards Afghanistan?  
1.4 Timeframe of the study 
The time frame of the present study begins from the U.S. Afghan intervention in 
2001, and the resumption of power by President Hamid Karzai under the Bonn 
Agreement on December 5, 2001. Therefore, it would include the period of the 
presidency of Hamid Karzai who served for 2 years as interim president from 2002-2004 
and then followed with an additional 10 years (two terms of 5 years each) until 2014. It 
ends with the withdrawal of most foreign forces and the shift of their security 
responsibility to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the 
government itself in the year 2014. The residual US/NATO foreign forces remained to 
“advise, train and assist missions, including counterterrorism and air support” for the 
national security forces of Afghanistan, as per the U.S. Naval Institute in their fight 
against the insurgents (which is claimed to be now a two-fronted, both Taliban as well as 
IS). The number has reduced down to approximately 8500, although there are 
speculations from the Pentagon that an additional 1500 troops might be deployed to 
strengthen the already present troops (Paton, 2017). 
A primary reason why this time period has been taken into account vis-à-vis the 
study is because, after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the decision-making of Iranian 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan had to be shaped in consideration of the foreign 
military intervention in Afghanistan. As already mentioned, the foreign policy of Iran 
towards Afghanistan has cut across different and at times conflicting fronts. For example, 
to limit the US-dominated western presence in Afghanistan, Iran both actively and 
passively assisted the Taliban even as there were numerous cases of violence against 
Hazaras (Shias) in Afghanistan committed by the Taliban which contradicts one of the 
main objectives of Iranian foreign policy in general (which is to consolidate and 
strengthen the Shia socio-political and socio-economic development in the region).  
The change in post-2001 Iran-Afghan policy was brought about for security, 
economic and national interests. However, it symbolizes a sort of change within 
continuity, and it was developed after periodic Tehran-Kabul-Dushanbe diplomatic and 
official meetings for mutual benefits. Ironically, for Iran to support the Taliban seeds a 
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level of ambiguity as far as the security dimension of the bilateral agreements is 
concerned. Therefore, the study aims to demonstrate how Iranian foreign policy has 
metamorphosed during the 2001-2014 period in its relations towards Afghanistan and 
how this dynamism has complicated the overall security and other aspects of the bilateral 
relationship. 
1.5 Relevance of the present study 
The present study has focused on the foreign policy of Iran with regards to 
Afghanistan as there has been neither deep enough research done in this regard by the 
Western and Afghan scholars, nor has there been focus made on the domestic sources of 
the foreign policy of this country. Thus, the present research will contribute to the 
academic discourse on Iran and Afghanistan and will serve as a guideline for 
policymakers in both countries and to various stakeholders (academic and non-academic) 
at the regional and global level. Subsequently, the present study will provide a relevant 
framework between the two countries in terms of socio-political and socio-economic 
interaction and also to some of the foreign state or non-state actors that have had an active 
role in the region over the period of time. In congruence with understanding the 
significance of the study, the following points will also be dealt with in order to reflect 
upon the anatomy of the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan as well as its 
operationalization and its overall relevance for other outside actors:  
 Where the line between the officially stated foreign policy of IRI and its de-
facto implementation in Afghanistan lies.  
 To shed a light on the management of Iran’s interests in the bordering region 
with Afghanistan on the following three realms: economic, political and 
security. 
 To define and explain the mechanism of policy implementation through the 
example of Iran’s social and development programs in Afghanistan.  
 To provide a better understanding of the pragmatic aims of Iranian dominant 
political actors as reflected in its foreign policy. 
 To comprehend the decision made by Iran in a high-level politics and derive 
from conclusions for understanding the behind-the-scene foreign policy 
implementation on the local level in Afghanistan. 
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 To make the prognosis with regards to the role of Iran in Afghanistan's affairs 
and Iran’s major foreign policy strategies by examining potential scenarios for 
Iran-Afghanistan relations after the withdrawal of the international troops in 
2014. 
 The research will serve as a supplementary aid to the German policy making 
institutes to help them to comprehend better the micro-level realities of the 
Iran-Afghanistan relations in Afghanistan's settings. The reason is that 
Germany is one of the main countries that has intervened both diplomatically 
and militarily in the region of Afghanistan besides the European Union, which 
happens to be the major non-state actor in the post-war reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, is again dominated by the German political and operational 
discourse across the globe especially in a place as volatile as Afghanistan.  
 The appendix provides some policy suggestions for Germany and the European 
Union which follow from the conclusions drawn in the present research. 
Due to a variety of reasons including the complexity and protracted nature of 
Afghan conflict and the lack of academic institutions and researchers, this is the first time 
that a work is being done to analyze Iran’s foreign policy in relation to Afghanistan. This 
research opens up an academic discourse and establishes a roadmap for future research 
for other young professionals and interested academicians. As mentioned before, the 
study provides a better understanding of relations between the two countries and gives an 
analytical overview of these relations. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The present dissertation is a qualitative case study on Iran-Afghanistan relations 
from 2001 to 2014. It encompasses a discussion of three components viz. historical 
reconstruction, content analysis, and semi-structured interviews. It is focused on 
understanding a phenomenon, rather than making predictions about the future. The study 
analyzes the nature of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. The 
historical reconstruction features a discussion on Iran-Afghanistan relations from 1979 to 
1989 and then from 2001 through 2014. Iran was always involved in such historical 
Afghan processes for being Afghanistan’s immediate neighbor. Therefore, besides the 
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interview method, the historical methodology will be followed in pursuit of the present 
study. 
Accordingly, the source material will be scientifically analyzed to draw inferences 
and identify specified characteristics of the content on the basis of objectivity (Holsti, 
1969, p.14). The objective is to present a balanced perception of Iran’s Afghan policy. 
The study will thus be based on the consultation of sources, both primary and secondary, 
such as official documents of Afghanistan and Iran (national laws, international treaties 
and agreements, official statements in the national languages: Dari, Pashto and Farsi as 
well as in English), administrative files, personal diaries of the Afghan and Iranian 
officials and academicians, and proceedings of political discourses, economic initiatives, 
and cultural cooperation ventures, newspapers (Afghan and Iranian newspapers available 
online and in the library archives in Kabul and Herat, Tehran and Mashhad), historical 
accounts collected from the interview partners in Afghanistan and in Iran relevant for the 
research question of the present study. While conducting this study I have made two field 
trips to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran and Mashhad) and seven field trips to 
Afghanistan (Kabul, Herat Farah and Nimroz). During the three field trips, travelling to 
Farah and Nimroz was under high risk, therefore additional field trips at a later stage to 
these provinces were necessary to conduct missing and follow-up interviews. Semi-
structured interviews and participant observation methods were followed for data-
collection during the three field trips to Herat province. By participant observation 
method I imply here the personal observations I made during the field trips to the border 
provinces of Afghanistan with Iran. Namely, I spent more than a week at the border, 
Islam Qala Border point, during each field trip, where I observed the goods flow across 
the border, the traders and border police behavior and had conversations with people, 
traders and drivers there in order to understand the peculiarities of everyday relations 
between the two countries. The interview partners consisted of both Afghan and Iranian 
nationals, a wide range of diverse people from different sectors of society, among whom 
were government officials, big traders and small businessmen, shopkeepers in the 
Western provinces of Afghanistan, long-distance truck drivers on the Iran-Afghan border, 
university professors and academicians, representatives of civil society (NGO employees, 
journalists), local elders and religious figures, former Mujahideen commanders and 
former governmental employees. While accessing people, I have used various methods: 
both my personal acquaintances, as well as the snowball technique, which is when people 
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I interviewed recommended to me another person with whom to communicate. I have 
thus managed to build a network of relevant partners who possess knowledge on the 
subject of the present study. Due to the sensitivity of the context in Afghanistan and 
ongoing conflict, most of the interview partners agreed to participate in the interviews, 
provided that their names were anonymized. The list of the interviews used in the present 
study with the details of interview partners, anonymized in the present work, is provided 
in the Annex for the internal purposes only and is not to be published. Being an Afghan 
native and contemporary to all that is happening in and across Afghanistan, I am well 
acquainted with the country’s history, languages, culture, etc., and could, therefore, 
organize interviews with the respondents in native language Dari, Pashto and Farsi, the 
most productive means of constructing data on a certain subject.  
The primary data was collected during the field research in Afghanistan (Kabul 
and the western part of Afghanistan) and Iran (Tehran and Iran’s bordering region with 
Afghanistan) and includes the above-mentioned interviews as well as documentary data. 
1.7 Theoretical Framework of the present study 
The present study uses the theory of realism in international relations because its 
inherent rationalism provides a strong base for interpreting Iran’s multilateral (political, 
economic, social, security) foreign policy towards Afghanistan (Ehteshami, 2002, p.284). 
The word "realism," in the context of international relations is associated with a number 
of key concepts: "power politics," "balance of power," "anarchy", "national interest", 
“security dilemma”. These concepts are rich in content; hence, useful in understanding 
the present study within the conceptual framework of realism (Ashley, 1981, p.204). 
Geoffrey Stern describes realism as “a tradition which prefers ‘inertia to 
innovation, stability to change and experience to experimentation’, accentuating [thereby] 
the phenomenon of political metamorphosis and the capacity of states to adapt as per the 
political dynamics taking place across the global political arena” (Stern, 1995, p.15). 
Realists see power as the "currency" of the international politics. Great powers, 
the main actors in the realist's view, are concerned with the issue of the amount of power 
they possess with regards to each other. Meanwhile ensuring that balance of power cannot 
be easily changed by the counterpart state, so as to ensure that the later has more 
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resources on its side. For the realists, international politics is synonymous with power 
politics (Mearsheimer, 2013, p.78).  
The theoretical part of the present study begins with a question as to what 
constitutes the notion of foreign policy and what are its key determinants in terms of 
national interests, national security, power politics etc. This will be followed by a 
discussion on the dynamics of the classical concept of realism by Morgenthau and the 
contemporary concept of neo-realism by Waltz. Further, it will also determine which one, 
classical or modern, concepts aptly fits in the present study and why. 
The theory of realism facilitates understanding of Iran’s behavior in the 
international system. This exogenous dimension is crucial for understanding the logic 
behind Iran’s foreign policy. The study also seeks to study Iran’s internal political 
structure, since to the realists, the logic behind establishing the foreign policy is dual in 
nature, internal and external state policies are intertwined. In this case, therefore, the 
focus of study will be on Iran’s holistic political structure including both internal as well 
as external factors.  
Realism in international relations is all about power politics in a state of 
international anarchy, and “the normative core of realism is national security and state 
survival; all these values drive the realist doctrine and realist foreign policy” (Jackson and 
Sorenson, 2013, p.66). Even when nation-states did not exist, political philosophers like 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and other classical realists like, Carr, Morgenthau, and 
Kennan believed that the power possession and its use are the central political activity of 
states (Jackson and Sorenson, 2013 p.66). Therefore, in realism, states’ security and 
national interests are always at the forefront of the international relations (Mearsheimer, 
2013, p.73). The psychological perspective of realism, to a certain extent, can be 
associated with the correlation existing in the maxim of "survival of the fittest", where the 
states’ strive for mutual wellbeing within their competitive relationship, thus squeezing 
the scope of their self-centric nature. According to Hans Joachim Morgenthau, one of the 
leading authors of Realism, "politics is a struggle for power over men and whatever its 
ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, 
maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action" 
(Morgenthau, 1965, p.195). 
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Thus, the core concepts which all realists agree upon are: (a) the international 
system is anarchic (Morgenthau, 1965), (b) states are the most prominent actors in the 
international system (Mearsheimer, 2013), and (c) states act in their own interest in 
pursuit of either power or security (Morgenthau, 1985, p.10). To summarize, the main 
concepts found in realist theory are anarchy, the balance of power, and national interests. 
Realists were accused of being incapable of explaining the resumption of 
harmonious relations between the USSR and the USA at the end of the Cold War era. 
Nevertheless, in my view, Realism can best explain the complex socio-political and 
socio-economical pragmatic policies of the states in the Middle East. Also, recent 
deterioration of the relations between Russia and Western states as well as the 
competition between China and the USA show that Realism might not be as outdated as a 
number of authors have thought since in the 1990s. 
As mentioned before, Iran’s Afghan foreign policy is the core of the present study. 
Based on a Realist understanding of foreign policy, the study will investigate the 
relationship between Iran’s national and the international politics (here, in this case, 
international in relation to Iran's interaction with Afghanistan) - between its policy 
formulation and policy execution. (Mearsheimer, 2007, p.71-88) 
With the help of the chosen theory, the political, security and economic aspects of 
the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan will be the center of attention, more 
specifically during the period of 2001-2014.The realist paradigm defines a body of 
theories that share a hand-full of core beliefs, more specifically based on the analogy that 
nation-states are the principal actors in world politics (Groupism), and no higher authority 
sits above them. This structure of world politics leads to an absence of hierarchy in the 
state system, commonly called anarchy, which does not mean chaos and balance, per se, 
but rather that states are sovereign political entities representing a significant recognition 
within the ambit of the global polity. Furthermore, strong power dominates state thinking 
as the primary national interest, and the states compete for the same (power- centrism) 
among themselves (Mearsheimer, pp.58-59). In a way, it suggests that "states are the 
primary actors or the centers of the power" in world affairs and it is the language of 
power politics that somehow helps to understand the state behavior in the midst of such 
interactions (Elias and Sutch, 2007, p.43). 
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Precisely, realism in international relations is all about power politics operational 
in a state of international anarchy. The national security and state survival that reflect a 
parallel manifestation of the power politics are the fundamental elements of realism in 
international relations (Morgenthau, 1978, p.9). 
1.7.1 General Context of Realism 
A. Anarchy in the international system: 
Anarchy in the international system does not virtually mean lawlessness or global 
disorder but more specifically an absence of a vertical global hierarchy, which according 
to Morgenthau, is because of a powerful centralized political authority over otherwise 
warring nation-states in a vulnerable geopolitical scenario. More so, this is because nation 
states find themselves in an incessant security dilemma (Kissane 2011, p.181). Security 
dilemma is a situational configuration in international relations under the garb of anarchy 
which promulgates actions by states aimed at strengthening their security by various 
means, like increasing their military strength, upgrading military strength and making 
alliances both at regional as well as international levels. Subsequently, other states also 
initiate a similar response to boost their security, thus leading to a state of tensions with a 
potential to pose a threat of a conflict even if it is unwanted. For example, North Korea 
and U.S. present political/security developments as the best characteristic of security 
dilemma which has led the two countries and their respective alliances on the verge of a 
large-scale conflict, a series of war of words has already begun. Therefore, “security 
dilemma theory and the broader spiral model constitute a powerful theory of war and 
peace via interaction. They capture general dynamics leading to the outbreak of war and 
the maintenance of peace (that is, by reversing or alleviating the security dilemma). The 
concept’s influence thus extends well beyond theory” (Tang, 2009) and hence, is a 
prominent driver for initiating a war or maintaining peace depending upon the direction in 
which the measures are taken.  
The classical realists view state behavior at two levels, one domestic and another 
international. In the former, the states’ anyhow manage security dilemma through 
national laws and regulations, whereas it is difficult for them, in the latter case, since 
actors are many and the states’ jurisdiction is limited. Mearsheimer characterizes the 
international system as being “self-helped” in the sense that there is no higher actor in it 
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to which a state may appeal in the case of need, such as an aggression from an outside 
powerful state. Even though states enter into multilateral agreements in order to protect 
their interest, no state, however, will prioritize the interest of another over its own. Even 
great powers will try to gain more power which will enable their dominance 
(Mearsheimer, 2013, p.72). Even international organizations like United Nations to some 
extent have a limited role to play when it comes to interaction between two states 
especially in matters related to their economic or security issues, more specifically those 
states which are members of the United Nations. The reasons could be many but the 
prime reason is that the concept of neutrality is somehow reflected by the United Nations 
through its intervention which is more of a tactical display than a result oriented 
interposition. For example, Israel has time and again been involved in gross human rights 
violations in Palestine in contravention of the International law, but due to its very strong 
alliance with the US, it gets carried away. The general concept of international anarchy 
can be related to a generalized perception that international system continues to be a 
volatile entity, and there is every possibility of a cataclysmic development at any point of 
time obviously for the clash of interests between/among nation-states (Goldstein and 
Pevehouse, 2006, p74). These point to an unprecedented pessimism in the global political 
system. To conclude, all the realists, both classical and the contemporary, argue that the 
international system is exposed to constant threat and conflict for the absence of a central 
authority over the nation states. Consequently, states seek to ensure their own fate and 
survival at the expense of others states which further complicates the whole network of 
international relations.  
B. States are the most important players: 
The states’ emergence gained significance after the Treaty of Westphalia 1648. 
Since then, the states consider themselves as the ultimate political institutions on the 
global forefront. All the international non-state actors, per se, regional and international 
organizations, formulate and operate policies within states’ interests, their sovereignty 
and integrity. Their thought has not changed despite the change in times. Instead, with 
every passing day, states try to be more strong and dominant (Vaughan, 2011).  
Hans Morgenthau’s approach shows as to how for the vested interests of the 
nation states shape their interaction with regional or global actors. The states are least 
bothered about morals and ethics in political, economic or societal structures. Therefore, 
“the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of 
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international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau, 
1978, p.5).  
C. Power Politics: 
Power sharing, the balance of power and power dominance have gained 
significance in global politics, primarily for the realist school of thought, both traditional 
and non-traditional). Naturally, the state has no limits for power urge: the more power a 
state gets, the more it wants, “as a key concept of interest defined as power” 
(Morgenthau, 1978, pp.4-15) pointing thereby to an "insatiable power appetite" (Toledo, 
2005). Realists establish a close link between power and military potential of states and 
its use against other states. This state-centric nature of realism inevitably pushes the states 
towards self-help and survival purportedly for their own safety (Riley, 2008). 
Morgenthau, in a way, gives a lot of weight to the concept of national interest in terms of 
power (Morgenthau, 1993, p.5). 
Morgenthau defines power as “anything that establishes and maintains the power 
of man over man" (Morgenthau, 1993, p.11). In political or the security/military terms he 
explains power as either the threat of use of force or the actual use of force by the states’ 
in the war. He also justifies the war and use of force unmindful of the international moral 
and legal obligation (Morgenthau, 1993, pp.4-32).  
Hans Morgenthau believes that power politics is in the very human nature since 
one individual tries to overtake another by whatever means possible, foul or fair. 
Precisely, the same kind of human urge is replicated in the state behavior for ‘power and 
security-centrism’. This presupposes that it is the desire for power more than anything 
else that constitutes the evil in human action (Morgenthau, 1946, p.194). 
Despite being a contemporary realist, Waltz upheld some basic assumptions of 
classical realists regarding human and state nature for power. However, he denounced 
‘self-help’ or ‘self-sustenance’ variables of classical realism, although these constitute a 
roadmap for the states’ adjustment in the regional and global framework (Erik, 2010, 
p.80). Both global politics and power politics are synonymous considering that power is 
the global currency. All the great powers, therefore, are in the constant race for building 
an army, arms and other military soft- and hardware to outweigh each other or to compete 
with other great economic and military powers (Wight, 1946, p.50). The power game has 
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two fundamental targets: to increase own power and reduce the power of others 
simultaneously to control the balance of power in their own favor. 
Morgenthau perceived national power in its national interests, national geography, 
natural resources, military capability, industrial power, national morale, the quality of 
government and diplomacy. However, he considers “quality of diplomacy” quite 
important because it "combines those different factors [aforesaid indicators] into an 
integrated whole, gives them direction and weight and awakens their slumbering 
potentialities by giving them the breath of actual power" (Morgenthau, 1985, p.14).  
Morgenthau in his book, Politics Among Nations, the Struggle for Power and 
Peace 1948, "categorizes power as means to the nation's ends, other than nation's ends for 
power". Any deviation from it is due to affect the states’ status quo and policy 
formulation and exposition. Though he advocates imperialism as an expression of ‘state-
centrism’, he does not undermine the human tendency for peace, moral obligation and 
humanistic principles. He admits that "there exists necessity of a certain relativism in the 
relation between moral principles and foreign policy; one cannot overlook this if one 
wants to do justice to the principles of morality in international politics” (Morgenthau, 
1979, p.4). 
D. Foreign Policy and Realism: 
The Foreign policy reflects the mode of a state interaction with other states or non-
state actors for the national interest pursuits. The national interests are diverse ranging 
from political, social, and economic to cultural horizons. These interests have changed 
over the years due to changes in the global setting. The new phenomenon of globalization 
and armed insurgency periodically impacted on the national interests as well as on their 
foreign policy formulation and execution. The foreign policy involves a comprehensive 
mainstream and peripheral vision. It has thus both internal and external dynamics. 
National interests and foreign policy are co-related processes in a global system.  
Foreign policy during the 21st century is characteristic of aggressive 
exhibitionism. Traditional and non-traditional security threats radiating especially from 
the rise of fundamentalism or extremism pose serious threats to the national 
security/interests. Classical realism explains the security compulsions binding the states 
in a common security mechanism through motivation and persuasion and provides the 
guidelines for conducting the states’ with unruly behavior, although neo-realists advocate 
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the former rather than the latter dimension (Rose, 1998, p.145). By and large, the national 
interests can guide foreign policy on three accounts:  
• National interest can pre-empt the participatory approach involving the local 
masses in the foreign policy formulation decisions of their concerned state. 
• National interest can provide a roadmap for the election or selection of a 
genuine national leadership; and  
• National interest can directly serve as a tool for the formulation, execution, and 
analysis of foreign policy.  
Hans J. Morgenthau prescribes two distinct levels of national interest, the vital and 
the secondary (Morgenthau 1962, p.191). The former concerns some of the general 
interests of a state, per se, its security, institutions, protection of freedoms and values. 
"Vital interests also negate compromise and represent issues over which the state is 
willing to wage war." (Liotta, 2000) On the other hand, secondary interests are softer in 
nature and revolve around the national diplomacy paradigms (Liotta, 2000). Both the 
levels of interest are significant at their own places depending upon the kind of situation 
in which a state actually remains at a particular period of time.  
Gideon Rose (1998) in his article, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign 
Policy" discusses four major theories of foreign policy. All of them have been classified 
on the basis of the internal and external factors responsible for the shaping of the foreign 
policy. Of these, only the first theory, Innenpolitik (Domestic politics) is crucial because 
it directly influences the foreign policy dynamics of a state. The remaining three theories 
focus upon the international system and its impact on the foreign policy of the states. 
1.8 Iran-Afghan Relations within international Relations Paradigms 
The Iran-Afghanistan foreign policy is based on the reciprocity of “giving and 
taking” relationship. However, it is ensured that mutual interests are safe within their 
respective national and international paradigms. The set analogy that "I scratch your back 
and you scratch mine" best illustrates the nature and scope of this and international 
relations in this modern era. 
The conflicts in the world today once again confirm the realists’ view that 
countries shape regional or global politics for their own interests rather than the interests 
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of others, and do not feel bound by any ethical or moral obligation, even though they may 
have mutual agreements simultaneously. The national interest or national power 
expressed especially in the states' “quality of diplomacy" reigns supreme to them, since it 
"combines those different factors into an integrated whole, gives them direction and 
weight and awakens their slumbering potentialities by giving them the breath of actual 
power" (Morgenthau, 1985, p.14).  
The UN failure to restore global order validates the classical realist thought that 
the states (presently China, USA, Russia and other great powers), “are the primary actors 
or the centers of the power" in world affairs and that the states (Iran in the present case), 
adopt themselves as per the changing global politics. No wonder it does not think 
necessary to balance the gap between 'saying and doing', which approach reaffirms that 
language of power politics is a key to comprehend the state behavior (Iran's conduct) in 
the international relations (Elias and Sutch, 2007, p.43). Iran's Afghan foreign policy 
precisely exhibits the same. In a way, Iran’s approach approximates to Morgenthau’s vital 
determinants of foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1962, p.191). That Iran’s relations with 
Afghanistan involve security and other vital considerations and that compromise and 
negotiate with other secondary measures that are essential for Iran's vital foreign policy 
objective. Both the levels of foreign policy interest intertwined and vigorously pursued as 
regards its partner Afghanistan.  
Iran’s Afghan foreign policy replicates classical realism proposed by Morgenthau 
and is multi-factorial in nature and limited in the scope of ‘state-centrism’. The 
relationship between Iran and Afghanistan sustains on the basis of an anarchic 
manifestation of the global politics, here in this case, regional in nature, since Afghanistan 
seems to be an open and semi-porous territory for various close-by and far away 
international actors (India being the recent “to be addition” in this race). The dense 
neighborhood intervention in Afghanistan including Iran is justified to a large extent since 
Afghanistan has had a historical lineage to affect the political climate of its neighborhood 
and this lineage seems to be ever sustainable even in present times. The scope of the 
relationship between Iran and Afghanistan is predominantly confined between the two 
countries (mostly in case of Iran if not completely for Afghanistan) even if outside actors, 
both state as well as non-state, have stakes in the emerging political dynamics of the 
region. United Nations being a major non-state actor also persuades a limited scope for 
intervention when it comes to formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of 
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Iran towards Afghanistan, even though the same cannot be said about the reciprocity of 
reaction by the Afghanistan government wherein the scope of foreign actors especially 
the UN and the U.S. is inevitable. Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan seems to be 
dominated by economic factors that are somehow favorable for both and wherein the 
scope of outside actors is very minimal. It is the security dimension of the political 
interaction between the two countries that has attracted regional as well as international 
actors. Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan is governed by the realist thought of 
high-levels of vital and secondary dimensions of the foreign policy. The dimensions 
range from traditional security threats from other states to the non-traditional security 
threats from the IS and Al-Qaeda like violent religious organizations. Iran-Afghan 
security cooperation is covered under the vital dimension of the foreign policy. Even if 
Iran opposes the US-Afghanistan security ties up for its chronic enmity with the US, it 
nonetheless sustains security cooperation with Afghanistan. Iran-Afghanistan economic 
cooperation under the "bilateral strategic cooperation agreement" also falls within the 
same realist purview. Their mutual trade expansion and transport networking 
diversification constitute their vital foreign policy initiative. Pertinently, Afghanistan 
happens to be the transit route for Iran’s Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project and 
Iran’s connect with China under China’s “One Belt One Road" overland and over-sea 
trade and transport project Central Asia, Russia and Europe (Khalil, 2017). 
Iran’s Afghan foreign policy describes the changing paradigm of international 
relations. It developed on the eve of the famous Iranian Revolution of 1979; both 
countries were then caught up in inextricable challenges. Iran was busy in nation building 
and post-revolution recovery and reconstruction. Afghanistan was fighting the Soviet 
occupation through an armed struggle, as has been the case for Afghans in wars with the 
foreign occupational forces in the past. It makes the Afghan history kaleidoscopic in 
nature and scope.  
The Iran-Afghanistan relations were thus partly the product of the change of the 
role of international actors (e.g. US) vis-a-vis Afghan affairs. Overtly or covertly, Iran 
then supported the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets. Similarly, it supported the 
Taliban against the U.S. since 2001. Clearly, Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan was 
governed by its own multidimensional foreign policy as is normal in the realism-centric 
state structure. However, such a policy experienced transformation from time to time. 
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Iran’s Afghan foreign policy reflects its changing response to the changing 
Afghan government, its institutions and others structures over time. One major driver of 
this policy is anti-US rhetoric. Iran’s leaders are apparently motivated, at least to some 
extent, by the perception of threat to their regime and their national interests posed by the 
United States and its allies. Iran’s paramount decision maker and one of the main 
components of formulating the foreign policy, supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Khomenei (and erstwhile Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini), has repeatedly stated 
that the United States has never accepted the Islamic revolution and seeks to overturn it 
through support for domestic opposition to the regime, imposition of economic sanctions, 
and support for Iran’s regional adversaries. The following two points insinuated by the 
Grand Ayatollah vis-à-vis their political discourse towards the U.S. unequivocally 
confirm the threat posed by the U.S. (as claimed by Rahbar
5
): 
a)  The Supreme Leader frequently warns against Western “cultural influence”—
social behavior that he asserts does not comport with Iran’s societal and Islamic 
values.  
b) Iran’s leaders assert that the U.S. maintenance of a large military presence in 
the Persian Gulf region and in other countries around Iran reflects its intent to 
intimidate Iran or attack it if Iran pursues policies the United States finds 
inimical (Katzman, 2017).  
Another major driver is the Islamic ideology since both countries confess Islam as 
the state religion. Yet another is a sectarian factor, on which account Iran supports its 
fellow ethnic Shia Hazaras in Iran’s immediate Afghan neighborhood of Herat and 
elsewhere. The community suffered ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Taliban, which 
Iran always resented and protested at the international forums. The Shia Hazaras’ 
vulnerability has no ending till date. It is for this sectarian factor that the Iran-Arab world 
is sharply divided in the Middle East and it is this very factor that drives Iran to befriend 
Afghanistan and seek the security of Shia Hazaras community and their due 
representation in the country’s legal, executive, financial, political and other 
governmental institutions. It is again for this reason that Iran opposes the Presidential 
form of Government in Afghanistan and supports a Parliamentarian set up so that the Shia 
Hazaras find a legitimate platform for expression and security against the Sunni-centric 
                                                 
5
 Rahbar – translated from Farsi into English as “Leader”, used in Iranian academic literature to refer to the 
Supreme Leader of Iran. 
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fanatic insurgents. Even Iran backs them to find a reasonable representation in the State 
cabinet and indeed in the entire politico-economic format of the country. 
1.9 Thesis Structure 
This study intensively as well as extensively demonstrates how Iran has made a 
significant impact on the political, security and economic stability of Afghanistan and 
also what have been the issues that have arisen concerning the national interests of both 
state actors alongside and what has been the reaction of the two, by analyzing the foreign 
policy of Iran towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. I have explained my arguments on 
the basis of information contained in my eight-chapter format. Chapter one contains the 
introduction of the research problem, its theoretical foundation and methodology used for 
its pursuit as well as the literature review. Chapter two situates Iran-Afghanistan relations 
in a historical perspective since the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, including a time 
frame prior to the subscribed time frame of the study (which begins from 2001), because 
the historical development in terms of their relationship is significant to the analysis of 
the various dimensions especially at a time when the global configuration was changing 
dramatically (Iranian revolution of 1979 and 1991 Soviet breakdown). Chapter three 
focuses on formal and informal Iranian political institutions, including foreign policy 
making institutions. The intention is to link Iran’s domestic policy with its foreign policy 
formulation vis-à-vis Afghanistan in this particular case. This chapter is based on the 
qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. The materials used in this chapter 
are mostly relying on the analysis of the Iranian Constitution to describe the political 
structure of Iran. Various sources such as books, journal articles and governmental and 
non-governmental reports and documents have been used as primary tools for the analysis 
of the formal and informal power structure of IRI in practice. This chapter also analyzes 
the power and role of the Iranian Supreme Leader and the institutions under his direct 
supervision, per se, executive, legislative and judiciary. However, to comprehend Iranian 
political institutions, it is necessary to understand its post-1979 constitution as well as the 
ideology of the revolutionary leader of Iran. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
the de facto shaping of the foreign policy. Chapter four is an Iran’s foreign policy review, 
with a focus on the underlying goals and objectives (2001-2014), and their relevance to 
Afghanistan as a state and local non-state actors, such as political parties, civil society, 
and the Taliban. It shows how Iran achieved these goals and objectives through various, 
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sometimes contradictory, policies: by building ties with political parties, state officials, 
and individuals within Afghanistan and promoting and protecting the rights of Shia ethnic 
groups through the medium of ethno-sectarian ideology, as well as by rendering Iranian 
assistance to Taliban and finally recognizing the Taliban as a key non-state actor not only 
in the conflict in Afghanistan but also as a political entity in the region by allowing the 
Taliban to open an office in Zahedan (eastern Iran) in 2012. The analysis is conducted in 
light of the four major visions of Iranian government I single out to discuss Iran’s foreign 
policy towards Afghanistan. Chapter five examines Iran’s foreign policy interests 
(security, economic and political) in Afghanistan, existing Iran-Afghanistan geopolitical 
setting and its influence on Iran’s political, security, strategic and sectarian interests in 
Afghanistan. More important, it unfolds the Iran-Taliban links building upon what 
already has been focused upon vis-à-vis Iran-Taliban relationship more exclusively and 
even more comprehensively. Chapter six is a detailed analysis of the Iranian institutions 
that implement its foreign policy in practical policy pursued with regards to Afghanistan. 
Chapter seven is devoted to a discussion on Iran’s economic policy, its strategies and 
given financial support to Afghanistan for building trade, railway roadways and other 
economic projects. This policy has both short- and long-term objectives to reach the 
regional market in Central and South Asia via Afghanistan as a transit zone. Finally, in 
Chapter eight I draw the conclusion and discuss the findings which will be based on the 
comprehensive observation of the different dimensions of the relationship between the 
two countries in terms of the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan. I look back at 
the theory of realism in light of all the dynamic developments that have taken place over 
the period of stipulated time frame and make suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2. Iran-Afghanistan Relations: A Historical Overview 
 
Iran-Afghanistan relations date back to the Achaemenid rule (the first Persian 
Empire) in 550–330 BCE. Its famous King, Cyrus the Great, occupied and ruled over the 
territory of today’s Afghanistan through his Governors, and thus laid the foundation of 
the Iran-Afghanistan relations during the period BCE. The Persian Afghan rule sustained 
under the Parthians (150 BCE-633 CE) and the Sassanids (3rd Century CE). In fact, the 
Sassanid Empire was the last Iranian rule over Afghanistan before the advent of Islam. 
Subsequently, Afghanistan fell into the hands of different other dynasties, the Khanate of 
Bukhara, Mughals from Kabulistan and the Safavids from Iran in the 16
th
 century.  
The Safavid King, Shah Ismail I (1501-1524) occupied eastern Afghanistan in the 
wake of territorial expansion. However, his rule diminished in the 17
th
 century as a result 
of his anti-Sunni policy and the repression that followed for conversion of the Afghan 
Sunnis into the Shia creed. The sequential reaction led to the decline of Iranian rule in 
Kandahar and the independence of southern Afghanistan under the leadership of Mirwais 
Hotak, a distinguished Sunni Ghilzai Pashtun tribal chief. In retaliation, his 
son Mahmud conquered Persia but retained it for only a brief period in 1722 and because 
Iran was then confronted with civil strife and the foreign threat from the Ottomans and 
the Russians (Amy, 2003). However, the Iranian King Nadir Shah retook Afghanistan in 
1736 and retained it till 1747 when Ahmad Shah Durrani defeated him and established an 
independent Afghan empire by uniting all Afghan tribes under one political flagship. 
Nonetheless, Iran’s meddling in Afghan affairs did not end. Iran made several invasions 
in Afghanistan, especially in the Herat province, in the 19th century. (Clements 2003, 
p.8).  
This is the extended past and is meant here as background to the description of the 
historical developments more relevant for the present study of Iran-Afghanistan relations. 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the historical events in the modern history of 
the Iran-Afghanistan and show how they shape the relations between these two countries. 
Such historical excursion is necessary, as it will help to prepare the reader to understand 
the analysis performed in subsequent chapters. The below historical overview covers 
several important periods and aspects: after the independence of Afghanistan from the 
British Empire in 1919 (section 2.1); the period starting with the Soviet occupation of 
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Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 (section 2.2); the next period 
starting with the pull-out of Soviet troops in 1989 and covers the beginning of the civil 
war in 1991 (section 2.3); it leads to the post-2001 period, in which the involvement of 
Iran and other regional actors is briefly described (section 2.4); in light of the events after 
2001, the next section discusses the shift in Iran’s foreign policy (section 2.5); it further 
discusses the cultural aspect of Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan (section 2.6); and the 
summary (section 2.7). 
2.1 Independence of Afghanistan from the British Empire in 1919 
Although Iran-Afghanistan relations were almost dormant during the 20th century 
Anglo-Russian imperial wars, some relations did exist. King Amanullah Khan declared 
independence from the British Empire in August 1919. He assumed power through war 
while the Iranian King, Reza Shah (Iran’s ousted King after the Islamic revolution), 
assumed power with British support in 1920. Both were focused on the economic 
development of their respective countries and believed in peace and cooperation with 
each other (Mozhda, 2010). Their mutual relations were declared especially after the 
three Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1839-1842; 1878-1880 and 1919 respectively. 
 For the love or hate of the growing British power, the two countries under King 
Amanullah Khan and Iranian King Ahmad Shah of the Qajar dynasty (1908-1925) 
thought to sort out border, water, and political issues. As a confidence-building measure, 
they established diplomatic relations between Tehran and Kabul in 1920 (Amanat, 2013, 
pp.2-3), and the first Afghan Ambassador to Tehran, Abdul Aziz Khan, was appointed. 
This was followed by a Friendship Treaty (accessed in Dari language in the Archive of 
the MoFA of Afghanistan 2016) between them in 1921 with following terms stipulated in 
the agreement:  
 To start a friendly dialogue and establish diplomatic and political relations; 
 To establish an Afghan Council in Mashhad city of Iran; and 
 To develop trade relations between Kabul and Tehran.  
However, the relations were strained due to the countries’ making of alliances and 
counter-rallies with Turkey, Russia, and Britain. Between 1927-1928 King Amanullah 
Khan visited several European countries in order to strengthen diplomatic relations with 
these countries, followed by visiting Turkey and Iran. During this detour, he called for the 
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signing of a treaty between the Soviet Union, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. This 
proposal was welcomed neither by Turkey nor by Iran and has aggravated the 
Afghanistan-Iran relations. On return to Afghanistan, King Amanullah Khan gave such 
statements before Loya Jirga (Grand Afghan Assembly) as infuriated Iran to the extent 
that it called back its Ambassador from Kabul (Haqiqi, 1386). These statements were not 
only anti-Iran but also pro-Baloch separatist movement launched by Dust Mohammad 
Khan Baloch in Iran-controlled Afghan area. Russia unsuccessfully tried to intervene and 
restore Iran-Afghanistan relations (Ḥaqiqi, 1386, p.109). During an interview at Balkh 
University, a Professor of Balkh University commented on these changing Iran-Afghan 
relations by saying that actually,  
“Afghan King Amanullah Khan feared that Iran may, with the British support, re-
attempt taking Herat from Afghanistan, though Russia announced that it would 
fully stand by King Amanullah in that event. Obviously, Amanullah Khan visited 
Turkey to garner Turkish support against the anticipated Iranian threat on its 
western borders. Further, since Iran was drawing close to Britain, Afghanistan 
wanted to be close to both Russia and Turkey for the security of its national 
interests” (N. M., personal interview, 17 March 2015). 
Indeed, the fear of Afghan King was substantiated. Thus, when King Amanullah 
has started his reforms after returning from its European detour, which was met by the 
popular rebellion in Afghanistan, the claims on Herat were once again expressed by Iran. 
Iran has offered its military support to the Afghan King to suppress the rebels, asking for 
Herat to be returned to Iran, in exchange (Rahmani and Hoseini, 1391, p.236).  
King Amanullah Khan was dethroned by Nadir Shah Khan, who later was 
succeeded by his son Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1933 (Mozhda, 2010). During Zahir 
Shah’s regime, Kabul-Tehran diplomatic and political relations resumed. In the process, 
Nadir Shah recognized all the prior treaties and agreements with Afghanistan by his 
former King Amanullah Khan. Their relations, however, were damaged in 1933 on 
account of border and water issues.  
Further progress in their bilateral relations was achieved through a four-power 
arbitration agreement between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan in 1937 (Sadabad 
Pact) in order to resolve border issues and ensure non-interference in one another’s 
internal affairs (Zürcher, 2004, p.202). 
The settlement of the border and water issues between Tehran and Kabul was 
possible because of the recommendations of an international commission. Accordingly, in 
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1936, the Commission Chairman, General Fakhruddin Altay, demarcated up to 234 km. 
borderline (Altay Borderline) between Iran and Afghanistan. Their border dispute in 
Musa Abad district also ended in 1937 with the Sadabad Pact signed by the Afghan 
Foreign Minister Faize Mohammad Khan and Iranian Ambassador Mirza Mohammad 
Taqi Khan Esfandiari. In view of the improved relations, the first Tehran and Kabul 
postal service were commissioned in 1938 (MoFA archive, Kabul, Afghanistan).  
Nonetheless, while border issues were settled by the Altay Commission, water 
issues existed particularly because of Iran’s water scarcity due to climatic and other 
changes. The scarcity was of such intensity that Iran vainly approached U.S. Security 
Council for its settlement at the time of the Altay Commission (Mozhda, 2010, p.45). 
Since water significantly characterized Iran’s foreign policy, Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran 
again picked up the issue with the last Afghan King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, in 1938. 
The result was a treaty through which “the governments of Iran and Afghanistan agreed 
to divide into equal shares all waters of the Helmand River which flow to Band-e Kamal 
Khan (30 miles inside Afghan territory) between Iran and Afghanistan” (Mojtahed-
Zadeh, 2007, p.249). Further, Afghanistan pledged not to repair old or construct any new 
stream on the Band-e Kamal Khan River (Bakhtyari, 1381, p.68). But this agreement was 
not realized due to the collapse of Reza Shah’s Kingdom in Iran and the denial of the 
Afghan Parliament (Majlesi Shura) to ratify it (Bakhtyari, 1381, p.69), although Iran 
regarded this agreement in accord with international standards. The Sistan Draught in 
Iran in 1947 was the result of the construction of a dam by Afghanistan on the Helmand 
River done through the Americans in 1945 (Islam, 2011, p.125). 
While the two countries established air service in 1956 and joint transit and trade 
relations on December 3, 1960, they nonetheless lacked mutual trust to permanently 
normalize their relationship.  
Iran-Afghan relations resumed in 1963. These relations sustained during the 
Republican government of Sardar Mohammad Dawoud Khan. His presidency (1973-
1978) was noted for his close relations with USSR, the emancipation of women and the 
famous Helmand Valley project. Under him, Kabul and Tehran kept good border 
relations through mutual understanding on border issues and water sharing of Helmand 
River (Clements 2003, p.8). Friendship with Iran was so close that Iran facilitated 
smoothing over of Afghan-Pakistan relations related to the impasse on the Pashtunization 
issue. Dawoud Khan realised that the cordial relations with Iran were essential for 
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Afghanistan’s economic development. Afghan president visited Tehran in 1354 (1975) 
and returned to his country with a promise of two billion USD for Afghanistan made by 
Iran’s Shah, to be paid in the course of ten years. However, water issues between Iran and 
Afghanistan have remained unresolved. In addition to this, Iran was also concerned with 
the close relations of Kabul with Moscow (Masiha 2018). With the U.S. help, Iran paid 
300 million USD in a loan to Kabul with a condition that Kabul limits its relations with 
Moscow in exchange. Iran also provided two billion USD in a loan to Kabul for its 
railway projects, although it could not materialize due to the Communist coup d’état in 
Afghanistan in which Dawoud Khan was assassinated (Grantham, n.d.). 
 
Figure 1. Drainage Map of Afghanistan 
 
Note: Showing Helmand River basin as Number 3; Hari Rud and Murghab as Number 2.  
Source: Center for Afghanistan Studies, (n.d.). 
 
2.2 Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
Iran-Afghanistan relations were severed after Soviet Afghan occupation in 1979, 
which coincided with the occurrence of the Khomeini-led Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
Initially, Iran’s response to Soviet Afghan occupation was passive so as not to offend 
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Moscow. Subsequently, however, it condemned Soviet Afghan occupation (Milani, 2006) 
on ideological grounds (namely, due to the ideology of Velayat-e faqih: guardianship of 
the jurist) and its allied foreign policy shift (1979-1992). Under this ideology, Khomeini 
was not only the Iranian religious-spiritual Supreme Leader but the decision-making 
power in all political matters. In that capacity, he underscored the need to export the 
Islamic Revolution outside of Iran. He advised the Soviet Union Ambassador to Iran 
before 1979 to abstain from the invasion of Afghanistan:  
“On the day when the Soviet Ambassador came to me and told me that Afghan 
government has requested the Soviet Union to send troops, I told him that it will 
be a mistake if the Soviet Union will do this. Of course, Soviets can occupy 
Afghanistan but they cannot remain there. If you think you will take Afghanistan, 
and you will stabilize it, it is a useless idea. Afghans are Muslims, they stand 
against the communist government. If you or any other power will go there, this 
power will break” (The Institute for compilation and publication of Imam 
Khomeini’s Works, 2013) 
The first ten years of Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan, therefore, were largely 
shaped by Khomeini and his successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (as this study will 
analyze in detail in chapter four of this study).  
Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh (1978-1980) outlined Iran’s policy in 
Afghanistan in 1979, during the Soviet occupation, in three simple terms. First, all Soviet 
troops must leave Afghanistan. Second, the “insurgents” should be brought into a new 
movement. Third, the Karmal regime cannot be recognized as Kabul’s legitimate 
government but could participate in negotiations on the country’s future as an ‘interested 
party’ (Emery, 2013, p.170).  
With the resumption of Presidency by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989 and 
until 1997, Iranian foreign policy radically changed (Ehteshami, 2002, p.238-309). 
Ideology was exhaustively used as a cover for pursuing security, economic and 
geopolitical interests, settling remaining border issues with Afghanistan and extending 
security to the ethnic minority Shia Hazaras of Afghanistan and their participation in the 
political structure of Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the foreign policy objective was to 
block the Saudi Wahhabism
6
 or what was labeled by Iran as the ‘America's Islam’ to the 
region as a whole. Similarly, it featured support for the one and a half million Hazara Shia 
refugees from Afghanistan to Iran (Milani, 2006).  
                                                 
6
 Simply explained, Wahhabism is a religious movement and doctrine within Islam, which is often seen as 
extremist. 
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A little lyrical digression must be made here to describe the Afghan 
migration/refugees issue. There were various reasons, but most prominently economic 
reasons, that led to the migration of many Shias from Afghanistan to Iran. This migration 
was happening in different periods. For instance, at the end of the 19th century, around 
five-thousand families traveled to Iran in order to settle there. Often this was due to the 
active pilgrimages by the Afghan Shias to the holy places important for the followers of 
this branch in Islam, which were situated in Iran. Only under the Amir Abdur Rahman 
Khan (1880-1901) – Afghanistan’s Emperor, about 15,000 Hazara families left 
Afghanistan for Iranian Mashhad (namely Torbat-e Jam, a place in the close vicinity of 
Mashhad), making up 90 percent of the population in Torbat-e Jam of that time. It is 
important to mention that, in 1925, when Reza Shah Pahlavi became the King of Iran, the 
Afghan ethnic Hazaras (Khawari)
7
, residing in Iran were very much integrated in Iran’s 
life, inter alia, during various celebrations. Thus, Hazaras became a recognized tribal 
group within Iran’s borders and as part of Iran’s social life (Abbasi-Shavazi, 2005, p.13). 
One should also not forget here the historical seasonal migration of the Afghans to Iran, 
so-called “Raft-o-omad”8, which was happening sporadically and had its ebbs and flows 
(Danish Institute for International Studies, 2016). Finally, another migration of Afghans 
was during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) of the country. According to some sources, 
almost three million Afghans fled to Iran during this period (Abbasi-Shavazi, 2005, p.13). 
After half of these refugees returned to Afghanistan in 1992, Iran, besides other 
objectives became puzzled with the vacuum, caused by the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, which led to the outflow of the Afghan refugees.  
Indeed, the influx of the Afghan refugees during the Soviet occupation was on the 
largest scale, comparing to previous historical periods of migration. All these refugees 
obtained so-called “blue cards” of Muhajireen9. It is important to note here that these 
refugees, in contrast with Pakistan where refugees had to reside in the special settlements, 
scattered themselves all over Iran, and thus dissolved themselves among the local 
population. Such integration was possible due to the fact that there was no impediment to 
their employment, additionally, these Afghan Muhajireen, (Refugees) were provided with 
                                                 
7
 The Hazara Khawari or Berberi is a term, used to refer to the people of Mongolian descent who 
immigrated to Iran from the neighboring Afghanistan in the 19th century. 
8
 Raft-o-omad, can be literally translated as “coming and going”, also referred to the seasonal migration. 
9
 Muhajir literally refers to a Muslim immigrant (who migrated for various reasons). 
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various subsidies towards accommodation, work, and even education. (Danish Institute 
for International Studies, 2016). 
This situation is very different from the bilateral relations between Afghanistan 
and Iran in the recent years, which are much more complex than they were historically 
because Iran is strategically alarmed by the U.S. presence within Afghan borders, 
although people still do emigrate to Iran for economic reasons. This has led to the 
controversies in Iran’s policies towards Afghanistan ranging from “solidarity and 
brotherhood with the Shias” to the ties with the Afghan groups that are opposed to the 
Shias. The irritation of Iran is of course also instigated by its tensions with Saudi Arabia 
and the economic sanctions imposed on Iran (Alam, 2000). 
2.3 Soviet troops pull-out (1989): Civil war (from 1991) and the Taliban 
(from 1994) 
Iran’s initial response to the outbreak of the new violent conflict in Afghanistan 
following Soviet pull out was quite passive. It joined with the UN and called for peaceful 
resolution of the Civil War and vainly appealed to the then interim Afghan government to 
share power with Pashtuns and Shias (Milani, 2011, p.156). Kabul could not agree to it as 
it tried to pacify Saudi Arabia and Pakistan instead. Subsequently, Iran, like other powers, 
became active in the Afghan Civil War. 
Each country had its own agenda in the Afghan Civil war: Saudi to promote 
Wahhabi Islam; Pakistan to empower Pashtuns for resuming power and Iran to shield and 
unite all Dari-speaking population (Milani, 2011, p.156). Therefore, while Saudi and 
Pakistan governments backed the Sunni Pashtun groups, Iran supported the warring 
Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara Mujahideen groups of non-Pashtun origin (these groups from 
1996 to 2001 were known as Northern Alliance, or officially as the United Islamic Front 
for the Salvation of Afghanistan).  
During an interview in Kabul in 2015, a former Mujahideen commander 
explained that the “Iranian religious Qom center had built firm ties with the Afghan 
people, especially in rural areas. Such a support was possible because of the response of 
country’s population to the Pakistan and Saudi-led Islamic fundamentalist movements 
within Afghanistan.” (K. S., personal interview, 19 April 2016). In this way, on the 
stretch of Civil War, Iran backed the Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan under 
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its veteran leaders, the former Tajik President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his military 
commander Ahmad Shah Massoud and Uzbek and Tajik warlords, Abdul Rashid Dostum 
and Ismail Khan respectively. The group was generally identified as the Northern 
Alliance (NA). Iran’s support for it was because it considered Taliban a serious security, 
ideological, and economic threat to its own security and its fellow ethnic Shias in 
Afghanistan. 
India and Russia also supported the Northern Alliance, though Iran was its 
principle military strength (Milani 2011). Further to this support, Iran has been supporting 
various organizations of Iranian Islamic thought in Afghanistan since 1982 (Wilde, 2009, 
p.19). These include, for instance, Shura-inqilab-Ittifagh-Islami-e-Afghanistan 
(Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union of Afghanistan) under the leadership of 
Sayyad Beheshti. Beheshti has a large number of supporters in Central Afghanistan 
(Hazarajat), (Salahi, 2015); the Islamic Victory Organization of Afghanistan (Sazman-i 
Nasr-Islami-yi Afghanistan), comprised the educated Shia Hazaras from Iran. This radical 
Islamist organization has its main office in Daykundi (Salahi, 1394) [2015]; Harakat-i-
Islami Islamic organization, comprising Shias only, was operated by Ayatollah Asif 
Muhsini from Iran. It encompassed all ethnic Shia groups regardless of the region. Its 
prominent commander, Mohammad Anwari, is known for his famous Turkmen Valley 
battle towards the western Kabul (Demont and Roy, 2015, p.89); and the Army of the 
Guardians of the Revolution, Sepah-e Pasdaran. This radical Islamist party is 
commanded by Akbari and Saddiqi (Tsypkin, 2013, p.126). The support of this group by 
Iran can be indirectly evidenced in the message of Imam Khomeini to the Head of the 
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachyov during the Soviet occupation: “A serious view to 
Islam [Author’s note: proper understanding of its essence] will save you from the 
problems in Afghanistan and in the rest of the world. We recognize the Muslims of the 
world in the same manner as we recognize the Muslims of our country and we consider 
ourselves as the partners in building their destiny” (The Institute for compilation and 
publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 2013). Former Iranian Ambassador to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian in his interview to Iranian 
Diplomacy news agency has officially acknowledged that Iran provided support to the 
Afghan Mujahideen (Iranian Diplomacy, 2012).  
In 1367 (1988) the first assembly of the Afghan Shias took place in Tehran. 
Following the event, Iran has pursued to establish a unified pro-Iranian Shia military 
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alliance in Afghanistan made up of the previously uncoordinated Shia groups/parties 
described above. These parties were united under the one Islamic military-political party, 
known as Hizb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan (hereinafter, Wahdat party/ The Islamic 
Unity Party of Afghanistan). Its establishment was announced after some of the Afghan 
Shia leaders met with the Iranian Supreme Leader in Tehran. After 1988 Iran provided 
continuous support to Wahdat party and trained twelve thousand men from Afghan Shias 
in Sabzawar and Fariman military camps in Iran (Rahmani and Hoseini, 1391, pp.238-
239). It may be thus concluded that that the military solution was chosen by Iran to deal 
with Afghanistan’s situation.  
The Afghan conflict of the 1990s was perceived by the Iranian state as a danger to 
“security and stability in the region, and even global peace”, and even more dramatically 
as “one of the biggest, unresolved tragedies of the centuries” (Alam, 2000). Although 
Iran’s President Khatami (1997-2005) many times has called the Afghans to leave aside 
the factional differences for the sake of peace, Iran itself continued to pursue its own 
interests in Afghanistan. The national interests that Iran continued to pursue, as well as 
those of another of Afghanistan’s neighbors – Pakistan, influenced the conflict in 
Afghanistan greatly, in the direction of its aggravation. Regardless of the friendly 
statements that Iran and Pakistan continued to make with regards to each other, in reality, 
these two countries have competed in Afghanistan on many accounts (e.g. to access the 
routes to Central Asia) (Alam, 2000).  
 The Taliban emerged triumphant in the Civil War but not until thousands of 
people were killed, caged, and displaced from Afghanistan. It framed an Islamic 
Government lasting for five years until 2001 (Fatima, 2014, pp.35-46). But Iran did not 
recognize it and rather denounced it by labeling it as a government of the ‘narco-
terrorists’ based on the draconian laws, all to the detriment of the Northern Alliance and 
Shia community. Obviously, news about the Taliban’s rise to power in 1996 was not at 
all heartening to Iran in its immediate Afghanistan neighborhood. In view of ideological 
compatibility, Iran perceived the Taliban as a potent threat to its identity because of its 
anti-Iranian and anti-Shia rhetoric. It considered the Taliban an exclusivist group of 
wayward Islamists, meant to spread religious extremism across the region, besides a 
deterrent to the state systems and their national borders. Instead, the Taliban believes in 
an Emirate (Barzegar, 2014). For this reason, Tehran did not recognize the Taliban from 
1996 to its collapse in 2001.  
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For Iran’s anti-Taliban perception, the Taliban blocked the supply of Helmand 
River water to Iran (Bhatnagar, 2013, p.6). This brought them virtually on the brink of a 
war and especially after the assassination of nine Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif city 
of the Balkh province (Siddique, 2014, p.51). Iran mobilized troops on the Iran-Afghan 
border, leading to nervous speculation about an impending war (Akbarzadeh, 2014). 
Naturally, Tehran’s economic relations with the Taliban regime were limited in scope, 
structure and time. Iran-Pakistan and Iran-Saudi relations also diminished on the same 
Taliban account. 
A few remarks should be made with regards to the improvement of the relations 
between Iran and India as a result of the Taliban regime in the recent past. These two 
countries’ concerns with the Taliban were based on their perception of the Taliban as a 
threat to their own countries’ order as well as to security in the entire region. Iran and 
India thus saw themselves as, perhaps, the main actors who should be involved in the 
international negotiations on the formation of the Afghan post-Taliban government, 
whereby Iran’s concern here was also about ensuring the interests and share of those 
ethnically and culturally affiliated with Iran Hazaras as well as Tajiks (Alam, 2000). 
2.4 Iran’s involvement in the post-2001 Afghanistan 
The events of September 11, 2001, in the U.S. became a turning point in 
Afghanistan’s modern history. The U.S. has used the events to justify its invasion of 
Afghanistan, toppled the Taliban from power on the pretext of it giving shelter to Al-
Qaeda chief, Usama Bin Laden, the alleged leader behind the 9/11 terror attack. 
Iran’s active involvement in Afghan affairs continued further with the US-Afghan 
invasion in 2001. It joined the UN and the U.S. call for “War against terror”. Its army 
worked hand-in-hand with the U.S. army and even offered to provide sanctuary to the 
stressed U.S. military personnel and to transport humanitarian aid to Afghanistan from its 
soil (Sadat and Hughes, 2010). Reportedly, it facilitated the precision of military targets 
on the Taliban hideouts. Publicly, it supported the formation of a provisional government 
under Hamid Karzai via Bonn Conference resolution in December 2001. It also joined the 
international community to reconstruct Afghanistan and provided 560 million USD for 
the Herat region and in its immediate neighborhood (Saikal, 2016, p.148) at the Tokyo 
conference. Iran aided western Afghanistan with an extra 15 million USD for the 
construction of a power line from Iran to Herat and spent 38 million for the building of a 
Iran-Afghanistan Relations: A Historical Overview 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
45 
highway from the Iranian border to the Afghan city of Herat in Iran’s immediate 
neighborhood (Fiscus, 2003, p.55). The given aid was expended on Afghanistan’s 
infrastructural development, roads, bridges, education, agriculture, and power generation 
and telecommunication projects (Saikal, 2016, p.148). Iran also facilitated building a 176-
kilometer railroad from Iran to the city of Herat and declared it a free tax zone for trade 
from the Iranian Chabahar port on the southern end of the Sistan via Balochistan 
province, near the Oman Sea, to the southwestern border post of Malik in Afghanistan, 
and onwards to Kandahar and Kabul. The railroad was intended to decrease the distance 
between the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan by 700 kilometers, which “would significantly 
diminish the importance of the Karachi-Kandahar road, which is Afghanistan's traditional 
roadway to international waters” (Milani, 2006). 
 Iran’s main consideration in doing so was to transform Herat into a high 
economic zone for the transit of goods and service between the Persian Gulf, 
Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, and India (Milani, 2010). Additionally, it was to ensure 
necessary supplies to the Afghan Government amid adversary. 
Contrarily, however, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported the Pashtun-centric 
Taliban resistance movement against the foreign forces presence in Afghanistan. From 
the very beginning, Pakistan wanted to have a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul not only 
to secure its position and interests against India’s but also because of the unresolved issue 
of Durand line, that Pakistan wanted to resolve in its favor (Sajadi, 2009). They even 
patronized Sunni-led separatist movement in Iran-controlled Baluchistan for their own 
interests. Saudi Arabia’s intent was to spread Wahabbi Islam in Afghanistan and 
neutralize Iran's revolutionary spill over (Sajadi, 2009). Pakistan intended to establish a 
Pushtun-controlled Taliban government to gain leverage against its enemy, India. Iran 
wanted to set up a non-Pashtun Government of all Dari-speaking people preferable with 
the Shia background, all presupposing varying foreign power perceptions about post-
Soviet Afghan affairs. 
Coming back to Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan post-2001 and in light of the 
above-mentioned Iranian assistance, one must keep in mind, that from then on whatever 
Iran did and still does is very much connected to the fact that the U.S. is present in 
Afghanistan. Iranian involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan cannot be 
disregarded, they, nevertheless have to be viewed through the lenses of a pragmatic 
approach, that from 2001 will start to gain increasing dominance in Iranian foreign policy 
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with regards to Afghanistan. Thus, in the winter of 2008-09, for instance, it supplied 25 
million liters of oil at cheaper rates to help address Afghan energy shortage. In the same 
winter, however, it was Iran that deported 800 Afghan refugees – the move that was quite 
sufficient to demonstrate to the U.S. that Iran can pursue any policy suiting its interests, 
regardless of the U.S. in Afghanistan. (Institute for the Study of War, n.d.)  
As the events of the time, 2001-2014 will be intensively examined in the 
analytical chapter of the present study, one will not go into the further details of their 
description here. Below, however, to prepare the reader for the comprehension of the 
analysis conducted in the subsequent chapters, it is important to elaborate further on the 
shift in the foreign policy, on the cultural aspects, and the future prospects, already at this 
point. 
2.5 The shift in Iran’s foreign policy 
Iran’s foreign policy after 2001 indicated a radical shift on four accounts. First, the 
2002 statement given by the U.S. President George Bush in which he termed Iran as a 
member of the "axis of evil." Second, the U.S. decision to overstay in Afghanistan despite 
its announcement in 2002 that Taliban elimination was complete. Iran perceived the US-
Afghan overstay as a potential threat to its national security, in the backdrop of its 
established impasse with the U.S. on its nuclear program.  
Third, instead of exclusively backing on the Shia Hazaras, Iran turned to the Tajik, 
Uzbek and other non-Shia groups for creating Iranian influence in Afghanistan (Rubin, 
2013, p.34-35) as well. Its Hazara factor had, otherwise, also led to the division of and 
infighting among the Afghan Shias. Most of them followed Ayatollah Abul Qasim Khui, 
an Iranian-born Islamic jurist of Najaf, Iraq, who unlike Khomeini, was disinclined to 
spreading Iranian political Islam outside Iran (Ibrahimi, 2009, p.4).  
Fourth, perhaps more important than other changes was a shift in Iran’s Taliban 
policy. What was hitherto an ideological enemy (Taliban) turned to be Iran’s strategic 
asset against its arch-rival (US) (Levkowitz, 2017). What was hitherto an identity-
ideology-centric power politics turned to be power-politics-centric identity-ideology in 
Iran’s foreign policy. In an interview a Professor at Herat University, stated towards this 
end, that: “Iran wants the Taliban to be strong enough to remain a thorn for the United 
States, but not strong enough to become a challenge for Karzai or his successor's 
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government, or to turn into a dominant power in Afghanistan.” (H. J., personal interview, 
24 October 2016)  
Iran, thus, in the course of this shift started to see the Taliban as a bulwark against 
the U.S. in Afghanistan. Iran always thought a direct war with the U.S. was infeasible. 
Hence, Iran’s changed policy after 2003 was aimed at avoiding a full-fledged or open war 
with the U.S. across Afghanistan, preserve its Islamic character and defend its territory 
from the foreign aggression.  
 Iran felt slight respite on the U.S. announcement to pull out its forces from 
Afghanistan in 2014 (Kaw, 2016, pp.271-290).
 
However, it was soon disappointed to see 
that the U.S. was leaving behind around 8,500 soldiers purportedly for the training of the 
Afghan National Security Force, a catalyst to continued Afghan conflict with little or no 
scope for recovery immediately after 2014 evacuation of foreign forces (Kaw, 2014, pp.6-
9). It was compounded as growing foreign powers struggle to fill the partial vacuum 
created by the U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan. The Baghdadi’s Islamic State (IS) 
growing militant attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran borders was an added factor 
behind Iran-Taliban bonhomie in the changed Iran’s foreign policy narrative (Zindia, 
2017).  
 Thus, since both the U.S. and IS posed a potent threat to Iran, it chooses the lesser 
evil Taliban as its ally in the post-2014 Afghanistan. The understanding was to maneuver 
efforts to oust the U.S. and eliminate the IS from Afghanistan and its Iran-Afghan borders 
(Levkowitz, 2017). However, Iran’s reported support to the Taliban is “tactical and 
limited”, as Iran is disinclined to any direct military encounter with the U.S. in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, Iran’s Taliban support is not because either like each other 
(Majidyar, 2017). It is rather because of an old saying that for expediency “you should 
sometimes even own enemies”. 
 For Iran-Taliban discreet ties, Iran’s trade with the present Afghan Government is 
largely confined to bilateral trade and culture-related activities. The changing geopolitical 
settings also favor the Iran-Taliban alliance. According to general Sharif Yaftali the Army 
Chief of Staff of the Afghan government, Iran is reportedly supplying the Taliban with 
mines and weapons against the U.S. and Afghan forces, as was revealed often by the 
Afghan Intelligence agencies (BBC news, 2017). True, Iran is indisposed to the Taliban’s 
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return to Afghan power. But for the U.S. threats, Iran desires the Taliban to sustain at 
least while the U.S. remains in Afghanistan.  
The objective of Iran’s Afghan foreign policy around the historical water issue 
continues. As it was described above, Helmand water has been a source of constant Iran-
Afghanistan conflict from the early 19
th
 century. It flows some 1150 km before reaching 
Iran’s Sistan wetlands (Aman, 2016). The dispute emanated from General F. Goldsmid’s 
demarcation of the Iran-Afghanistan border in the middle of the Helmand River and in 
absence of any adequate water-sharing agreement (Islam, 2011, p.123). The issue was 
partially sorted out by a British commission led by Henry McMahon (Shroder and 
Ahmadzai, 2016, p.224). However, after King Nader Shah death in Iran, the issue 
resurfaced but was neutralized by his son King Zahir Shah in 1939, to the effect that the 
Helmand water would be shared between the two countries right from the Kamal Khan 
Dam, 47 km. to the Iranian border, and that the Afghan government would not construct 
any dam on its water. It is a different issue that the agreement was not implemented for 
the collapse of King Reza Shah and the absence of Parliamentary ratification on it. 
Consequently, the Afghan Government in 1948 unilaterally decided to build two water 
dams (Kajake and Boghra dam) on Helmand River; hence, pre-empted the two-country 
water-borne conflict, which had no ending, though in 1973 the Afghan Prime Minister, 
Mohammad Mussa Shafiq, had suggested a plan to settle the water dispute by allowing 
twenty-six cubic meters per second to flow to Iran. It was the only official agreement of 
Afghanistan with its western neighbor (Habib, 2014). But, it went into a limbo of political 
uncertainty in both Iran and Afghanistan.  
The problem thus continues until the present day. During an interview, a Professor 
at Herat University confirmed to me that: “Helmand water was always a point of conflict 
between Afghanistan and Iran. Before the Iranian revolution when Afghanistan had a 
strong government, Iran intended solving the water issue through dialogue and diplomacy 
with Afghanistan”. He further emphasized that “after the Afghan civil war and its allied 
instability, Iran used the Afghan Mujahideen to destroy the Salma Dam and they did so. 
Iran was benefiting from the Civil War in Afghanistan as the Helmand River was going 
fully to Iran…” (H. J., personal interview, 24 October 2016). Thus, the water issue 
remains to be a tricky one, which justifies its extensive description in the present chapter 
of the study. 
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Additionally, Iran’s Afghan foreign policy is targeted towards stopping the flow of 
drug traffic from across the Afghanistan border. Significant amounts of narcotics are 
continuously transported to the international market through Iran and Pakistan. Although 
Iran remains a transit country for poppy transport to Europe, 2.08% of its own population, 
between the ages of 15 and 64, are afflicted with drug ailments. (Ghane et al., 2017)  
Stopping the influx of Afghan refugees and their repatriation also features Iran’s 
Afghan policy. The majority of Afghan refugees are comprised of Tajiks and Hazaras. 
Since the 2001 U.S. invasion, Iran has hosted around 2 million Afghan refugees at a huge 
cost to its economy, society, and culture. Iran wants their deportation and is, thus, 
building great pressure on Kabul to accept and re-settle them. The present Afghan 
Government does not have the capacity or the compulsions to do so (Christensen, 2016).  
In aggregate, Iran’s Afghan foreign policy has been oriented towards blocking 
radicalism and IS infiltration across Afghanistan, expediting the U.S. withdrawal, 
ensuring equitable water sharing, promoting Iranian influence, protecting the Shia Hazara 
ethnic minority, repatriating Afghan refugees, demonstrating that Iran can pursue any 
Afghan foreign policy agenda unmindful of the U.S. liking or disliking and underlining 
that Iran’s security is grounded in Afghanistan’s stability.  
2.6 The Cultural Aspect of Iran-Afghanistan relations 
The cultural relations are not going to be extensively dealt with in the present 
analysis, that is concerned with other, more dominant issues, analyzed through the 
realist’s lenses. The cultural aspect of the Iran-Afghanistan ties is nevertheless 
contributing to the understanding of the greater picture of their relationship and, therefore, 
I would like to mention a few things about it in this historical excursion chapter. 
Political integration, foreign policy relations, trade connections, mutual influences, 
mutual diaspora, cultural assimilation and transmission and social, political, economic, 
religious, diplomatic and other processes tended to create cultural commonality between 
Iran and Afghanistan. For mutual religious interactions, for instance, Zoroastrianism or 
fire cult was common to both countries before the Arab Muslim conquest of Persia. 
Essentially, an Iranian practice, Balkh Afghanistan was its main hub. It is from here that 
the cult radiated to Central Asia, India and other parts of the Asian continent. Like other 
parts of Asia, Persian-originated spring festival, Nowruz (in Persian means: New Day) is 
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celebrated in Afghanistan with zeal and zest. In fact, Balkh in northern Afghanistan is its 
typical representative. As an eastern dialect of Persian, Dari is one of the common 
official Afghan languages. Almost half of the Afghans speak one of the several dialects of 
Persian (Dari). Baluch ethnic community is common to both. The Baluchs live in 
Pakistan, Iran, and southwestern Afghanistan simultaneously. Shia sectarian groups form 
a part of the demographic profile of both countries. Iran as a Shia-inhabited country 
contains a certain percentage of Sunni Muslims. Similarly, Afghanistan has a certain 
percentage of Shias in its Sunni-dominated demographic profile. Among the Afghan 
Shias, the Hazaras form the largest group in central and western Afghanistan. Above all, 
both countries share a common and protracted borderline since the days of the British 
Indian rule. It is drawn by the flow of a famous Helmand River along Herat, Farah, 
Nimroz provinces from this side of the Afghan border.  
For decades, the cultural relations between Iran and Afghanistan have persisted 
due to the same language and many other local similarities; people to people relations 
between Herat in Afghanistan and Mashhad in Iran were growing even stronger. Starting 
with the year when Mahmood Tarzi founded the newspaper Seraj al Akhbar (Lamp of the 
News) in Afghanistan in 1911 and in the years that followed this event, a number and 
variety of newspapers and magazines were exchanged between the people in both 
countries. Today this exchange implies, most prominently incoming mass media and 
literature, etc. from the Iranian side. According to the Head of the Printing Media 
Department of the Ministry of Culture and Information of Afghanistan in Heran, the 
Iranian influence in this province was considerable and it is still perceived as such: 
“For a long time, Iranian newspapers such as Atlahat, Jong-e Hafta, and Sukhan 
were coming to Herat each week and from Afghanistan, the same way - our 
newspapers and magazines such as Herat, Baladya, and Mehri were sent to 
Mashhad. Iranian newspapers and magazine were always available in a bookstore 
Haji Sahid Hashim Koril that existed in Herat. If a newspaper or a magazine 
would not come to this store even for one day, a number of people would come to 
ask for the reason, why it is not there, this is how high the demand was. Iranian 
musicians and singers were coming to Herat very often to perform in the concerts. 
Same goes for our singers and musicians [Author’s note: Once Afghan, they also 
made tours in Iran on a regular basis. Even today, the main TV channels in Herat, 
watched by our people are the Iranian TV channels. People watch Iranian TV 
shows even more than the Afghan. There are no issues raised by the Iranian side 
with regards to the copyright issues, associated with unofficial broadcasting, 
which is most likely the Iranian policy to provide such free access to its media 
sources.” (N. A. K., personal Interview, 27 October 2016)  
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Indeed, this Iranian cultural policy is often seen in Afghanistan as a conduit of 
various other Iranian policies. The control over the information dissemination is certainly 
in favor of Iran’s strategic and pragmatic goals in Afghanistan. 
2.7 Summary 
There was no such concept of foreign policy until the creation of nation-states as 
the bilateral relations were then among the despots and these largely revolved around 
their imperial interests. The foreign policy concept evolved with the formation of the 
nation states and their designated and varied foreign policy perspectives regarding 
security, resources, land, trade, culture etc. For its pursuit, they framed relevant strategies, 
both for and against each other, as is characteristic of realism in international relations. 
 The chapter was intended to reveal these strategies in the historical relations of 
Afghanistan and Iran, to provide the reader with the main motives and incentives behind 
these relations that have emerged, it describes the ebbs and flows of the relationship. In 
the course of the chapter, it becomes clear what the issues are that represent the major 
areas of concern for Iran.  
As this historical overview described, initially, Iran had no Afghan foreign policy 
since Afghanistan itself was Iran’s political constituent during the reign of the 
Achaemenids, Sassanids, and Safavids. Regular Iran-Afghanistan foreign policy evolved 
after the formation of the nation states in the 19th century. The benefit of such a foreign 
policy, however, was mostly in Iran’s favor because it was far ahead of Afghanistan in 
terms of requisite systems, structures, and institutions.  
The Iran-Afghan foreign policy experienced ups and downs in view of their long 
pending land, water, sectarian, ethnic and other issues. Besides domestic factors, foreign 
power politics impact on the making and re-making of their foreign policies. No doubt, 
their relations soared to a level where war seemed sometimes inevitable. But both averted 
it for expediency and the threat looming large on them due to British and Russian 
imperialism and colonialism. Afghanistan, in particular, was cautious about it considering 
its complex ethnic composition and “predatory neighborhood” threats. Despite 
considering the U.S. as its arch-enemy, Iran also ensured that it has no direct encounter 
with the U.S. in Afghanistan, its immediate neighborhood.  
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Despite often conflicting interests, both countries have managed to resolve the 
conflicts through negotiations. Iran’s Afghan foreign policy changed radically after the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the 
subsequent Civil War, Iran stood by the non-Pashtun Afghans, the Shia Hazaras, Tajiks 
and Uzbeks (Northern Alliance). Iran wanted the Northern Alliance to assume power in 
Afghanistan in preference to the Taliban.  
There was, however, yet another structural change in its foreign policy after the 
US-Afghan invasion in 2001 and the violence that stemmed from it between the U.S. and 
the Taliban for power and ideological domination. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan has 
become an assumed threat to Iran’s national existential reality. During this change, Iran 
entered into an alliance with what was otherwise its staunch ideological enemy, the 
Taliban. The consideration was to use the Taliban insurgency to deflate the U.S. mission 
in Afghanistan and make Iran’s borders safe from its harmful designs. Since 2001, the 
Iranian government has urged Afghanistan to accept back those hundreds and thousands 
of Afghan nationals who took refuge in Iran for decades. But the Afghan Government is 
unable to entertain Iran’s request for its own reasons such as its weak economic situation. 
This excursion into the history of the Iran-Afghanistan’s relations provides 
background knowledge, necessary as a foundation prior to jumping into the analytical 
field of the study – to dig deeper and wider in order to increase the understanding of all 
trajectories, shifts, and peculiarities of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the 
period 2001-2014. 
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Chapter 3. Formal Power Structure of Iran 
3.1 Introduction 
The political system of Iran is comprised of the formal and informal power 
structures. It runs on the basis of two sets of hierarchies of authority; elected and non-
elected (religious) (Swarte, 2013). The inclusion of the latter in it reveals the State’s 
magnanimity of taking on board personal networks and peer groups in policy formulation 
of domestic and foreign affairs. Sometimes, personal networks are even stronger than 
institutional or formal power organs.  
The formal power structure is clearly defined under the Islamic Constitution and is 
visibly exhibited in the working of the government institutions held and run by the 
Supreme Leader, Assembly of Experts for Leadership, President, Council of Ministers, 
Expediency Council, Majles, Judiciary, Council of Guardians, armed forces, and State 
Television and Radio.  
The informal power structure consists of religio-political and paramilitary 
organizations. These are woven into “four concentric rings” for real functioning. The 
first, the central ring, includes prominent clergymen in the executive branch, the judiciary 
and the legislature. The second ring is made up of the high-ranking government officials. 
The third consists of revolutionary, security and media organizations, including the Basij 
Militia and the Pasdaran groups. The outer ring is comprised of the individuals formerly 
in power. They provide a link between those in power and outside the power (Prifti, 
2010). 
Political Institutions, both formal and informal, shape the foreign policy of Iran 
(Crane, 2008, p.34; Hasib, 2011, p.44). However, these institutions are ambiguously 
complex (Crane,  2008, p.34; Hasib, 2011, p.44). Consequently, cardinal contradictions 
exist in Iran’s institutional formulation and institutional functioning within the country’s 
constitutional framework. These contradictions are manifest in the day-to-day 
enforcement of the constitutional norms (Hasib, 2011, p.5; Arjomand, 2008, p.210; 
Moslem, 2002, p.99) that this chapter demonstrates through the specific examples below.  
The constitutional contradictions between institutional form and function are 
traceable in the continuum between theocracy and democracy (Kesselman, 2012, p.365; 
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Lust, 2013, p.478). The supreme religious leader, the key player of this system, enjoys 
unlimited powers since Ayatollah Khomeini espoused the idea of Velayat-e Faqih 
(“Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist”) in 1979. According to Ruhollah Khomeini, “God 
has formed the Islamic Republic. Obey God and his Prophet and those among you who 
have authority”. So absolute are his powers that it has tended to undermine the 
democratic spirit in Iran (Rabinovich and Shaked, 1989, p.397; Buchta, 2000, p.46), 
although democracy continues to have a space in the country’s constitutional framework.  
Whatever its implications, clerical supremacy opened vistas for the 
complementary role of formal and informal institutions in Iran and its internal and 
external policies. The informal institutions are effectively conducted by the Iranian 
Supreme Leader; Friday Prayer Leaders Association (Imam Joma) and Religious 
Foundations (Bonyads), besides heads of the Iranian Foreign Policy; Politically Active 
Iranian Society and Nation's Exigency Council (Buchta, 2000; Rakel, 2008, pp.56-58; 
Posch, 2013, p.11; Kutty, 2014, p.148).  
In the post-revolutionary era, the Iranian authorities expressly established a 
political continuum between theocracy and democracy. The Supreme Leader, usually a 
state actor, wields unlimited powers, given to him by the Iranian Constitution (see article 
57 of the Constitution of IRI). As a result, two respective sets of institutions are in place 
in Iran. One comprised of democratically elected officials and the other of heads of 
clerical councils. These key actors enjoy optimum authority in the country’s power 
structure. This is perhaps why, in the last three decades, clerical institutions have been 
complementing the country’s power and administrative structure (Rasmussen, 2009). 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979, led by Khomeini, was based on the concept of 
Velayat-e Faqih (the Governance of the Jurist), (Article 5 of the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Iran), a conduit for political and religious ideology, served as a justification 
for the religious and political legitimacy of the Revolution. The concept implies that a 
religious leader, by law or constitution, combines religious and political authority in one. 
The former equips him with the popular legitimacy, while the latter gives him the 
leverage to mobilize the society for a collective action (Roy, 1999, p.203). Indeed, the 
Islamic Revolution caused a fundamental change in the composition of state institutions 
in Iran (Khiabany, 2013, p.32).  
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A variety of social forces have unfolded in response to Iran’s republican form and 
its foundation on Islamic ideology. This has eventually tended to foster a peculiar type of 
contradiction both within Islamic and Republican principles since the two are radically 
opposed to each other (Katouzian, 1999, p.203). These cardinal contradictions find a 
detailed explanation in the sections below and throughout the present study as one of the 
root causes of the double-face external policy of Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and as 
contributing to the overall argument of the research, presented in chapter one.  
The present chapter has an aim to discuss the fundamentals of political structure 
within the Iranian constitution that help to understand Iran’s internal political picture and 
how it influences the political decisions made in the country and outside. This implies, 
before all, a closer analysis of the formal and informal institutions that are involved in the 
foreign policy shaping, which provides the necessary foundation for comprehension of 
the analysis conducted in the subsequent chapters.  
The chapter unfolds in the following way: section 3.1 provided an introduction to 
the discussion; section 3.2 analyzes the Iranian Constitution in order to explain the 
political structure of Iran; section 3.3 thoroughly analyzes the role of the Iranian Supreme 
Leader; section 3.4 elaborates on the activity of the Assembly of Experts; sections 3.5, 3.6 
and 3.7 analyze the three branches of power: executive, legislative and judiciary 
respectively; section 3.8 elaborates on the informal institutions active in shaping foreign 
policy; section 3.9 analyzes the role of the individual actors and associations; section 3.10 
summarizes. 
3.2 Fundamentals of the Political Structure within Iran’s Constitution 
The nature of Iran’s constitutional structure is well formulated in the following 
statement:  
“In theory, Iran’s constitution combines theocracy with republicanism. But in 
practice, Iran’s unelected institutions, namely the Supreme Leader and 12-men 
Guardian Council, wield far more power than the elected institutions of the 
Presidency and Parliament. The Guardian Council is competent to vet all 
candidates for public office and disqualify those whom it feels are not sufficiently 
loyal to the Supreme Leader” (Sadjadpour 2010, September 1, n.p.). 
The decision-making process is split between the state apparatus and a parallel, 
vertically integrated “shadow” status system under the direct control of the Supreme 
Leader (Mason, 2015). Policy deliberation among the senior ranks of the government in 
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the Islamic Republic is a process that Western diplomats often refer to as a “black box”. 
Whereas political figures and bastions of power that shape policy in Iran are detectable, it 
is the informal and non-transparent debate within elite circles that continues to confound 
Western audiences. From the perspective of the West, such uncertainty about the division 
of labor and power surfaced during the European Union (EU)-Iran negotiations over 
Tehran’s controversial nuclear program. (Vatanka, 2008) 
The Iranian Constitution recognizes three branches of government, the legislative, 
judicial and the executive (Article 57 of the IRI Constitution). Being intertwined, these 
are inseparable from each other. However, all these are under the supervision of the 
Iranian religious Supreme Leader,
10
 who thus wields unlimited and absolute powers in the 
whole Iranian set up (Hasib, 2004, p.6). In the process, all three branches stand integrated 
and harmonized under the chief religious’ leadership of the country (Mahmood, 2006, 
p.52). 
“The governing powers in the Islamic Republic of Iran consist of the legislative, 
the executive, and the judiciary powers. They operate under the supervision of the 
absolute authority of the command (velayat-i amr) and religious leadership 
(imamat) of the community of believers and according to the forthcoming articles 
of this law. These powers are independent of one another”. (Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Article 57) 
According to Hossein Bashiriyeh, the Iranian scholar in political theory and 
political sociology, the Iranian Constitution is based on totalitarianism, therefore, the role 
of the Leader is the core power in the governmental structure of Iran. The unlimited 
power of the Leader can be seen in Majles (Parliament), Expediency Council, Guardian 
Council, Judiciary, and in the President’s Office (Bashiriyeh, 2006, p.62). 
The Iranian Scholar Abdolkarim Soroush goes further in asserting that:  
“the theory of Velayat-e Faqih is the same as religious tyranny. The theory cannot, 
in principle, create a democratic order. No one can justify justice under the 
authority of Velayat-e-Faqih, because, as the old philosophers have said, an 
absolute power creates grounds for the absolute corruption. If a person is the head 
of an unaccountable government, such person’s policies after a few years will be 
far from justice. Therefore, the theory of Velayat-e Faqih of Ayatollah Khomeini 
from the very beginning was an immoral theory, in practice, too, it has revealed its 
nature. Now, more than ever, with the bitter experience of the Islamic Republic, it 
has become clear that the theory of Velayat-e Faqih is not a theory of justice. If 
something is to be sacrificed, it is absolute power and absolute authority of the 
                                                 
10
 The reader may be more familiar with the Arabic and Persian term “Imam,” rather than its English 
translation as “leader”. 
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jurisprudents, if this shadow is removed from Iran, the Iranian people will be able 
to see the colour of freedom and justice” (Soroush, 2010). 
The Iranian Constitution gives a sufficient space to Islam in its domestic and 
foreign policy agendas. A quoted Quranic verse in the Constitution reads: "Your 
community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship me" [Quran 21:92]. 
Such position of Islam became possible only after the Imam Khomeini-led 29th and 30
th
 
March 1979, a referendum with a large majority of popular votes (98.2%) in its favour. It 
combined country’s national sovereignty with a preponderance of Islam in the 
Constitution of the country (Article 1 of the IRI Constitution). 
In fact, the foundations of the Iranian Islamic Republic are based on the following 
few determinants of Article 2 of the Islamic Republic of Iran [henceforth IRI]: 
 That “God is absolute [inalienable, indivisible and infallible]; hence, worship 
none other than Him”; 
 He has [the or a] divine role in setting forth the legislation of the country; 
 Islam is the key to the success of humans in the world hereafter; 
 Continuous Ijtihad (independent reasoning) of the Faqihs (Rule or 
guardianship by a jurist) on the basis of the Quran and the Sunnah [Saying of 
the Prophet of Islam] is necessary for equity and justice and politico-economic 
and socio-cultural independence and national solidarity; 
 Perpetual religious leadership by a chief cleric (Imam) is crucial for the 
restructuring of Islam in Iran;  
 Human rights and responsibilities are guaranteed and governed by natural laws; 
 All forms of oppression and exploitation are un-Islamic (Article 2 of the IRI 
Constitution).  
Besides Islam, the Iranian Constitution is explicit on the country’s domestic and 
foreign policy formulation as can be gleaned from the following fundamentals discussed 
in the next section. 
3.2.1 Non-alignment with Oppressive Powers 
Iran is disinclined to alignment with most oppressive and super-powers of the 
world. However, it cherishes cultivating mutual relations with countries devoid of conflict 
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from within and without. Further, Islam and Muslim rights are the cornerstone of Iran’s 
domestic and foreign policies (Article 152 of the IRI Constitution). 
- Imamat and leadership: 
Perpetual Imamat is essential for the country’s religious revivalism and eternal 
inspiration of the Iranians by a certain supreme religious chief (Article 2 paragraph 5 of 
the IRI Constitution). 
- Muslim Brotherhood: 
Iran recognizes that extending generous support to the Mustad’afin (the oppressed 
people of the world) is incumbent upon all Muslim Brethren (Article 3 paragraph 16 of 
the IRI Constitution). 
- Policy of Non- interference:  
Iran upholds the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries, 
believes in the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and vice 
versa. However, it would seek to support oppressed Muslims across the globe (Article 
154 of the IRI Constitution). 
- Islamic Unity:  
Iran strongly believes in the unity of all Muslims into a single national whole. The 
Iranian government feels duty-bound to promote it for the harmonization of the Muslims 
and their political, economic and cultural convergence at the global level (Article 11 of 
the IRI Constitution). 
- Securitization: 
Iran considers securitization essential for its national sovereignty, national security 
and Islamization of the government (Article 3 paragraph 11 of the IRI Constitution). 
- Foreign Aggression: 
Iran will resist all forms of foreign aggression for the security of its resources, 
territory, ethos etc. (Article 153 of the of the IRI Constitution). 
- The Separation of Powers: 
Iran recognizes the executive, legislature and judiciary as three separate entities of 
the government. Although these function independently, they are under the common 
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control of the Supreme religious (Imam) and Supreme Leader (Rahbar). (Article 57 of the 
IRI Constitution), which is currently Ali Khamenei.  
3.3 Supreme Leader 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a response to the decades-old and pro-US 
Shah regime in Iran. The Revolution led to an inside-out renaissance of the political and 
diplomatic machinery of the country. Additionally, it brought to fore the country’s 
Supreme Leader. The Revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was the first Supreme 
Leader holding the highest political and religious authority in Iran. No major policy 
decision can be taken without his consent purportedly for the national interests 
(Sadjadpour, 2010). Consequently, Iran's foreign policy is highly influenced by the 
Supreme Leader’s own vision about the country, region and the globe at large (Swarte, 
2013).  
After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, Ali Khamenei became Iran’s Supreme Leader 
with the complete support of the public and of the security and intelligence organs of the 
government. For expediency, he avoided implementing policies that could accelerate the 
existing rift between his faction of the conservatives and their reformist/pragmatist 
opponents. His range of powers naturally extends to the realm of foreign policy and 
Islamic government pursuits and management of severed relations with the US. Arguably, 
therefore, “Ali Khamenei, the current supreme leader, is …one of the best indicators of 
Tehran’s foreign policy behavior and goals in the immediate future” (Vatanka, 2008). 
Still, while Khamenei is the final arbiter in Iran’s foreign policy deliberations, he 
has his own internal and external pressures to manage Iran’s relations with other 
countries, also within the country’s Islamic format. Accordingly, he remains preoccupied 
with maintaining the greatest possible control over policy debates and warding off 
attempts to diminish his powers (Vatanka, 2008). His responsibility expanded manifold 
with the 1989 constitutional amendments which bestowed upon the Velayat-e Faqih, even 
more powers than enjoyed by Khomeini before (Nourbakhsh, 2005). Therefore, the 
Supreme Leader’s decisive role in decision-making does not allow the President to 
function independently in foreign policy matters (Negahban, 2017, p.37). Indeed, the 
Supreme Leader determines the course of Iran’s domestic rules and foreign policy by 
himself (Negahban, 2017, p.37).  
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Every foreign policy initiative [“from below”] mandates the approval of the 
Supreme Leader [“from above”] (Hunter, 2010, p.29). Seemingly, his position is very 
convenient. Nonetheless, he has inextricable challenges before him due to the surging 
Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East, the ever-increasing rift with the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia, and managing the impact of the bygone and the forthcoming economic sanctions 
due to the changed U.S. policy towards Iran under President Trump. These challenges 
demand his balanced approach lest the country descends into a serious social unrest 
(Shanahan, 2015). 
The Supreme Leader has before him a complex Iranian political system due to a 
mix between Islamic theocracy and liberal democracy. On the one hand, it is a semi-
theocratic style of rule based on the Velayat-e Faqih system (governance based on the 
Islamic jurists, religious bodies and foundations) and, on the other, it is a democratically 
elected institutional formation (republic institutions), (Rakel, 2009, p.109). Such a 
conspicuous configuration foretells growing split among various factions on country’s 
domestic and foreign policy perspectives (Rakel, 2009, p.108). 
Policymaking in Iran, as elsewhere, is primarily about political struggles between 
and among various factions; the conservatives and the reformists/pragmatists remain the 
major factions (Rakel, 2009, p.108). The conservatives’ aim is to reinforce the Islamic 
values and restore the ideals of the Islamic Revolution through “a good partnership with 
Islamic countries” only (not necessarily with their governments). Contrarily, the 
reformists/pragmatists pursue a more liberal approach and wish Iran to emerge as an 
important player in the international arena through diplomatic and economic cooperation 
with all countries irrespective of religion (Rakel, 2007a, p.166). Nevertheless, as 
compared to the reformists, the conservatives hold Iranian power to articulate their vision 
within their ideological setting.  
In a sense, the constitutional amendments opened up vistas for Iran’s top elite to 
perceive consensus rather than conflict as a key to Iran’s peace, stability, success and 
cordial foreign power relations (Nourbakhsh, 2005). Consequently, the Supreme Leader, 
Ali Khamenei, demonstrated his authority through reconciliation on the one hand and 
surveillance by 2,000 clericals “commissars” on the other. In this kind of situation, the 
President alone can’t be a watershed in Iran's foreign policy (Swarte, 2013). 
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After the 1979 Revolution, Iran shaped its own Constitution, which, inter alia, 
includes the provisions related to the creation of the institution of the Velayat-e Faqih by 
the then chief revolutionary cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (often called as Iran’s 
Supreme Leader). By this idea, the Iranian government is mandated to build a theocratic 
Islamic state, run it in accordance with the Islamic model (Janin and Kahlmeyer, 2007, 
p.142) and transport its idea to other Muslim states for adoption of the state. The 
underlying objective of the Shia Islamic model of the governance, in a way, is to restore 
and relive the position of 12th “Hidden” Imam, Imam Mahdi (who is assumed by Shias to 
have disappeared in 941 AD) for producing quality Believers and protecting the Ummah 
(Community of Believers).  
For furtherance of the idea, the Supreme Leader (Rahbar) is granted extensive 
powers under the Iranian Constitution, which eventually transforms him into a most 
powerful man of the country (Tarzi, 2011, p.23). Among other things, he is empowered to 
recruit and dismiss the Judges, bureaucrats, both civil and military, and resolve the issues 
between various government institutions, the executive, legislature and judiciary. Quite 
precisely, the whole Iranian system reflects Khomeini’s influence, his “his eyes and ears” 
are everywhere. In fact, his office established vide Article 5 of the Constitution is the by-
product of the institution of the Velayat-e faqih in the pyramid of Iran’s governance (Ruth 
de Boer, 2009). 
The aforementioned doctrine was made the basis for the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Iran, of which Khomeini was the first prominent Supreme Leader (Imam), 
presupposing the establishment of a theocratic state in Iran (Thaler, 2010, p.54). This is 
why the Iranian Constitution prescribes that "all civil, penal, financial, economic, 
administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based 
on Islamic criteria". (Article 4 of the IRI Constitution) 
The Supreme Leader is responsible for all religious and spiritual affairs besides 
the functioning of different political institutions at various levels. To be short, Iran’s 
constitution has two manifestations, one religious and the other political. The first has a 
co-relationship with the Islamic model regarding the nature of the state and the other with 
the French Republican model for political governance (Jones, 2011, 1; Arjomand, 2000). 
However, Iran’s constitution bears the imprints of the models of other modern states. In 
either case, the Presidential and Parliamentary elections exemplify Iran’s democratic 
model within the Islamic prefecture.  
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The officials of the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, Judiciary, Parliament, 
Presidency, Assembly of Experts, Association of Friday Prayer Leaders, Special Court of 
the Clergy and other institutions are under the absolute control of the Supreme Leader. 
Half of the Guardian Council’s officials are appointed by the Supreme Leader and the 
remainder by Parliament. The responsibility of the Guardian Council is overseeing 
Parliamentary affairs. All this suggests that the Supreme Leader has an extraordinary 
impact on republican institutions. 
Article 110 of Iran’s constitution empowers the Supreme Leader to mobilize the 
armed forces and act as the Commander-in-Chief to declare war or conclude peace with 
any power he chooses. In that capacity, he can recruit or dismiss the Supreme 
Commander of the regular army, General Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab Islami) and that of the Basij (A branch of Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps). Both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij play 
a strong role in Iran’s policy-making process; hence, they are staunchly loyal to the 
Supreme Leader (Sadjadpour, 2009). In addition, the Rahbar can recruit or dismiss the 
members (six) of Council of Guardians (Shura-e Negahban) and Chiefs of the Judiciary 
and the state TV and Radio. Alongside the powers, he is responsible to ensure that the 
country’s politics are rooted in the Islamic system and Revolutionary values and that 
various government institutions are run smoothly (Cordesman and Seitz, 2009, pp.16-17; 
Cavendish, 2006, p.488).  
3.4 The Assembly of Experts 
Pursuant to Articles 107 and 111 of the IRI Constitution, the Supreme Leader is 
appointed and removed, if so needed for his poor-performance, by the Assembly of 
Experts often termed as the Majles-e Khobregan or Majles-e Khebregan-e Rahbari. The 
Assembly is composed of high ranking and duly-elected Muslim clerics from all 30 of 
Iran’s provinces and is empowered to elect or disqualify the Supreme Leader. However, 
the Assembly mandates the approval of the Guardian Council for this purpose. According 
to Article 96 of the IRI Constitution, the Guardian Council is comprised of twelve 
prominent Ulema of the country, of whom six are appointed by the Supreme Leader and 
six by the Supreme Judiciary Council headed by a Mujtahid (someone qualified to 
exercise ijtihad) appointed by the Supreme Leader himself (Przeczek, 2013, p.64). 
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3.5 The Executive Branch 
3.5.1 The President  
The head of the executive branch is the President, the second most prominent 
official after the Supreme Leader. He too is elected with the majority votes of the 
members of the Guardian Council for up to two successive terms, each of 4 years tenure.  
The President is empowered to appoint the administrative officers; sign 
international treaties; designate Iranian Ambassadors; approve the appointment of foreign 
ambassadors in Tehran; control the Planning and Budget Organizations; confirm 
ministerial appointments of Parliamentary Council and authorize the implementation of 
Iranian laws. 
In addition, the President heads the National Security Council, since the 
"Presidential Center" was created at the head of the executive in August 1989. This 
Council is a nerve center of foreign policy formulation and execution, though foreign 
policy decisions are not taken in isolation of other power centers (Hinnebusch and 
Ehteshami, 2002, pp.292-293). In addition to this, the President heads the Council of 
Ministers and the Foreign Minister is under the President’s direct control. However, the 
President does not control any forces such as police, security services or any other organ 
of the armed forces (Milani 1993) since they are under the Supreme Leader. 
Actually, the Supreme Leader rather than the President formulates and executes 
foreign-policy decisions. Nonetheless, the Faqih remains important for the purpose. He is 
represented by his personal representative in the NSC. He is thus empowered to justify 
foreign policy decisions in the face of public criticism (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, 
p.293). 
The President chairs the NSC on issues regarding the intelligence services, 
defense, and foreign policy, however, he does not solely conduct the foreign policy 
domain (Tazmini, 2009, p.100). Even though the president is the second most powerful 
official after the Supreme Leader, in some more affairs, like foreign policy, defense, 
judiciary and many others, both offices share responsibility (IRI Constitution, Articles 
113-142). 
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3.5.2 The Council of Ministers 
According to Article 133 of the IRI Constitution, members of the Council of 
Ministers are appointed by the President with the advice of the Assembly of Experts. As 
head of the Council, he oversees the performance of the Ministers (Article 134 of the IRI 
Constitution). He coordinates the government decisions and ensures their implementation 
in the state system. However, he is required to take the Assembly of Experts on board for 
every decision. The essence of the ministerial post, its operational tasks, and procedural 
issues are provided in Articles 138 and 139 of the Constitution. This article, however, 
does not apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
3.5.3 The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) 
The Supreme National Security Council is the superior body associated with 
cou8ntry’s national security and defense policies. It is constituted by the Supreme Leader. 
This office emerged as a result of the constitutional amendments of 1989. Its policies 
have nonetheless co-relationship with country’s other issues: economy, polity, society, 
culture, intelligence, etc. (Buchta, 2000, p.23). The Constitution thus reads:  
“In order to protect national welfare, safeguard the Islamic Republic, and 
territorial integrity and national sovereignty, the Supreme Council of National 
Security is established under the leadership of the President of the Republic. Its 
duties are as follows: 1. determining the defense and security policies of the 
country within the boundaries defined by the leadership; 2. coordinating political, 
social, informational, cultural, and economical activities in relation to general 
defense and security concerns; 3. benefiting from the country’s material and 
spiritual resources in confronting domestic and foreign threats.” (Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Article 176). 
The SNSC is headed by the President since he is in charge of the country’s policy 
formulation. (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, p.293). Its other members are the heads 
of the Judiciary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Interior, Revolutionary 
Guards and Regular Army, Speaker of Majles (Parliament) and the Supreme Leader 
representatives. In addition, each decision of the SNSC is forwarded to the Supreme 
Leader for consent (Dumitrescu, 2010), which was not always guaranteed. For instance, 
the SNSC had proposed that the Supreme Leader attack and occupy Herat province in 
response to the Taliban’s killing of nine Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif in 1998 
(Jehl, 1998; Cafiero and Wagner, 2013; Agarwal, 2014). The proposal was shelved by the 
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Supreme Leader for fear of an open war with the Taliban as a consequence (Byman, 
2001, p.24). 
3.5.4 Iranian Force 
Iran has two military forces, the Artish (the regular army) and the Pasdaran 
Inqilab Islami (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps / IRGC). Each has its own identity 
within Iran’s security system (Byman et al., 2001, p.54). 
The different missions of these institutions have had an impact on the nature and 
attributes of the security institutions involved. The former is an internal risk minimizer 
since it formulates and implements strategies in a manner that could marginalize the 
potential damages from the enemy side. The latter engages in fight for the defence of the 
country, even outside its borders. (Byman et al., 2001, p.42). It is on the forefront for 
meeting the security challenges facing the country. (Byman et al., 2001, p.53). The 
difference between Artish and IRGC stem partly from the rivalry between them in the 
past. It is important to be said that IRGC has started as a militia group organized under 
the order and protection of Ayatollah Khomeini in order to safeguard Islamic Revolution 
in Iran from the then Artish which swears its allegiance to the Iranian King. Even after 
the Islamic revolution has happened Artish has remained under the suspicion of the 
Supreme Leader as if it continues to support the King in exile. This rivalry, although does 
not take place today, after so many years have elapsed, does, however, continue, among 
other reasons, due to the legal base that was set in the Constitution of Iran, which foresees 
functions of Artish and IRGC that often overlap. Thus, based on article 143 and article 
150 Artish and IRGC should be concerned with military and ideological protection of 
Iran from foreign aggression and influence accordingly. However, de facto, as the 
example of Iraqi aggression shows, both forces intend to intervene in each other’s realm: 
Artish – have a say in ideological debates and IRGC – become involved in direct military 
decision. Other issues of rivalry concern doctrinal issues, different access to materiel and 
recruits and last but not least great civilian control by the Artish (Alfoneh 2011). 
3.5.5 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 
The role of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Pasdaran Inqilab 
Islami in the Persian language, is crucial in Iran’s political system. Its role is, however, 
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seriously debated in public domain of Iran as compared to the role of Artish, so-called 
“regular” military force of Iran. The debates on the role of IRGC are mostly concerned 
with its growing political importance and vast economic resources of this “revolutionary 
institution” (Katzman 2011).  
The IRGC was established by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 (Article 150 of the IRI 
Constitution). He also created Basij military force the same year (Article 150 of the IRI 
Constitution), initially independent Basij became subordinate to IRGC in 1981 by the act 
of the parliament under the control of the IRGC consisting of 20 Million Iranian armed 
men. Thus, the main task of the IRGC is “providing for all the citizens a program of 
military training and its facilities, in accordance with the criterion of Islam such that 
everyone will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the country and the order 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Article 151, Constitution of IRI). 
 The purpose of IRGC is to safeguard the Islamic Republic from the foreign 
aggression, provide internal security, guard Iranian Revolutionary values and export 
(Johnson, 2012, p.190) and provide financial and other kind of support to Islamic 
movements across the globe. It has around 4 million military men for the purpose, beyond 
“standing army” - the reservists, subcontractors and volunteers (Buchta, 2004, p.9-10). 
The IRGC consists of various groups. Its special group conducts underground 
operations and organizes intelligence activities within and outside Iranian geographical 
borders (Octavina, 2010). In fact, the “The IRGC has no geographical border. The Islamic 
revolution is the border of the IRGC.” (Byman et al, 2001, p.54).  
A part of the annual national budget [Author’s note: in 2010-2011 amounted to 
USD 368.4 billion] is allocated to the IRGC, which has been varying over the years for 
changing defense-budget allocation in the overall national budget. In 2010-11, it was 
USD 5.8 billion as compared to the USD 4.8 billion for the army (Artesh) the same year. 
However, unlike the army, the IRGC has direct access to Iran’s foreign exchange reserve. 
The IRGC’s Khatam al-anbiya unit, resembling the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, was 
allocated USD 25 billion for gas and oil mining during 2009-11. In addition, the IRGC’s 
role is visible in other sectors also: economic, legal etc., which together have made the 
IRGC one of the most important actors in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The army has no 
such role within the constitutional framework (Alfoneh, 2011, p.33). The Revolutionary 
Guard’s importance in Iran is due to its well-known entrepreneurial activity as well, that 
puts it in the direct interest to safeguard the Islamic Revolutionary order of Iran also 
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outside its borders. Thus, for instance, according to the Iranian Minister of Oil during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013), IRGC was running gas projects in South Pars 
equal to USD 21 billion and is involved in a number of other gas pipeline projects (BBC 
2011, 26 February). It justifies IRGC’s active involvement in the region and in 
Afghanistan, that this study is concerned with, which I elaborate on in the next chapter. 
3.5.6 Regular Army (Artesh) 
The Artesh (Islamic Republic of Iran Army) is the formal military force of Iran. Its 
responsibility is to safeguard Iranian territory and to maintain internal peace and order. 
The Artesh is composed of three forces, the Air Force, Navy, and Army (Grossman 
2011). 
It has a wide range of powers on national security issues for both advice and 
action. Its functional role recognizes no geographical borders within or outside the Iranian 
domain. It has a direct role in procuring military supplies, organizing military exercises 
and training and discussing the annual national budget. However, its domain on the 
procurement of military supplies is mandated to have the consent of a political think tank 
in Tehran on the basis of its political calculations and budget limitations (Grossman, 211, 
p.54). 
In October 1998, Khamenei created a new position of the Supreme Commander 
for the regular army which is analogous to that of the IRGC in 1981. However, with the 
creation of the post of supreme commander, the regular military was now equal to IRGC 
in this regard. This move meant that in the event of a war with Afghanistan or any other 
power, Iran would rely on the role of its regular army and the IRGC both (Buchta, 2000, 
p.147). 
3.6 Legislature 
The legislature is represented by the Iranian parliament (Majles-e Showra-ye 
Eslami) which is an Islamic Consultative Assembly. Majles are accountable to the 
Council of Guardians (another important component of the legislature that hold a 
reviewing power), the latter can veto any of Majles’ decisions. As of today, roughly 40% 
of the Parliament’s decisions have been overturned, which can arguably be considered as 
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Majles’ lesser powers vis-à-vis the Council of Guardians. The Parliament’s role is 
nevertheless important as it affects a number of foreign policy decisions. Namely, the 
Parliament approves all international treaties and agreements, as well as bilateral and 
multilateral contracts to which Iran is a party. 
3.6.1 Majles-e Showra-ye Eslami (Parliament) 
The Majles is to oversee the budget, propose bills, and confirm treaties and the 
performance of the President and Ministers (Article 71-90 of the IRI Constitution). Thus, 
Iran’s annual budget must be ratified by the Majles (Article 52-53 of the IRI Constitution) 
through discussion under its Speaker, a strong actor since he can sometimes afford to roll 
back the decisions of the President by his “power of review”. 
Its members need clearance by the Guardian Council nomination in the Majles. 
This pronounces the role of the Supreme Leader in its decisions as half of the Guardian 
Council members are directly and remaining half are indirectly appointed by him.  
The Majles head, the Speaker, is elected by the Majles members. In case of a 
constitutional dispute between the Majles and the Guardian Council, the Expediency 
Council mediation remains supreme. Anyhow, the competence of the Majles is to seek 
clarification in writing from the Ministers regarding the decisions of their respective 
Ministries. Therefore, the Majles has a wide role in country’s policy formulation 
including foreign policy affairs. Its Foreign Affairs Committee is, of course, proactive 
when it comes to the issue of foreign policy (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, p.293). It 
can exert a great deal of pressure on government institutions for both national interests 
and the Iranian Islamic ideology (Kostiner, 2009, p.171). 
3.6.2 Guardian Council (Shora-e Maslahat-e Nezam) 
This Shora-e Maslahat-e Nezamis is the most powerful body in the overall Iranian power 
structure (Mishal and Goldberg, 2014, p.87) as can be gauged from the following 
passage: “All civic, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, 
and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle governs 
all the articles of the constitution, and other laws and regulations. The determination of 
such compatibility is left to the Foqaha of the Guardian Council” (Article 4 of the IRI 
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Constitution). It is comprised of 12 members (Article 91-99 of the IRI Constitution), half 
appointed by the Supreme Leader and half by the Majles on the recommendation of the 
chief of the Judiciary Council (who is himself appointed by Supreme Leader). The tenure 
of all members is either 6 years or until new elections, whichever is earlier. 
The Guardian Council regulates and oversees the Majles proceedings. It can 
recommend reformist candidates for election (Samii, 2001) and obstruct the passage of 
un-Islamic and un-constitutional laws in the Majles. (Mishal and Goldberg, 2014, p.87). 
A Decree passed by a 75% vote in the Guardian Council has constitutional value.  
3.6.3 Expediency Council (Majma-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam) 
The Expediency Council, also termed as the Majma-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e 
Nezam, was created in 1988 with 35-40 members. Its permanent members, which are now 
290, are appointed by the Supreme Leader and the temporary members on the need-basis 
only. It is meant to resolve as and when there is a constitutional dispute between the 
Majles and the Guardian Council (Article 156-158 of the IRI Constitution), of course 
under the advice of the Supreme Leader (Rakel, 2009, p.34).  
In addition, the Council is competent to pass laws on its own under “emergency” 
conditions, and neither the Majles nor the Guardian Council has the right to challenge 
such laws of the Expediency Council (Giles, 2003, p.134). 
The Expediency Council is the other major clerically-dominated organ of the 
government with a disclaimer that it does “not become a power alongside the other three 
powers”. Presently, it has transformed into a legislative body though its decisions are 
reviewable. In fact, one-third of its laws were reviewed in its first four years of history 
(Gheissari, 2009, p.252). 
The Council designs the so-called “Grand Strategy” and proposes foreign policy 
guidelines. Ayatollah Rafsanjani, its former President, is now the head of the Tehran’s 
Friday Prayer body (Imam). (The Friday prayer is a vehicle to convey the views of clerics 
each week). Within the framework of “Asian Identity,” he advocates close ties with 
Russia, China, and India and free market exchange within the global economy (Maleki, 
2002).  
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3.7 The Judiciary 
According to the letter of Iran’s Constitution (Article 156), the judiciary is an 
“independent power”. Its role is in ensuring the rule of law and the order in the country in 
all areas, except those legal matters which are considered to have constitutional aspects 
and importance. The latter areas fall under the jurisdiction of the Council of Guardians. 
While civil and criminal cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Public Courts, the issues 
of a national concern are considered only by the Revolutionary Courts. Such cases are 
important for foreign policy decisions and include, inter alia, national security matters, 
drug-trafficking issues etc. (Sial, 2011) There is also a special Clerical Court for the trial 
of the crimes where clerics are suspects. Since the decisions of the Revolutionary and 
Clerical Courts are final (Alexander and Hoenig, 2008, pp.16-17), they may be arguably 
considered more powerful in comparison with the Public Courts. 
The institution of the judiciary serves as a bridge between the offices of the 
President and the Supreme Leader. Its head, the Rais-e Qowa-e Qazaiyya, is appointed by 
the Supreme Leader for a term of 5 years and retains office at his discretion. He has to 
ensure the conduct of judicial proceedings as per the Islamic and Iran’s Revolutionary 
ideology (Mahmood, 2009, p.53). As argued above, the judiciary is an independent body 
responsible for the imposition of Islamic laws and recommendation of 6 non-religious 
scholars for the Guardian Council (Bruno, 2009). 
The Iranian constitution has prescribed the following structural organization of the 
judiciary branch: 
- Head of the Judiciary: 
Appointed by the Supreme Leader from amongst the Muslim jurists (Mujtahids) 
for 5 years, the head of the judiciary holds high-ranking position in the judicial, 
administrative, and executive structure of Iran. He is believed to be well-versed in judicial 
knowledge and managerial skills (Article 157of the IRI Constitution). 
- Minister of Justice: 
The minister of Justice is appointed from amongst a panel of names recommended 
by the President of the Judicial Branch to the President of the Republic (Article 161 of the 
IRI Constitution). He is responsible for the relationship of the judiciary with the executive 
and legislature. He is also competent to set up lower-level judicial courts, define their 
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jurisdiction and arrange for their premises and personnel, in accordance with the law 
(Mahmood, 2009, p.94). 
- Office of the Supreme Leader: 
The Office of the Supreme Leader consists of those clerks and other officials who 
represent the Supreme Leader in almost all Ministries and government and civil 
institutions. These representatives are sometimes more powerful than the Ministers 
(Schirazi, 2007, p.73). 
The Supreme Leader’s representatives constitute channels through which he 
knows about the changes to be affected in foreign policy decisions. They ensure that the 
Supreme Leader’s position remains paramount on the decision-making bodies 
(Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, p.293). 
Indeed, the Office of the Supreme Leader and its working reflects the mind and 
thought of Khomeini in the country’s foreign policy. Obviously, this office is considered 
to be the strongest in terms of its role and influence on Iran’s strategic foreign policy 
goals related especially to the USA (Vatanka, 2008). 
Amid huge controversies and opposition by the U.S. and Israel in particular, the 
executive, judicial and legislative set up of Iran so meticulously structured as has little 
scope of its collapse in future. Alamdari writes that “The political structure of the IRI is 
not constructed like a canopy, in which removing the central pole causes its collapse; 
rather, it is built on many independent, rival, parallel columns of power that hold the 
system together” (Alamdari, 2005, 129). Even Bill Clinton admitted this reality of Iran’s 
conspicuous but well-structured political design. To quote him,  
" ... Iran is the most perplexing problem ... we face, for the following reasons: It is 
the only country in the world with two governments, and the only country in the world 
that has now had six elections since the first election of President Khatami [1997]." (Bill 
Clinton, 11 February 2005 issue of Executive Intelligence Review) 
Precisely, Iran’s executive, judicial and legislative bodies do not overlap in real 
functioning. Realm of responsibility is clearly defined on foreign and other policies. The 
Supreme Leader is meant to approve or disapprove the foreign policy initiatives 
submitted by the President of the country. The President is required to shape foreign 
policy in coordination with the other power centers. The Guardian Council seeks, 
develops and recommends foreign policy guidelines for adoption within the constitutional 
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framework. The Foreign Minister gives feedback to the policy planners about 
establishment, retention or continuation of foreign relations with other countries. The 
SNSC (Supreme National Security Council) is a key institution for debating foreign 
policy issues. Although the Majles (Parliament) has no direct role in foreign policy 
decision-making, it can issue statements in its regard at regional/international levels 
(Rakel, 2010, pp.109-110) After the necessary process is complete at all levels, the 
foreign policy bills are referred “from below” to the Supreme Leader for consent “from 
above” (Sadjadpour, 2010, p.7).  
All this presupposes diversification of institutions, formal and informal, for a 
common cause and a politically pluralistic approach for dealing with most sensitive and 
complex issue of maintaining and winding up foreign relations with other nations of the 
world. It is a reality that such an approach bounced back sometimes during the Iran-Iraq 
War and Iran Hostage Crisis. The country nonetheless remained intact and gave little 
rather no chance for fragmentation and foreign aggression or adversary (Nourbakhsh, 
2005).  
3.8 Informal foreign policy institutions 
Informal actors make significant contributions to the Iranian political sphere 
(Sallam, Mandelbaum and Grace, 2007). These are sometimes more influential than the 
formal bodies of the government (Thaler, 2010, p.35). They possess a say in foreign 
relation matters and are often seen active in the public debates. But, there is no such 
institutional mechanism as could tend to distribute power among them (Rakel, 2008, 
pp.58-59). 
In all, four groups influence Iranian foreign policy: those who form a breakaway 
group of Iran’s political or bureaucratic leadership; those legislative and other 
government actors who share power with the executive (described in detail above); those 
who are politically active in the Iranian society and those who form the civil society 
groups for opinion-building in foreign relations. These groups are especially active during 
internal and external crisis (Hagan, 1989, p.343). 
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3.8.1 Religious Foundations (Bonyads) 
Religious Foundations (Bonyad) characterize yet another contributory to Iran’s 
political and economic domain. The most important Bonyads are Imam Khomeini Relief 
Committee (IKRC), Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, Martyr’s Foundation 
and Imam Reza Foundation (Rakel, 2008, p.38). These are meant to evaluate and promote 
the Islamic and Revolutionary values in the country. Those ways, these Bonyad are 
sometimes comparable with those formal institutions (Saeidi, 2009), which receive direct 
orders from the Supreme Leader and are accountable only to him. They thrive on the 
resources drawn from donations and charity, of which they transfer to the office of the 
Supreme Leader for routine functions (Aris and Snetkov, 2013, p.104). Even these 
Religious Foundations have their indirect role in shaping the country’s foreign policy for 
they provide necessary feedback to Iranian policy-makers.  
The largest charity organization is the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC), 
which raises funds from both governmental and non-governmental organizations within 
and outside Iran (BBC Persian, 2009). The foundation is mandated to "support as much as 
possible the needy outside the country based upon the Islamic Republic of Iran's 
government policies” (BBC Persian, 2009). 
A part of the funds so raised are provided to newly-wedded couples (USD 220), 
farmers (USD 700), Afghan families (approx. USD 7,000) and Afghan orphans (around 
USD 72,000) as help, aid, assistance, loan etc. In the first 6 months of 2011, the IKRC 
provided an amount estimated at USD 623,000 (non-cash assistance only) in Herat 
province. This is in addition to the relief given in-kind: sugar, cooking oil, flour etc., and 
assistance given for training courses of auto mechanics and sewing workshops (Peterson, 
2013). All such philanthropic activities of the IKRC are perceived to support Shiism, the 
Iranian ideological and political base and its anti-American narrative (Christensen, 2011).  
Besides the Bonyads, the Iranian cultural groups contribute to the foreign policy 
formulation and execution. Indeed, these cultural groups represent the country in foreign 
lands through the medium of their concerned Embassy (Buchta, 2000, p.50). 
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3.8.2 Friday Prayer Leaders Association (Imam Joma) 
The Friday Prayer Leaders on whom Friday Prayer is obligatory, are extensively 
used as a special conduit by the Supreme Leader, Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC), Expediency Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President of Iran for 
the furtherance of Iran’s domestic and foreign interests. They are meant to publicize the 
Supreme Leader’s position on important aspects of Iran’s domestic and global issues 
considering that they are under his direct control (Rakel, 2009, pp.54-55). 
In Iran, the week begins on Saturday and ends on Friday and millions of people 
offer Friday Prayers across the country. These prayers provide a platform for the 
government to invoke public support regarding its domestic and foreign policies. The 
Imams of the Friday Prayers, the leaders, have thus a crucial in building public trust for 
the state.  
3.9 Individual Actors and Associations 
3.9.1 Individual Actors  
Within the Iranian political system, powerful individuals also impact the country’s 
foreign policymaking. One of them is Faqih, the term describing the religious role of the 
Supreme Leader as an individual (not political figure). Although no one has, to date, 
substituted his political role, it does not mean that Iran has no active political leaders after 
the Supreme Leader (Maleki, 2002, p.39-58).  
The Faqih makes an apt case. The position was created by the Council of Experts 
on 4
th
 June 1989. He remains an important person to influence country’s foreign policy 
domain, the President, the heads of Expediency Council, Parliament and the others.  
3.9.2 Iranian Youth Organizations  
Youth constitutes the largest population in Iran: over 60 percent of Iran’s 73 
million people are under the age of thirty (30). Compared to the 57 Muslim countries, 
Iranian youth is particularly active in country’s political life. It remains on the forefront of 
the opposition to the government policies. That way, the Iranian youth pose a threat to the 
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changing governments (Wright, 2010, p.48). The youth organizations are generally made 
up of the college and university students in Iran.  
Office for Strengthening Unity, Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat, is Iran’s largest 
student organization which surfaced to pursue Imam Khomeini's given Revolutionary 
Islamic thought in 1979. Its branches are spread across Iran’s state and private 
universities. While its initial agenda was to resist the liberal secular policies and support 
the Islamic Revolution, subsequently it diversified the same with the inclusion of human 
rights issues in it (Wright2010, p.51). 
3.9.3 Students for Freedom and Equality 
It is a left-wing student organization established in 2006 to resist the presence of 
security in Iranian universities. It organized peaceful demonstrations in December 2007, 
following which around 70 people were arrested, the majority of whom were members of 
the Students for Freedom and Equality (Khiabany and Sreberny, 2009, pp.129-130). 
3.9.4 Green Movement 
It is an informal youth association that surfaced in response to the alleged rigging 
of the Presidential elections on June 12, 2009. Its initial forms of protest were confined to 
the boycott of consumer goods and the display of anti-government graffiti by youth, both 
men and women (Nesvaderani, 2010). President Mehdi Karoubi and former Prime 
Minister Mirhossein Mousavi were the prominent Green Movement leaders in Iran.  
3.10 Summary 
The aforesaid discussion profiles Iran’s structural formation for governance and 
foreign policy management. The institutional structure is unique for it combines state and 
non-state actors for building Iran nation and making it powerful enough to thwart any 
hostile design from within or outside the country.  
However, in all this, Islam remains the nerve of the Iranian regime and its foreign 
policy and the post of the Supreme Leader is its main driver. As it becomes apparent from 
the above analysis of various norm of the Iranian Constitution, the Supreme Leader 
dominates each and every branch of power of the Iranian state. The letter and spirit of the 
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Constitution make it clear the Supreme Leader’s role cannot be overestimated by saying 
that he guides and advices the state actors and institutions both formal and informal on 
matters of national importance, which includes the foreign policy issues in the first run. 
Most of the Iranian formal institutions are led by Iran’s hardliners who are loyal to the 
Supreme Leader and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution. His absolute authority is 
sometimes so imposing that other organs and actors of the government are bound and 
restricted by them in their official business. 
The tension between the republican and religious elements in the constitution and 
the overlapping competencies of the various elements in the formal structure of Iran are 
important messages the present chapter has communicated, they are the pieces of the 
foreign policy puzzle that serve the better understanding of how and who shapes the 
foreign policy in Iran. It provides an initial thought as to where the contradictory foreign 
policies of Iran take their roots. 
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Chapter 4. Iran’s Foreign Policy Review: three presidents, four visions 
 
Foreign policy formulation and execution is always a ticklish issue with every 
government since various compulsions and complications must be considered. Iran’s 
position is particularly complex due to its nuclear question marks, anti-Western rhetoric 
and its impasse with neighboring Saudi Arabia. Regional and international experts on 
Iran’s foreign policy unanimously agree that Iran’s foreign policy is caught up between 
its insightful ideology and political and institutional complexities. To quote Mahan 
Abedin saying that the “foreign policy making process in Iran is considerably more 
complex; that consensus is either lacking or where it is achieved, it is at an unacceptably 
high price. Moreover, the actual policies often reflect the tensions and divisions 
bedeviling the Iranian elite, leading foremost to inadequate implementation”. However, 
he states that “Iran has made huge inroads in relatively non-contentious foreign policy 
areas, namely in the region where it is steadily emerging as the dominant power. But now 
it is faced with a hostile global climate, an outcome that is directly tied to Iran’s 
antagonistic relationship with the West” (Abedin, 2010). 
The diversified nature of its policies and foreign affairs are a result of both Iran’s 
officials and formal institutions. But there remains a significant scope for political 
malfunctioning in the overall system of the country. It may unfold a crisis of greater 
magnitude, which, in the event of delayed response, could deepen on the analogy of the 
1979 Iran Hostage Crisis. Notwithstanding that more than 38 years have passed and 
regional and global geopolitics has radically changed since the Iran Hostage Crisis, it can 
nonetheless be a lesson for the present government. Any delayed response to the potential 
crisis could be suicidal for Iran keeping the surging Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle East 
and bitter US-Iran and Iran-Saudi relations in mind. Forthcoming crisis aside, the Foreign 
Ministry is already marginalized due to its high-level of institutionalization. As a result, 
the Iranian leadership has become a subject of great criticism. Further, ideological 
diversification, internal power struggle, personal rivalry, sectarian and/or factional 
dissension can all impede the decision-making process in foreign relations. Therefore, the 
profound philosophical and ideological contradictions have penetrated into every Iranian 
institution, which breeds the lack of consensus on a broad range of domestic and external 
issues (Abedin, 2010). 
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Iran encountered a battery of complications from within and outside Iran: the Iran-
Iraq War, UN economic sanctions for its nuclear program and anti-Semitic stance. 
However, it managed to withstand till date. But hereafter, it seems to be difficult, if not 
impossible, in view of steeply growing differences with the US-led West and the Saudi-
guided Middle Eastern Muslim world.  
Since the domestic policy has a co-relationship with the foreign policy narrative, 
the overpowering role of the Supreme Leader at the cost of other actor or organs serves 
only to deepen inbuilt complexities. Subject experts unanimously agree that the foreign 
policy of Iran is caught up in strange ideological, political and institutional complexities.  
Notwithstanding the complexities and contradictions, Iran continues to show 
resilience in its domestic and foreign policies and disallows their allied challenges or 
complexities to affect its basic governmental edifice. Towards this end, the formulation of 
the foreign policy is examined from the four major visions as reflected in the 
governments of the three Iranian presidents. 
 This chapter analyzes the goals and objectives of Iran’s Afghan foreign policy 
from 2001 to 2014. During this period, a number of internal changes took place in 
Afghanistan, significantly, the fall of the Taliban and the U.S. Afghanistan invasion in 
2001. Meanwhile, in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected to the office of the 
President, however, it is perhaps still the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan that 
brought about a major change in Tehran’s relations with Kabul.  
Further, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that Iran’s foreign policy has several 
dimensions. One dimension revolves around the Sunni-Shia discourse and is paramount 
to understanding the ideological foundations of Iran’s foreign policy. The other 
dimensions are in the economic, political and cultural realms. The discussion below 
shows as to how far Iran’s foreign policy narrative is workable in real practice. The 
chapter, in particular, is focused on the analysis of the foreign policy objectives of Seyyed 
Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani, for their relevance 
to the present study.  
The Iranian foreign policy is reviewed on the basis of the information contained in 
the secondary sources and the primary sources (interviews in Iran and Afghanistan), 
gathered from the empirical analysis conducted during the field trips of the investigator of 
this study. Further, the chapter presents the analysis in light of one of the major concepts 
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of International Relations (IR) - realism (for more on the theoretical approach see: chapter 
1, subchapter 1.9), operationalized in this chapter in order to explain Iran’s Afghan 
foreign policy.  
Iran’s Afghan foreign policy has experienced changes in various periods, 
depending upon the changing dynamics of Afghanistan’s political structure under 
different regimes: the Soviets (1978-1992), Mujahideen (1992-1996), Taliban (1996-
2001) and the post-Taliban 2001 US-sponsored interim government in Afghanistan. 
Beyond that, another thing is also certain – the dynamics in Iran also have played their 
role, and the foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan, indeed, has always been, 
throughout the history, determined by the internal political processes of both, Iran and 
Afghanistan. The analysis of the foreign policy with consideration of these changing 
dynamics serves as a tool to unfold the main argument of the present study on the 
contradictory foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan. 
The chapter unfolds in the following way. It starts with describing a paradigm 
shift in the Iranian foreign policy objectives, which is to be associated with the Islamic 
revolution (section 4.1). Then, I present the four main visions, partly overlapping with the 
tenures of the three Iranian presidents, existing in the Iranian government with regards to 
Afghanistan, that I formulate as geopolitical, geographical-cultural, geostrategic and 
geoeconomic (section 4.2). I elaborate on the Iranian foreign policy sources after the 
Islamic revolution (section 4.3). The discussion on the trajectories of the foreign policy is 
discussed in greater detail in the analysis of the important elements of the foreign policy 
Iran pursues (section 4.4). Last but not least, the analysis of the goals, done in the sections 
above, allows one to summarize the objectives of the foreign policy, corresponding to the 
presidencies of Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani (section 4.5). The last paragraphs 
summarize the outcome of the chapter (section 4.6). 
4.1 Islamic revolution: a paradigm shift for Iranian foreign policy objectives 
The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 is undoubtedly the most significant 
development in Iran’s modern history. It led to an inside-out revivalism of the country’s 
political and cultural identity. It injected Iran into global politics. It pointed to a transition 
from the decades-old pro-American Shah regime to a new theocratic-republican political 
and economic model of the state. The structural renaissance of Iran’s political system had 
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thus religious and republic orientations, which eventually opened vistas for revival of the 
country’s domestic and foreign policies.  
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 took place at a time when the global politics was 
conspicuously divided into bipolar identities; the pro-US Capitalism and the pro-Soviet 
Communism. The newly emerging nation was determined to safely position itself in 
between two opposing blocks. Eventually, the Islamic Revolution pre-empted Iran to re-
orient its foreign policy for expediency. While it espoused the slogan of “Neither the East 
nor the West”, it devised its own model of state by combining theocracy with 
republicanism for furtherance of its interests within and outside Iran. Indeed, a new 
foreign policy approach was the natural corollary of the Islamic Revolution and its 
orientation to perceive beyond the East and the West. It became operational during the 
Imam Khomeini’s period. True, changes were affected in it from time to time. But, these 
did not exclusively discard Khomeini's original plan of the state-building and foreign 
policy formulation and execution on the basis of the Islamic Revolutionary and modern 
republican thought/s. It was a sort of combination of continuity and change in Iran’s 
foreign policy narrative.  
With the demolition of the old order, a purely new and unique political structure 
emerged in the post-Islamic Iranian Revolution in 1979. Although the new order assured 
convergence of Islamic and democratic narratives, it could not balance the two, and thus 
its foreign policy was affected by sequential system fault-lines. These breed cardinal 
contradictions and indiscreet conflict between and among formal and non-formal actors 
and institutions, and thus cause a split between the state apparatus and a parallel, 
vertically integrated “shadow” status system under the direct control of the Supreme 
leader (Mason, 2015, p.86). For this reason, western diplomats began to label Iranian 
policy strategy as a “black box”. The opaque and contradictory characteristics of Iran’s 
foreign policy, in general, are also observed in its relations with Afghanistan. This study 
demonstrates and emphasizes the difference between Iranian foreign policy goals towards 
Afghanistan as clear and aiming at influence and the de facto foreign policy 
implementation, that at times seems to conflict with these goals, as being rather 
contradictory (see in particular chapter 6). 
The 1979 Islamic Revolution was a turning point in the history of Iran as it 
determined the Iranian Foreign policy objectives for the following decades and religion 
was one of the major driving forces behind Ruhollah Khomeini’s orchestration of the 
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aforesaid Revolution. The Revolution was also an antidote proposed not only to Ulama 
and to Iranian merchants, the so-called Bazaaris, against the allegedly utterly corrupt and 
brutal reign of the Iranian Shah. During the first ten years after the Revolution, however, 
Iranian foreign policy can be described as featuring the "combination of the pragmatic 
and ideological considerations", whereas "pragmatism became more evident" than 
ideology in the subsequent ten years of the Revolution (Rakel, 2007a). Consequently, 
security and economic concerns began to dominate Iran’s foreign policy formulation and 
execution (which was the case during the Shah’s regime and according to realism is what 
foreign policy is concerned with). The latter was indisputably a shift from the isolation of 
Iran after the revolution to interdependence and cooperation with other countries (Beasley 
et al., 2010). The balancing attempts between the ideology and pragmatism and the final 
choice made were explained by the Professor of Political Science in Tehran: 
“If we will look back to the history of Iran’s foreign policy after the revolution, 
the Iranian government was struggling between idealism and realism and it was 
and still is dependent on the domestic/internal as well as of course international 
events, especially in the Middle East. This struggle was resolved when Iran made 
a choice in favor of its pragmatic considerations. We are evidencing a clear 
pragmatic shift in the foreign policy of our country in the last years. Changes in 
the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq wars
11
, internal economic problems, 
negotiations with the West on Iranian nuclear program are only some of the 
variables in Iranian foreign policy shift towards pragmatism. Yet, I believe, they 
are the most important ones”. (K. S., personal interview, 10 April 2017) 
This is an interesting explanation that allows one to suggest that it is not only the 
Supreme Leader and clergy who direct the foreign policy but regular politicians and 
bureaucrats as well. This shift was observed and perceived not only in the western 
academic literature but by the Iranian scholars inside the country as well. It was further 
confirmed in another interview in Iran. Thus, according to the Research Fellow of the 
Iranian think tank in Tehran:  
“Iran started to realize the importance of the external factors – cooperation with 
the countries of the region- for its own survival. We need to manage our relations 
in such a way as to adjust them to the realities around us. Actually, this is what the 
Iranian government does today. We must fight IS, there is no other way, as IS is a 
threat to Iran. On the other hand, we continuously work on enhancing of our 
relations with other countries, not in the immediate neighborhood, like Russia, 
China, India, and EU, which is a must for ensuring Iran’s economic goals and 
objectives. You see, today the ideology became a servant for the Iranian realistic 
national interests.” (A. Sh., personal interview, 8 April 2017). 
                                                 
11
 In particular, Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) has allegedly pushed Iran to a more pragmatic foreign policy due 
to its high cost. 
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The recognition of the importance of cooperation by the Iranian leadership had to 
naturally emerge from Iran’s long isolation and the consequent attempt of Iran to re-
establish positive relations with other countries. Such attempt can be seen as somehow 
reflecting the Iranian leader’s recognition of the benefits of interdependence, and hence of 
the importance of the external factors (Beasley et al., 2010).  
This chapter argues that, initially, Iran upheld the concept of a pure Islamic State, 
and shaped its foreign policy accordingly. With the passage of time, however, its foreign 
policy changed, from idealism to pragmatism, due to the rapidly transforming geopolitical 
setting from bipolar to unipolar and to a multi-polar world, which has affected Iran’s goal 
at the international arena. Iran has rationally adopted a pragmatic foreign policy towards 
most actors (both state and non-state) that fall within the ambit of Islam as ideology, 
while also continued focusing on the ideological part (which was greatly reduced over the 
period of time, though). The ideological dimension was exhaustively used to mobilize 
people during the time of formation of the Islamic state of Iran against the USA that was 
presented by Iran to the population as the primary enemy of Muslim Ummah
12
. Ever since 
the Islamic state of Iran has settled down as a people’s republic, the ideological aspect of 
the foreign policy has decreased considerably.  
To summarize the above, Iran’s foreign policy was drawn to the accomplishment 
of two fundamental objectives: one, to fight back its arch-enemy - the US, and second, to 
organize the Muslim Ummah against the anti-Islamic block. Currently, however, Iran’s 
extent of enmity has widened. Besides the neighboring Sunni world led by Saudi Arabia, 
Iran has potent threats from the non-state actors, the ISIS/Daesh, Al-Qaeda etc. 
Eventually, Iran revamped its foreign policy to fit in the new geopolitical scenario. 
Shunning its Revolution-times isolation, it began developing cooperation both with the 
Muslim and non-Muslim world. Some of the major practical changes that have taken 
place in the foreign policy of Iran, in light of the above-described shift, would generally 
include: 
"adopting a new flexible approach toward the United States; forging closer ties to 
Russia; deepening the Khatami-led cooperative détente with Europe; improving 
Iran’s role and image in the international community and international 
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 The word Ummah literally means Muslim society. 
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organizations; fostering better relations with the Arab world—particularly in the 
Persian Gulf; stabilizing relations with Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq; enhancing 
regional cooperation; exploring new security arrangements; and, simultaneously, 
upgrading its military preparedness" (Afrasiabi and Maleki, 2008). 
Obviously, more thrust is on pragmatism than the Islamic ideological dimension. 
Foreign policy towards Afghanistan is no different from Iran’s aforesaid paradigm shift in 
its general foreign policy, especially after the Taliban’s fall in 2001. The foreign policy 
shift towards Afghanistan followed the change in Iran’s domestic policy due to the 
country’s tilt towards democracy and the security threat exacerbated by the foreign forces 
presence in Afghanistan.  
Specifically, the chapter emphasizes that the main policy goals include the 
development plans which Iran adopted over a period of time. These pertain to the 
following areas/objectives: 
 Promoting Iran’s security interests (also by undermining the U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan); 
 Building ties with the political parties and individuals within Afghanistan, such 
as Afghan officials and Shia minorities;  
 Safeguarding the Shia minority rights and bringing them into Iran’s political 
mainstream. 
While the Shia factor at the first glance creates an impression that Iran is only 
driven by ideological concerns, the issue, in fact, is quite tricky and one should not 
misunderstand how this factor, embedded in Iran’s political mainstream, serves the 
pragmatic approach Iran has of placing its security considerations at the forefront. The 
sections below (as well as this study in general) demonstrates how Iran is able to achieve 
this goal technically, by focusing on the above objectives. 
4.2 The four major visions of Iran’s government regarding Afghanistan  
Iran has a number of opportunities as well as challenges and threats coming from 
Afghanistan’s internal and external dynamics. Thus, Iran sees Afghanistan as an 
economic market and at the same time as a threat in terms of security due to the internal 
chronic conflicts in Afghanistan and the external factors such as the presence of the U.S. 
troops and the long-lasting competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The weaknesses 
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of the Afghan government, the long border with Iran, the long history of Iranian 
involvement in Afghanistan and a number of other factors make it very complicated to 
understand how Iran is exhibiting its political interests in Afghanistan. 
For the purposes of convenience, however, I single out the four major areas for the 
review in this particular chapter, which I call four visions (perceptions) regarding 
Afghanistan existing within Iranian government: 
- Geopolitical vision: 
Iran knows well that its Afghan neighbor is fragile on many accounts. 
Nevertheless, it pursues the geopolitical vision while keeping its larger security, 
economic, ethnic and other interests in mind. For the fulfillment of these interests, it goes 
as far as to engage with the Taliban and other anti-governmental groups, while at the 
same time enhancing its cooperation with the Afghan government. It does so despite 
knowing that the latter is supported and sponsored by its arch-rival, the United States. 
- Geographical and cultural vision:  
Under this vision, Iran endeavors to befriend those groups and minorities which 
share the same culture and religion (specifically, this refers to the Shia branch of Islam) 
and are part of the Persian civilization (which includes linguistic affinity). Iran wants all 
such groups to share the Afghan power. While some in Iran want only to empower the 
Shia population, others want the Afghans of Tajik ethnicity
13
 to enjoy Iran’s patronage as 
well. There are also groups in the government who believe that both groups should be 
patronized. 
Due to its importance for understanding Iran’s geographical and cultural vision, it 
is relevant to provide an overview of the Sunni and Shia Islam dichotomy and existing 
discourse, which I analyze in light of the above-mentioned vision of Iranian government. 
 For the sake of historical clarity, a short remark should be made on Shia mazhab
14
 
before going further into the terrain. The Shia emerged as a consequence of the 
martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson, Imam Hussein, in the Battle of Karballa. They held 
that Hazrat Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet, was actually entitled to the Khilafat after the 
Prophet’s death; hence, denounced the Khilafat of the first three Khalifas (califs). Since 
                                                 
13
 There is a linguistic affinity between Tajik Afghans and Iranians, since Dari (spoken in Afghanistan), 
Farsi (Iran) and Tajik (Tajikistan) are essentially the same language. 
14
 Mazhab is a school of Sharia Law in Islam. 
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Iran is largely inhabited by the Shia, it has been, as such, upholding the cause of the Shia 
all over the world. The Shia is dominant in Iran, Lebanon, Bahrain, Syria, Iraq (Husain, 
Kéchichian, Dabashi and Moussalli, n.d.). In 2015, there were approximately 1.8 billion 
Muslims in the world (Pew Research Center, 2017), while Shia constituted a minority, 
approximately 10-13 percent (Pew Research Center, 2011, pp.153-154).  
Very tactical, Khomeini and his associates used Islam as a tool to oust the pro-
American Shah and the decade’s long Pahlavi rule. The use of Islam by Rahbar can be 
compared with the idea of “Pan-Arabism” of Jamal Abdul Nasser in the 50s in Egypt 
where it was used as a means of mobilization of the nation (Terry, 2013). He (Rahbar) 
followed the constructivist approach to elevate Shiism as compared to the Sunnism. The 
constructivist approach demonstrates how the Iranian foreign policy was socially 
constructed in the international relations right after the Islamic revolution and until the 
death of the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. During that period, the Iranian 
leadership has situated the country’s shared values and ideas within the ambit of Islam, 
and, at the same time, sustained support to the Shias of Afghanistan, while not 
disregarding their counterparts in Pakistan, India, and Central Asia and the Middle East.  
- Geostrategic vision: 
Based on this vision, Iran shapes its Afghan policy in a manner as would 
marginalize its enemies, the U.S. in particular. To this end, it utilizes all its tools and 
resources, to implement its policy. Strategic goals and cooperation of Iran with other 
regional powers, such as Russia, China, India, and Central Asian countries are also aimed 
to limit the U.S. influence in Afghanistan and in the whole region. The core institution 
which has this geostrategic view is Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and it can 
be considered the main body which implements this policy in Afghanistan.  
“Afghanistan has been at the core of Iranian foreign policy since the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. It can be stated that this country has been important for Iran for 
different reasons First, Afghanistan has a geopolitical importance for Iran meaning 
that Iranian foreign policy has noted its geographical and geopolitical situation. In 
other words, it has been and still is considered that Afghanistan is the neighbour of 
Iran and apart from the nature of politics and government in this country, Iran has 
to come to terms with the governing state. It may be said that efforts made to 
establish a relationship with the Taliban within the last two years of its ruling, can 
be evaluated in this framework.” (Haji-Yousefi, 2012) 
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- Geo-economic vision: 
For Iran, the export of its goods to Afghanistan and use of Afghanistan as a transit 
route to Central Asia and China constitutes a major geo-economic interest. Precisely, Iran 
has invested significant resources in the construction of the transit routes within 
Afghanistan through a number of projects (discussed in Chapter 6 and 7). 
With regards to the geo-economic vision, one thing requires clarification. Indeed, 
Iran, like any other country strives to attain economic growth. However, in this regard, 
one has to highlight that such economic growth often presupposes a country’s willingness 
to open itself to the world. In the case of Iran, the situation does not fall under this 
generally accepted view, as this country continuously tries to make sure that geo-
economic considerations do not collide with Iran’s overall perception of the imports, 
coming from the West as, what Iran considers to be, the “soft war”, posing in long-run a 
danger to the Islamic core values and even to the very integrity of the country’s regime 
(Sariolghalam, 2018).  
However, understanding Iranian foreign policy is difficult, since a number of 
individuals and institutions are involved in its formulation and execution. In many cases, 
the policy is not public and the objectives are usually kept secret. Moreover, the fact that 
Afghan people and even Afghan government, based on their past experiences with Iran 
and its policies towards Afghanistan often pigeonhole this country, by sticking various 
labels on its policies, which often is done in the manner that is quite exclusive, makes it 
difficult to unambiguously name Iran either a friend or an enemy.  
On the one hand, following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Iran has been suspected 
of creating security challenges in Afghanistan, namely in the western part of the country. 
By supporting insurgency and organizing attacks on governmental entities and even 
civilians, Iran is following its strategic agenda which can be narrowed down to 1) giving 
warning to those who are against the presence of Iran in Afghanistan; 2) putting pressure 
on the Afghan government to give a bigger space for Iran in the political agenda of 
Afghanistan; and 3) demonstrating its power to the western counterparts in Afghanistan, 
namely to the U.S. (but also to the Afghan government). 
On the other hand, however, the Iranian government claims to have provided 
support to the Afghan government worth billions of USD for a number of construction 
projects. The focus of such support is mostly on trade and in the transit sector, where 
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Iran's activities have been more overt, making its geo-economic vision more 
comprehensible. The covert activities (analyzed in this study) are observed when it comes 
to Iran’s security and political considerations towards Afghanistan – its geopolitical and 
geostrategic vision.  
4.3 Overview of the Post-Revolution Iranian Foreign Policy Motives 
Although the literature on Iran's foreign policy is vast, the details about the driving 
forces of this policy are far from clear. Nevertheless, I dare to offer the following critical, 
though non-exhaustive, explanations with regard to the impetus behind Iran’s foreign 
policy towards Afghanistan:  
 The general driving force behind Iran’s foreign policy is its perceiving of the 
existing global world order as unipolar, dominated by the US, a major rival of 
Iran. Iran’s strategy is to fit itself in the same order while keeping its larger 
national interests in mind.  
 Another major driving force is the complex Iranian domestic structure and the 
incompatibility issues existing between conservatives and the liberals, 
hardliners and the moderates as well as various cultural groups.  
 Economic troubleshooting has been one of the major drivers of Iran’s foreign 
policy, considering the fact that the UN has periodically imposed economic 
sanctions on Iran for its alleged nuclear program, a perceived threat to Israel 
and its allies.  
 Iran's foreign policy is driven by its concern with the composition of global 
power (the international distribution of power, and precisely Iran's place in it), 
with the domestic policies (the internally belonging to regime factional, 
strategic and cultural competition). 
 The Shia-Sunni rivalry is another potential driver of Iran’s foreign policy. 
Pertinently, Iran represents the Shia sectarian groups within the Middle 
Eastern/West Asian region. It perceives the Wahhabism and Sunnism as a 
potent threat to the Shia followers in general. Such a perception followed the 
Khomeini-guided Iranian 1979 Revolution. Though Khomeini, theoretically 
speaking, espoused that Revolution was meant to protect the Muslims in 
general, in practice, Iran stood for the Shia in particular. Consequently, the 
post-Revolution Iran aims at overturning the Sunni or the Saudi power 
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domination in the Middle East, following the nexus between the US, Israel and 
the Sunni Muslim Arabs (Katzman, 2015). 
A digression should be made here to elaborate a bit on how the Shia factor should 
not be seen as purely an ideological tool that Iran uses, but as a tool very much embedded 
into the pragmatic approach Iran pursues. In fact, the notion of constructivism of a 
famous campaigner of this approach - Alexander Wendt is suitable for an explanation of 
the usage of the Shia factor by Iran during the Khomeini era. His doctrine of 
constructivism has two dimensions. One relates to the composition of the human 
association, in our case, Shias, who are welded together by the common idea of Shiism. 
Second, the dimension of constructivism underlines that the “identities and interests of 
purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature" 
(Wendt, 1999, p.1), both dimensions help to understand the trajectories of Imam 
Khomeini’s approach in the foreign policy.  
 To study Iran’s foreign policy via the combination of discourse study (in the 
narrow sense: a study of text and talk) and constructivist approach is a way that has, 
indeed, been often used. A normative discourse on IRI foreign policy principally 
emanates from political Islam (Shia Islam), the constitution of Iran, the guidance of Imam 
Khomeini and the history of Iran as a strong nation in the region (Nia, 2012). In fact, the 
composition of Iran’s Islamic ideology and pragmatism in its policies were 
complementary to each other during the first years of Khomeini's Islamic Revolution 
(Friedman, 2010). However, it is not always clear as to which one of the two is a priority: 
the ideology is making use of the resources which the nation possesses or the nation 
represented by the country of Iran, is making use of the ideology for the sake of 
increasing the power and weight it has within international community (Posch, 2013). 
This study, based on the realism perspective as a theoretical foundation of the analyses, 
assumes that most of the obtained data speak in favor of the second, particularly as 
applied to the timeframe of the present analysis – from 2001 to 2014.  
Iranian policy-making experienced substantial change after 1989. The shift from 
the ideological use of Islam to other factors that gained more importance is crucial in 
shaping Iran’s relations with the rest of the world. Thus, the historical events in 
revolutionary Iran became turning points in its foreign policy. The combination of the 
post-revolutionary internal changes in Iran, including the demise of the Supreme Leader 
Khomeini in 1989 with the changing settings in its neighborhood in the post-Khomeini 
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era (like Gulf war, the consequences of the Cold war and, most prominently, the collapse 
of the USSR) led to the paradigm shift from Khomeini’s “Neither East, nor West” to his 
successor Khamenei’s and Iranian President Rafsanjani’s so-called “Both North and 
South”. (Ramazani, 1992, p.393) 
Although supporting the Islamic movement is still one of the aims of Iranian 
foreign policy, the difference from the time of the Islamic revolution is evident. Back 
then, the support was ideological and much larger, it reached out almost to every Islamic 
movement in the world. Nowadays, this support is focused only on the Middle East and 
only to those against the Israeli state. The export of the Islamic revolution was principally 
an important part of Iranian foreign policy following the regime change in Iran. 
Gradually, however, after the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and other changes in Iran, such 
as the death of Khomeini and the internal economic problems, this idea has lost its 
ideological meaning and became the basis for economic modeling. President Rafsanjani 
believed that the revolution should be exported via Iran’s economic development. The 
idea of such approach was an assumption that if Iran, as an Islamic state, proves that it 
can manage its economic development, then other Islamic countries will voluntarily adopt 
such a model which would all but ensure achievement of the principal goals of the 
Islamic revolution. (Moeinaddini and Entezarulmahdi, 2009, pp.203-204)  
The emphasis on the economic modeling, rather than on the ideological aspects of 
the Islamic movement has naturally become possible due to “the rise of the dual 
leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani” 
(Ramazani, 1992, p.393) as opposed to the monocracy of the Khomeini leadership.  
The essence of this dual leadership was in the following. In 1989, the presidential 
system was established by the amendment to the Iranian constitution that formally put an 
end to the prime minister post. Rafsanjani, thus, became the fourth president of Iran, who 
in the absence of the prime minister and because of his close relations with both old and 
the new Supreme Leaders, was vested with a strong decision-making authority, which he 
exercised in order to shift the foreign policy into the economic and pragmatic directions. 
(Bakhash, 2015) Under the above-mentioned amendments to the constitution, the 
National Security Council was formed under the president. It is an important institution of 
policy-making and serves to increase and affirm the president’s power (Yapp 1996, 
p.351). The power of future presidents will change based on their personalities and 
particular affiliation to Rahbar. 
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In other words, the Iranian foreign policy, which presents the Iranian regime as a 
rational actor (Amuzegar, 2014, p.121), is rather constrained than motivated by ideology 
(Warnaar, 2013, p.11), whereby ideology is more a compulsion. This setting (though with 
variations) can be observed for the whole period under the investigation in the present 
study (from 2001 to 2014). 
The economic impetus behind the foreign policy of Iran is not only politically 
supported but also voiced today by the Iranian intellectuals. A prominent scholar in Iran, 
a Professor of political science of the Tehran’s University draws a clear line between the 
ideological motives vs. economic considerations, whereby he favors the economic once: 
“I do not agree with the ideological approach to the foreign policy, when it is 
about ideology ‘two plus two, not equal four, but five’ when it is about ideology 
‘you die or you kill – in any case, you are the winner’. We need the economic 
allies and we need to give preference to the religion-based relations in general as 
opposed to the Mazhab-based affiliations. This has been realized by our 
policymakers: that in today’s world we can’t win with an ideological approach 
only. Iranian policy-makers need to build an economic union from Afghanistan to 
Iraq, include here also Lebanon, Syria and Mediterranean states. We need to 
consider Russia as a part of this union, as well. Without Russia, building such 
economic union is unlikely to easily happen. Russia needs to have access to water 
due to its geographical location, but it still has more geopolitical goals in the 
region, comparing to the US, which has more geo-economical goals. The U.S. is 
primarily after the resources.” (H. P., personal interview, 09 April 2017)  
This invalidates the argument that the Iranian regime is primarily guided by 
ideological considerations, particularly by the political interpretation of Shia Islam 
(Amuzegar, 2012). It includes many other aspects, that allow one to justify the approach 
to Iran foreign policy from a realist perspective.  
Once again, it is true that the 1979 Constitution of Iran emphasized the ideological 
factor of its foreign policy. Accordingly,  
"The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the rejection of any 
kind of domination, both its exercise and submission to it; the preservation of the 
all-inclusive independence of the country and its territorial integrity; the defense 
of the rights of all Muslims; non-alignment in relation to the domineering powers; 
mutual peaceful relations with nonaggressive states." (Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 1979, Article 152).  
Since Iran’s Islamic Revolution gave rise to the “first theocratic regime” in the 
modern world, the spirit of ideological thoughts then dominated decision-making 
concerning foreign policy. Rather, revolutionary ideas back then dominated the new 
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government and its foreign policy (Amiri et al., 2010). Subsequently, however, Islamic 
ideology took a backseat to pragmatism (Flanagan, 2009). 
The discussion on Iranian “realism” versus “idealism” has long characterized the 
academic debates on Iranian foreign policy, both inside and outside the country 
(Katouzian and Shahidi, 2007). Only recently, a third view of Iranian foreign policy 
behavior emerged: the one based on a constructivist approach to the study of Iranian 
foreign policy (Warnaar, 2013, p.11) that tries to balance between realism and liberalism. 
In this study, however, the Iranian politics in the timeframe from 2001 to 2014 is looked 
at primarily through the lenses of the realism. 
4.4 Important Elements in Iranian Foreign Policy 
This part of the chapter focuses on the main features/elements of the Iranian 
foreign policy: inter alia, on the ideological (including Shia factor, security, geopolitical 
and economic) ones. They are congruent with the “visions” discussed above in section 4.2 
and are meant here to continue the discussion on the sources, factors, and trajectories, 
analyzed in section 4.3, in greater detail. These main features/ elements form the core of 
the Iranian foreign policy, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Iran’s behavior with 
the world, outside its own borders. 
4.4.1 Islamic Ideology (Revolutionary Islam) 
The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 is undoubtedly a landmark in the history of 
modern Iran. It combined theocracy with democracy, possibly a mismatch, and created a 
cluster of formal and non-formal actors and organs to complement each other for smooth 
government running, foreign relations managing and reshaping Iran’s internal and 
external dynamics, as the previous chapter has demonstrated. In consequence, Iran 
remained neither exclusive with the East nor with the West. Instead, it chose a mid-path 
for posterity (Saghafi-Ameri, 2009, pp.136-137).  
For the first decade after the Islamic Revolution, two ideological stances 
determined Iranian foreign policy: Khomeini’s general perception course of “Neither East 
nor West, but the Islamic Republic”, and the idea of the “Export of the Revolution in 
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order to free Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries from their oppressive and 
corrupt rulers” (Rakel, 2007a). 
The Iranian crucial political position is the one that is based on mutual protection: 
Islam for the Republic and the Republic for Islam. Simultaneously, the Iranian 
government takes control of both the country’s security and the economy, since the lack 
of material sources exposes the Islamic system itself to danger (Matar, 2012). Ali 
Khomeini, the prominent conservative head, is alleged to have scaled down the 
President’s over-arching powers in the foreign policy domain. Thus, he superimposed the 
Guardian Council; a group of clerics and laymen, on his authority (Abdo, 2013). 
Similarly, the Expediency Council’s foreign policy authority is substantially marginalized 
purportedly for balancing and building confidence among those constitutional bodies 
which were feeling threatened due to the extraordinarily growing powers of the 
Expediency Council.  
After the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and particularly starting from the presidency 
of Rafsanjani (1989-1997) Iran’s religious agenda and its relations with the outside world 
were also changing and underwent a transformation. This depended on the national and 
international situation at this particular time. Though President Rafsanjani in his interview 
given in 2003 mentioned that the Islamic factor is subject to change depending on the 
situation (Matar, 2012), he, most importantly, also maintained that: “we [Author’s note: 
Iranians] can solve whatever foreign problem is threatening U.S. from the viewpoint of 
Islam… Our ideology is flexible. We can choose our expediency on the basis of Islam. 
Still, to put the country in jeopardy on the grounds that we are acting on an Islamic basis 
is not at all Islamic” (Savyon, 2003). The two statements exhibit inconsistency in the 
thinking of Iran’s ruling elite about the future of its relations with the outside world. At 
the same time, these too suggest Iran’s preparedness towards change for good, 
irrespective of religious considerations. 
The Iranian leadership prioritizes its interests according to the attainment of 
stability in its system. The prioritization of these interests is based on religion and 
depends on the following three formulas: that religion should contribute to and strengthen 
the national interests of the country; national interests should be holy and symbolic for 
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Muslims and the ideology in Iran, namely its connection to the notion of "Mahdism”15 
and that the religious interests should be juxtaposed and serve the Islamic cause within 
and outside Iran. The interrelation between these religious and material aspects are of 
great importance for Iran’s vitality, sustenance, rationality and the interpretation of 
religious texts, etc. (Matar, 2012). 
 Iran's foreign policy is guided by the leitmotif of the "revolution" and religion for 
a variety of reasons. First, the religious issues are related to the Islamic order in Iran and 
“Mahdism”. The government incorporates religious discourse in the country’s national 
framework (Matar, 2012). Second, the Supreme Leader has a particular religious and 
ideological outlook. His suggested religious acts become law with the consent of the 
country’s President (Matar, 2012). Third, religious discourse accompanies the state-given 
legitimacy to Islam (Matar, 2012). 
4.4.2 Shia Islam in Iranian Foreign Policy  
Shiism is one of the two main branches of Islam, and Iran is the only dominant 
Shia regime in the world. The Velayat-e Faqih system, which stems from the essence of 
Shiism in Islam, constitutes the foundation of the political structure of Iran. Shiism has 
some sub-branches in itself: Imaamiyyah, Ismalliyyah, Zaidiyyah, and Naseeriyyah.  
One can perhaps consider the Shia mazhab in Islam as the cornerstone of Iran's 
foreign policy since the 1979 Islamic Revolution (Rakel, 2007b, pp.149-150). Iran 
positioned itself as a player who could change the setting of Islam in a region where, for 
decades, Sunnis had been dominant. The Revolution itself was perceived by Iranians as a 
Shia revolution rather than an Islamic revolution generally, since Shia had no share in the 
country’s power politics for a very long period of time (Barzegar, 2008) because of the 
regime in the Ba’athist Iraq and the oppressive Sunni Arab policy (muthloomiya) toward 
the Shia in general. The Islamic Revolution in Iran enabled the Iranian Shias to raise up 
their heads in the world (Rhode, 2013), which, in the process, led to a great deal of 
clashes between the two mazhabs (Sunni and Shia): the Shias in Iran and the Sunnis in the 
Persian Gulf, as well as the secular nationalists in Iraq under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein (Barzegar, 2008). 
                                                 
15
 Shias expect the Twelfth Imam (Imam Mahdi) as the Twelfth Imam until the end of time, to return to 
save the world when it had descended into chaos. 
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By supporting the Shia minorities in Iraq, Pakistan, the Arab world and 
Afghanistan, Iran's strategic goal remains to safeguard its security and economic interests 
in the region. However, Iran’s Shia-centric policy has caused domestic tensions in 
Afghanistan. Afghan Sunnis who constitute the majority of the population, often regard 
Iran's support to Shias as a source of conflict between the two mazhabs. On the other 
hand, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have historically supported Sunnis in Afghanistan 
including the Sunni extremist groups during the post-Soviet Afghan Civil War and 
various Sunni militant groups today. This fact also contributes to the appearance of a 
violent face to the religious factor in Afghanistan (which is elaborated in other chapters of 
the present study in detail).  
The current Iranian leadership seeks to secure a leading Iranian role in the Middle 
East. Towards this end, the recent Arab Spring opened up opportunities for Iran to 
pragmatically play the ethnoreligious card (the Shia mazhab card) to counter the Saudi-
led Sunni anti-Shia movement in the Middle East (Miller, 2018). 
It may be expected that Iran will continue pursuing a more pragmatic approach in 
its foreign policy for fulfilling the strategic, security, economic and other goals in the 
current geopolitical setting, the same approach that was expected already 20 years ago 
(Sadri, 1998). Thus, the present Iranian situation is in many ways different from what it 
was at the time of the Iranian Revolution (Barzegar, 2009). 
4.4.3 Security and Geopolitical Concerns  
Iran’s geographical setting is such that it has mounting security threats all around 
it. Iran has northern borders with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Caspian 
Sea; to its east lie Pakistan and Afghanistan; Iraq - to its west; Turkey - to the northwest; 
to the south - the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. In fact, the 
stability of the entire region is very fragile, which has presented Iran with challenges all 
around including the Arab Spring in the Middle East, the emergence of the Islamic State 
in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and growing Shia-Sunni divide due to the 
swelling Iran-Saudi differences. Besides, in the north, Iran’s challenges are caused by the 
instability of the processes in the political, economic and social spheres of the Caucasus 
and Central Asian States (CAS) that include socio-economic problems, high labor-
migration rates and political transformations. To the south, Iran is challenged by the 
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cross-border infiltration and drug culture emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. To 
reduce this non-traditional security threat, the three countries warrant strict border 
management. Equally important to Iran’s security is the threat posed by the U.S. presence 
along the Afghan-Iran border and the unending Afghan political instability in Afghanistan 
(Barzegar, 2010). It has intensified with the changed US-South Asia policy and its intent 
to stay on in Afghanistan until lasting peace is achieved. A further complication to this 
entire situation is the involvement of competing foreign powers in Afghanistan.  
Iran’s security has become critical in the given circumstances, warranting it 
thereby to take proportionate measures for redress as per the realist thought: “States act in 
response to their vital needs, not in response to international norms or institutions” (Sadat 
and Jones, 2009, p.95). Thus, quite a significant portion of Iran’s budget goes toward 
protection of its own security (Barzegar, 2009). 
Since 1979, Iran’s foreign policy was aimed at addressing various challenges and 
threats radiating from the west especially the U.S. and Israel, at the same time both feel 
threatened by Iran, its nuclear programme and the Islamic ideology that they tend to 
equate with extremism, fundamentalism, and even terrorism. This is in addition to the 
threats emanating from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/ISIL (hereinafter also 
referred to as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/ISIS) and the Wahabi-centric, anti-Shia 
movements in the Middle East, the Arab world, and Afghanistan. Iran views ISIL as a 
Sunni extremist movement backed by Saudi Arabia against the Shia Iran. Recent reports 
suggest the presence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) fighters near the 
Iranian border on the Afghan side (Levkowitz, 2017). It is possible that Iran will continue 
and re-establish its support of the Taliban and other groups that oppose ISIL, as the 
Taliban movement has declared war against the ISIL in Afghanistan. Interestingly, from 
the Iranian perspective, such support of the Taliban is “positive” as it helps to fight the 
“common enemy” of Afghanistan and Iran, as the Professor of Mashhad University 
explains it: 
“Iranian security is under the threat of ISIL and it [Author’s note: ISIL] receives 
the support from Arabs, to be used against Iran. As it is clear that Arabs have had 
a long history of supporting Mujahideen in Afghanistan and they are very well 
aware where the weakest points are - where to create a problem for Iran and it is 
security. For example, in Farah province of Afghanistan ISIL is very much active 
and we [Author’s note: Iran] have a long border with Farah, therefore we must 
help those who will fight with them right there, on spot. It can definitely be also 
Taliban, but of course also the Afghan government or even our own military 
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forces. Iranian support and relation (if there is any) with Taliban will not make 
problems for Afghans. I would call it even positive relations, as in this case Iran 
manages them [Author’s note: Taliban] to fight and stop our [Author’s note: Iran’s 
and Afghanistan’s] common enemy”. (H.A., personal interview, 14 April 2017) 
More important, however, has been the fear caused by the presence of U.S. forces 
in its immediate Afghan neighborhood. In fact, Khamenei, in a meeting with the former 
Afghan President, Karzai, stated that the withdrawal of the foreign military forces from 
Afghanistan is the wish of Iran: "The people of Afghanistan are suffering from the 
presence of American troops in their country, because this presence will bring about 
suffering for the Afghan people and the entire region” (Office of Iranian Supreme Leader, 
2011). The Iranian leader also referred to the U.S. President Barack Obama’s promise to 
withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan and cautioned that: “The Americans are after 
permanent bases in Afghanistan, which are dangerous because, as long as American 
forces are present in Afghanistan, genuine security will not be established” (Office of 
Iranian Supreme Leader, 2011). These statements of concern reveal Iranian leadership’s 
efforts to communicate the threat the U.S. poses to Afghanistan. The US-Afghan policy 
under Trump contributes to the above statements, as it now seems clear that the U.S. will 
not move its bases from Afghanistan. On August 21, 2017, announcing his new “Strategy 
in Afghanistan and South Asia,” U.S. President Donald Trump stated that: “Conditions on 
the ground – not arbitrary timetables – will guide our strategy from now on. America’s 
enemies must never know our plans or believe they can wait U.S. out” (White House, 
2017). Iran must cope with these new realities.  
Iran’s foreign policy has thus changed from idealism to pragmatism (Barzegar, 
2009) due to the changing geopolitics in the region and globe (Farhi and Lotfian, 2012, 
p.117). This can be observed in the way Iran has behaved in the international arena in 
recent years. This pragmatic approach is evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that Iran 
realizes the necessity of creating strategic allies and maintaining relations with them, due 
to the insecurity (as viewed by Iran) in the light of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan 
(Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, pp.284-286). It’s pragmatism towards Afghanistan, 
thus, is rooted in the U.S. presence in this country. Every Iranian foreign policy move 
with regards to Afghanistan revolves around this fact. 
Iran’s Foreign Policy Review 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
97 
4.4.4 The Economic Element of Foreign Policy 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the Iranian 1979 Revolution, carved out an 
independent Iranian state free from outside influence. He also created its strong economic 
base with the support of its natural resources. In fact, the economy is considered central to 
the Iranian foreign policy during the post-Revolution period (Hinnebusch, and Ehteshami, 
2002, p.305). Oil and gas exploration and export contributed significantly to the making 
of modern Iran, modernization of society and industrialization of the country. Over a very 
short period of time, the economics and politics of oil began to influence the foreign 
policy and national security strategy of the country (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, 
p.288).  
The reinforcement of the status quo has been ensured by the continued domination 
of religious leaders and the monopoly with regards to the natural resources in the country. 
After 1990, the change which has happened in the environment of Iran in geopolitical 
matters, as well as outcomes of the Cold War, it became evident to the leadership that the 
economic concerns in making foreign policy would shape the main strategy for Iran, 
although one should, certainly, not understand it as the total replacement of ideology 
factor with an economic one (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002, p.305). 
Iran is aware that its economic strength is dependent upon the high price of export 
energy while a low price will weaken its economy. As a result, from 1988 on, Iran 
pursued policies to increase oil income, by all means, including cooperation with other 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or oil-producing countries of the region, 
notwithstanding conflicts with many of them on various issues (Hinnebusch and 
Ehteshami, 2002, p.289). 
Thus, contemporary Iran has largely been built upon oil wealth. The country’s 
modernization has equally become dependent on hydrocarbons. Iran’s foreign policy, 
national security, and political structure are equally dependent upon its potential to 
produce and market its energy wealth (Wheeler and Desai, 2016). At the moment, Iran's 
economic strength has weakened due to financial pressures in the form of economic 
sanctions from the outside (Laub, 2015). Of course, economic sanctions and the low 
energy prices in the global market that followed them might be seen as an impediment to 
the modernization process pursued by Iran. It adopts various alternatives to counter the 
financial pressures, among them is an attempt to develop and enhance relations with 
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Russia, China, India, and Central Asia and using Afghanistan as a transit corridor for 
marketing Iranian goods in Central Asia (despite political fragility in Afghanistan), South 
Asian countries, Russia and China, whereby transporting them via the Wakhan Corridor 
of Badakhshan.  
 Iran-Afghanistan relations also have energy and trade-allied contours since 
Afghanistan offers a transit corridor to Iran and it is one of the biggest importers of 
Iranian goods. The trade volume between Afghanistan and Iran has been only increasing 
from 2013 onwards. The economic element of the foreign policy is crucial for the 
survival of Iran as a country, as a regime as a key economic actor of the region, and 
inevitably as a country that can remain to be the biggest Shia-dominated country of the 
world, which will be elaborated in further details in chapters 6 and 7. 
4.5 Iran's Foreign Policy Objectives 
The previous sections above were mostly related to the goals/aims Iran has. This 
section is focused on the objectives/tasks Iran is trying to realize for advancing its foreign 
policy goals. With a reference to the above sections, one has to repeat that Iranian foreign 
policy was rooted in the Islamic ideology, framed by the great revolutionary Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and followed by his Prime Minister Bazargan (during the 
time period 1979-1980). Iranian foreign policy allows registering a change after the death 
of Khomeini: from utopianism to pragmatism and from isolation to integration into the 
world community. President Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) played a key role in this 
regard. President Khatami has followed his course during his presidency, by appealing, 
inter alia, to the notion of Islam in connection to “liberty and development” (Khatami, 
1998). Khatami, in particular, resumed dialogue with the countries of different 
civilizations of the West (see Khatami, 2001). Ahmadinejad, however, reversed 
Khatami’s process by reverting back to the Revolutionary-centric Islamic ideology of the 
Khomeini times (Soltani and Amiri, 2010). Yet, the present President of Iran, Hassan 
Rouhani, again made some important changes in country’s foreign policy to improve its 
socio-economic conditions for the accomplishment of its nuclear vision. Thus, as is 
already stated about, based on the individual/personal characteristics of the Iranian 
presidents the pendulum of the foreign policy was swinging between ideological and 
pragmatic concerns. 
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Since half of the period of present study (2001-2014) is covered by the Khatami’s 
tenure as the President (1997-2005) and the rest by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) 
and Hassan Rouhani since 2013, a review of Iranian foreign policy objectives has to be 
done in consideration of these different regimes, each with its own peculiarity.  
Seyyed Mohammad Khatami’s election as the Iranian President in 1997 was a 
"turning point" in Iran’s history. He established relations with the European Union (EU), 
and thus spearheaded the movement to take Iran to new heights through cooperation with 
the non-Islamic world. He chose a reformist approach by: 
 Pursuing detente in foreign policy to solve domestic problems with outside 
support; and  
 Introducing reforms in domestic politics to integrate with the global institutions 
of democracy etc. (Amiri, 2006).  
With the help of these broad measures, Khatami sought to upgrade Iran’s relations 
with the European states; present Iran as an active member of the international 
community; safeguard Iran's national identity; promote the Islamic ideology; and 
strengthen Iran’s dialogue with other civilizations (Tajik, 2003). 
On assuming the office of the President in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
promoted political conservatism among the elite and widespread disillusionment against 
the reformist measures of President Mohammad Khatami. During his Presidency, Iran’s 
foreign policy relapsed to the Islamic Revolution times. Ahmadinejad’s tenure was a 
dramatic change from Khatami’s foreign policy, since he pursued a non-cooperative 
policy with international organizations; took an antagonistic stance against Israel; 
despised big powers for their intervention in the internal affairs of other countries 
(Mowlana and Mohammadi, 2008); condemned the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and 
demonstrated “duplicity” towards Afghan imbroglio, keeping ties with Afghan 
government while, at the same time, supporting its rival Taliban group (Nader et al., 
2014).  
Unlike Mohammad Khatami's liberal-pragmatic vision or Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad's ideological-populist stance, newly elected Iranian President, Hassan 
Rouhani, pursues a centrist pragmatic agenda, which emphasized that Iran should engage 
in serious negotiations with the Western world; reduce regional conflict, and prioritize its 
economic recovery and the general well-being of its people above its nuclear program 
(Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013). Hassan Rouhani’s period is strikingly different in that he 
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established diplomatic connections with the U.S. in September 2013 under Barack 
Obama. He led a robust diplomacy to settle Tehran’s longstanding nuclear dispute with 
the West while keeping following objectives in mind:  
 To eliminate anti-Shia Islamic State (ISIS) militants from Iraq, Syria, and 
Afghanistan. He brazenly declared that “the Islamic Republic will not tolerate 
violence and terror as foreign-backed Takfiri militants wreak havoc in northern 
Iraq” (Rouhani, June 14, 2014, during a press conference); 
 Rebuild relations with Turkey, which were strained since 2009; 
 Manage the critical situation with the Arab world especially with Saudi Arabia 
(although there remains to be more troubleshooting in Iran-Saudi bilateral 
relations over the Yemen issue); 
 Restructure Iran’s relations with the EU and its major partner the UK 
(Ehteshami, 2014); 
 Facilitate total U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan (Harrison, 2014); and  
 Discreetly support the Taliban in its anti-US drive in Afghanistan (Nader et al., 
2014). 
In other words, Khatami and Rouhani’s foreign policy have been distinguishable 
from their Iranian counterparts in that they established and sustained relations with the 
West in general and the U.S. in particular, although it has not been that easy, after all, as 
can be thought of in practical terms. Their foreign policy attitude has been largely liberal 
and cooperative as compared to the conservative, parochial and confrontational policy of 
the last three Iranian Presidents. For example, during Ahmadinejad’s tenure, Iran adopted 
more of an isolationist economic policy, which, in return, led to the imposition of further 
UN and U.S. economic sanctions on Iran. Contrarily, Khatami and Rouhani pursued a 
liberal economic policy vis-à-vis other countries of the West and East. This is why 
Ahmadinejad was highly criticized within and outside the country. Rouhani even went a 
few steps ahead of Khatami. He established friendly relations with Saudi Arabia, despite 
alleging, at times, that ISIS (ISIL) is backed up by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US.  
4.6 Summary 
The foreign policy review conducted in the present chapter had an aim to 
thoroughly analyze the pragmatic aspects of Iran’s foreign policy objectives while paying 
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attention to the ideological moves it often contains. The analysis of the present chapter 
contributes to the overall argument of the study on the contradictory character of Iran’s 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 by providing clues to what may 
have been contributing to the implementation of often contradictory policies of the three 
Iranian presidents.  
The 1979 Iranian Revolution led to the setting up of an Islamic state in Iran. Soon 
thereafter, global geopolitics had a change from bipolarity to the unipolar setting in the 
world order following the collapse of erstwhile the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
the USA as the global leader. This development was followed by the 9/11 terror attack on 
the US, the retreat of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in 2001 and the launching of 
an anti-terrorist campaign by the U.S. at the global level. Iran was impacted by it since 
the US, in the course of its Afghan invasion, began to knock at its borders, which Iran 
perceived as a dire threat to its national security. This threat compounded that of the 
Saudi-led nexus of the Arab world against Iran on the sectarian grounds and the grounds 
of regional domination. 
Iran’s foreign policy is a subject to great criticism on the grounds of its innate 
contradictions between its adherence to ideology on the one hand and the need to be more 
pragmatic and realistic on the other. This leads Iran to take actions that may not appear to 
be in line with its stated ideological objectives, that this chapter was able to demonstrate.  
The reason behind this, that was revealed in the course the analysis is because of 
Iran’s irresistible urge to behave in a certain way in light of a number of factors, such as 
the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Saudi and ISIS-triggered anti-Shia drive in Iran’s 
Middle East and South Asian neighborhood, as well as authoritarian regimes in Central 
Asian and Caucasian states. This is beside the non-traditional security threats of Afghan 
refugees into Iran and thriving narcotic culture in Afghanistan with cascading effects on 
Iran. This chapter was able to demonstrate how Iran adopted a pragmatic approach to 
reckon with these threats and shaped its foreign policy accordingly. However, such an 
approach was not coherent. It changed under different Presidents of Iran due to the 
internal and external settings. While some based it exclusively on Islamic ideology and 
Shia security issue, others based it on cooperation with the Western and the Arab world. 
In the end, however, Iran perceives itself to be caught up in a web woven by the US, 
Israel, and Saudi Arabia against it. Iran tries to neutralize it by cultivating and 
strengthening its relations with Russia, China, Turkey, EU as well as with India. 
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It may be concluded, that Iranian foreign policy goals and objectives with regards 
to Afghanistan have remained on the forefront irrespective of the changing leadership in 
the country. The chapter elaborates on these goals and objectives of Iran from 2001 to 
2014 by juxtaposing them with the internal political processes in this country and the 
external factors, all in correspondence to the singled out four main visions of the Iranian 
government with regards to Afghanistan.  
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Chapter 5. Iranian Foreign Policy Interests in Afghanistan 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarizes the interests of Iranian foreign policy in relation to 
Afghanistan. The main issues explored are; what goals does the Iranian government 
pursue, and what are the reasons for its actions. Taking a realist approach, this chapter 
aims to conduct a theory-based, empirical policy analysis of Iranian foreign policy 
regarding Afghanistan. This chapter is based on the qualitative analysis of both primary 
and secondary sources. 
The present chapter provides the overall analysis of Tehran’s security, political 
and economic interests in Afghanistan, which will be elaborated on in the next chapters of 
the study in greater detail (chapter 6: security and political aspects and chapter 7: 
economic aspects).  
Section 5.1 provides an overview of the Iranian foreign policy interests in 
Afghanistan; section 5.2 focuses on the security issues; section 5.3 describes the patterns 
of the politics; section 5.4 analyzes economic interests; section 5.5 investigates 
empirically Iran’s ties with Afghan individuals and political parties. It explores, in 
particular, the aims of Tehran to gain support from political figures and the public for the 
implementation of its policies in Afghanistan; Section 5.6 highlights the importance of 
the Shia factor; section 5.7 provides an introduction (picked up in the subsequent 
chapters) on the link between Iran and the Taliban; section 5.8 draws a summary. 
Chapter four of this study already addressed the pragmatic change of the Iranian 
foreign policy in relation to Taliban after 2001, this chapter investigates and analyzes the 
line followed by Tehran in its relations with Taliban to a greater extent. The chapter 
further explains how Iran utilizes the Shia factor in order to achieve its goals in 
Afghanistan by introducing the Shia-based approach to its security demands and political 
course. Historically, Iran has considered Afghanistan a source of instability as well as an 
obstacle to its strategic aims. Therefore, Iran has long demonstrated its power and 
influence in making sure that western Afghanistan is secure from Iran’s enemies.  
 Iran’s policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan appear diametrically opposed. Iran applies 
both defensive and offensive policy towards Afghanistan. On the one hand, Iran is 
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destabilizing the country with its support of the anti-government and anti-US elements. 
On the other hand, since 2001, Iran has maintained strong political and economic ties 
with the Afghan government. Such policies may protect Iran’s interests but they have 
both positive and negative impacts on the internal situation in Afghanistan.  
The outcome of Iran adopting such policies towards Afghanistan can be observed 
from the varying positions of top Afghan officials in Kabul, who often disagree with the 
official policy towards Iran. For example, during his recent trip to Tehran, Afghan 
President Ghani signed the “strategic partnership agreement” and called Iran a strategic 
partner. However, at the same time, Afghanistan’s chief intelligence official accused Iran 
of destabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. 
The post-revolutionary enthusiasm of Iran could be clearly traced by observing its 
role during the U.S. intervention in 2001 against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Iran aided 
the Northern Alliance, one of the prominent opposition factions, during the transition 
period 2001-2004. Also during this period, Iran played an active part in shaping the 
interim government. At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Iran put pressure on 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, one of the leaders of the Northern Alliance, to concede his 
potential nomination in favor of Karzai, who has been supported by the U.S. (Takeyh, 
2006, p.123). 
Iran’s efforts to participate in shaping the new government extended beyond talks 
when in January 2002, at the Tokyo Conference, it offered 530 Million U.S. Dollars for 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Takeyh, 2006, p.123). Therefore, it may be assumed 
that at this particular stage the idea of exporting the Islamic Revolution (Iran’s logical 
intention as one of the world’s major Islamic actors) has been put aside in the face of the 
more important national security interests at the time. Moreover, Tehran’s objectives 
transcended the immediate issues of removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. As 
Khatami noted, “Afghanistan provides the two regimes (Iran and the US) with a perfect 
opportunity to improve relations” (Sadat and Hughes, 2010, p.31).  
Since the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, a new path has been 
established for Iran’s strategies and their implementation. Iran, alongside other allies, has 
become an important part of this path with the expectation of economic advantages 
through improved business and reconstruction efforts (Tarfeh, 2013, p.111). 
Iranian Foreign Policy Interests in Afghanistan 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
105 
Iran’s overall policy interests with regard to Afghanistan include the following 
five main objectives: 
1. To uphold effective political and economic relations with Kabul; 
2. To create a "sphere of influence" and a security zone in the western region of 
Afghanistan;  
3. To ensure that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan does not create any threats 
against the Iranian regime and Iranian interests in Afghanistan and the region; 
4. That the economic policy of Iran toward Afghanistan is not only narrowed 
down to supplying the internal market of the latter with Iranian goods; its 
essence is in Tehran’s strategic goal to be the essential partner in regional 
integration, particularly economic integration - Iran’s economic policy is to 
have access to the gas market in South Asia, China and Central Asia; and 
5. To secure its borders from drug trafficking.  
These strategic objectives are the result of the real circumstances due to Iran’s 
immediate border with Afghanistan, which means that even if Iran wanted to untie its 
relations with Afghanistan, it could not do so. Foreign policy reviewers in Iran 
conventionally understand the significance of Afghanistan for their country’s security, 
and this is reflected in their apparent need to demonstrate their presence in Afghanistan 
and uphold communication through diplomatic and intelligence data collection in 
economic, political and cultural areas (Posch, 2014, p.1). 
Since the international intervention to remove the Taliban from power in 2001, 
Iran’s influence in Afghanistan has gone through diverse stages. Primarily, Iranian 
relations and influence have been exerted through the projection of soft power, via 
economic and cultural affairs (Majidyar, 2012), which this chapter reveals. Iran’s security 
and intelligence agencies have become more active since 2001 following the U.S. 
intervention in Afghanistan in order to support the withdrawal mechanisms of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States and go assist Afghanistan’s 
political stabilization (Samad, 2013). 
Iran’s policies toward Afghanistan have several dimensions. On the one hand, Iran 
has been an important facet of the stabilization process in Afghanistan, since the Bonn 
Conference and beyond, notably through spending millions of dollars on reconstruction 
and construction projects as well as supporting anti-drug trafficking efforts. On the other 
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hand, Tehran has been accused of supporting the Afghan Taliban in order to counter U.S. 
interests and presence in Afghanistan (Torjesen and Stankovic, 2010, p.31-32). 
Iran’s support of the Taliban after 2001 is a complex issue particularly since it is 
very complicated to provide a clear understanding of the Taliban itself. A significant 
number of Taliban local groups have and continue to fight with the Afghan government 
and international troops and each group has different interests. While Iran’s relation with 
the Taliban indeed exists, its strongest ties are with some local insurgents (that call 
themselves Taliban) mostly in western Afghanistan and not necessarily the Taliban as an 
aggregate of all these factions. While these local insurgents appear under the name of the 
Taliban, the real nature of their affiliation is difficult to determine. This study is not 
aimed to explain the Taliban insurgency, although, throughout the research and study of 
the primary sources and interviews, the term “Taliban” has been used for all local groups 
who appear under this name.  
While Iran’s strategy in Afghanistan includes the security of Iran in terms of 
having a stable Afghanistan as its neighbor, its strategy is also greatly affected by its 
unfriendly relations with the United States. This unfriendliness is due to the United 
States’ close relationship with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s support of Hezbollah and Iran’s 
nuclear production (Sharma, 2012). In view of the cold relationship between Iran and 
Afghanistan during the Taliban regime, Iran’s policies in fact strongly supported assisting 
allies opposed to the Taliban that could lead to ‘a genuine strategic opening’ for Iran and 
U.S. (Cohen, 2011, p.38). However, the failed strategies to pursue peace in Afghanistan 
under the George W. Bush administration, and Iran’s concerns that its relations with the 
United States upon its nuclear production might worsen have led to changes in the Iranian 
policymakers’ estimations. These facts also impact the U.S. “strategy of managed chaos” 
in Afghanistan (Torjesen and Stankovic, 2010, p.32-33). This approach results in the 
destabilization of Afghanistan through the support of anti-government elements (Taliban 
and other insurgent groups), (Jones, 2008, p.61; Milani, 2011; Boon et al., 2011, p.478). 
For this reason, the U.S. points to Tehran’s important position in Afghanistan’s 
stabilization process, a result of which is an improvement of its role with respect to the 
U.S. (Torjesen and Stankovic, 2010, p.32-33). 
Over the last decades, Iran’s policies toward Afghanistan have been substantial 
and frequently productive. In 2002, President Bush linked Iran to the so-called “axis of 
evil”. This resulted in progress in the policy of Iran with regards to Afghanistan. For 
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instance, the Iranian government under President Khatami made pledges and assisted the 
reconstruction process in Afghanistan, and Iran’s policy toward stabilization in 
Afghanistan continued to be supportive. However, the signs of another, simultaneous 
strategy slowly became apparent beginning in 2005 when the new president of Iran, 
Mahmud Ahmadinejad, came to power (Akbarzadeh, 2014). Among the new moves in 
the Iranian strategy, one can name the focus on disruption of military activities of the 
foreign countries, specifically Britain and the United States, due to security concerns. 
Iran’s pragmatic policy involves maintaining Islamic unity and solidarity and to support 
the ethnic groups of Dari speakers and Shia Muslims in western and northern 
Afghanistan. Beyond this, Iran has economic interests and wants to keep its position as a 
regional power (Koepke, 2013, p.12). 
However, Iran’s policy in Afghanistan has not been considered favorably by 
everyone, and it is viewed with a degree of anxiety and caution in Afghan society and 
Afghan political circles. In particular, Iran's pragmatic and sporadic support for some 
group of Taliban and Iran’s struggles to advertise its cause through academic means, 
religious and press organizations have brought up concerns and doubts about Iran’s 
objectives in Afghanistan (Bhatnagar, 2013, p.2). Amongst Afghanistan’s neighbors, Iran 
is the only one to exert a degree of influence to balance out the influence exerted by 
Pakistan (American Institute of Afghanistan Studies, 2009). 
Being viewed as an important regional power, Iran could see that consideration of 
its interests could play a vital role. Iran has spent millions of dollars on Afghanistan’s 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process, through which Iran played its part in creating 
regional business networks and linking Central Asia with the eastern Afghanistan, which 
has effectively contributed to Iranian governed trade affairs (Riecke, 2013, p.11). Below, 
is a concrete analysis of Iran’s course in security, economy and in political aspects of the 
Iranian-Afghan relationship, which reveals and explains the essence of the foreign policy 
interests of Iran in its neighboring country.  
5.2 Security Interests 
This section explains Iran’s security policy towards Afghanistan through the 
lenses of the realism approach. To do this, the independent variables, common for 
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realism, such as power, economic resources, and the international system’s polarity are 
operationalized.  
The chapter is structured in order to show how the economic, cultural and political 
dimensions shape Iran’s security policy towards Afghanistan. In the course of the chapter 
I try to establish whether they contribute to Realpolitik, therefore these aspects although 
discussed in other sections, are also analyzed in this section. Through this analysis, I aim 
to determine whether Iran is a so-called realist “utility maximizer” whose actions are 
rooted in the logic of consequence. 
Following the realist tradition, this section operationalizes systemic factors: 
polarity of the international system and the role and power capabilities of a particular 
country in such system. Thus, it highlights the international system settings in which Iran 
and Afghanistan are placed and further analyzes the position of Afghanistan in this 
polarized system in which Iran interests contrast with the west, Pakistan, and Saudi 
Arabia.  
Iran’s security policy toward Afghanistan can be seen from three different angles 
Firstly, from the view of the other regional (Pakistan) and international players 
(the USA and the Saudi Arabia), secondly, in light of the interests of the Afghan internal 
groups (Taliban and pro-Iranian groups in Afghanistan), and thirdly, considering the 
existence of the anti-regime groups within Iran itself (Sunni Baluchis). In brief, these 
three existing angles manifest in the following ways: 
1. Iran is shifting its security policy based on the ideological and physical 
presence of regional and global powers in Afghanistan. In ideological terms, 
Iran’s primary concern is the support of Sunni extremist groups within 
Afghanistan by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The second concern is the presence 
of the USA military in Afghanistan which Iran sees as a direct threat to its own 
security. Of fundamental interest to Iran is the withdrawal of U.S. forces, which 
is viewed as more important than the internal situation in Afghanistan. 
(Stepanova, 2009, p.7) Pakistan, which shares a border with Iran, is also of 
significant concern due to its support of the Taliban as a Sunni extremist group.  
2. The second element of Iran’s security policy is support for Afghan internal 
interest groups, which can be divided into pro- and anti-Iranian, due to their 
religious, ethnic and financial interests. This includes some of the Taliban 
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groups, Shia minorities, and individuals within the Afghan government and 
political parties. 
3. The third element is internal potential security problems. Iran is concerned that 
the Sunni extremist groups supported by the Arabs and Pakistan could build 
ties and provide support to the Sunni Baluchis and other anti-regime 
movements within Iran. The affiliation of the Wahhabists with the above-
mentioned groups on both sides of the border is a direct threat to Iran’s internal 
security, national unity and its territorial integrity (Abbasi, 2011, pp.173-196). 
According to the realist view, states share the same common knowledge about the 
international system. Iran sees the west, and especially the presence of the U.S. in 
Afghanistan, as the main threats to the existence of the regime itself. Given this, security 
is considered as the main goal of Iran’s realist foreign policy. Everything else it strives to 
do can be seen as supplementary to the means of achieving strength in the political arena 
(Omidi, 2013, p.3). 
On his meeting with President Karzai, the Supreme Leader of Iran said, "the 
Americans are after permanent bases in Afghanistan which are dangerous because as long 
as American forces are present in Afghanistan, genuine security will not be established” 
(Omidi, 2013, p.4). 
Iranian interest is to exert influence on Afghanistan and understanding the 
strategic position of the U.S. and the West in Afghanistan which is influencing the region. 
Iran is aiming at influencing the region through its security and economic policies and at 
ensuring its dominant position. In fact, Iran is trying to shift the balance of power in the 
region. 
According to Sariolghalam, the head of the Center for Strategic Studies in Tehran, 
“In the reality Iran is against the presence of U.S. in the region, dominance of the U.S. 
and Institutionalization of its politics in the region which includes Afghanistan and central 
Asia is the important part of it” (Sariolghalam, 2003, p.78). 
Hence, Tehran sees that the increasing influence of the U.S. in Afghanistan and in 
the region is leading to the reduction of Iran’s influence and power capabilities there. 
That is why Iran aims to exert its influence in Afghanistan. Iran’s self-help approach is to 
realize its interests, both economic and political, by making the country’s policymakers 
focus on influencing Afghanistan, especially in the bordering region, to secure their 
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interest. A large number of Iranian agencies are working in the western region of 
Afghanistan. Media (TV, radio channels, newspapers), charity organizations and a 
number of other institutions are working there. Chapter seven of this study analyzes the 
mechanisms of Iran’s policy implementation and the institutions involved in Afghanistan.  
As a strategy to ensure its internal security and to prevent possible security 
challenges within the border zone with Afghanistan, Iran sees its political and security 
involvement on the Afghan side of the border region as an important and strategic factor. 
Thus, apart from its economic involvement, Iran is playing an effective role in the 
security and political situation in Herat, Farah, and Badghiz provinces. It is interesting to 
note that despite the differences in the foreign policy of the U.S. and Iran in general, they 
actually have much in common when it comes to Afghanistan. Thus, both countries are 
highly interested that the extremist Sunnis, represented by the Taliban, do not come back 
to dominate ideologically in the country.  
Iran-Afghanistan relations are the reality reflected in the constitution, which 
serves as a foundation for Iran’s security interests in Afghanistan. Thus, under the 
categorization of the countries mentioned in the Iranian constitution (e.g. neighbouring 
countries, Muslim countries etc.), Afghanistan occupies the following significant position 
due to its relevance to the objectives of the Iranian foreign policy: 1) Afghanistan as a 
neighbor; 2) as a Muslim country; 3) as a third world country and 4) as one of the 
countries having a significant position in terms of economy and security (Omidi, 2013). 
Since 2001, Afghanistan’s security-related issues have presented one of the greatest 
challenges not only for the Afghan government but also for its citizens all over the 
country due to the insurgency of Taliban and other anti-governmental groups. Kabul’s 
government can hardly manage its security and establish a secure environment, even 
within Kabul itself (Fitzgerald, 2005). 
At the same time when it is about the security of Iran, Tehran never can fully trust 
that the Afghan government will have the control of any action of the U.S. on its soil, 
which can be aimed against Iran. Therefore, Iran’s policymakers and its different 
institutions active in Afghanistan aim to control the situation and take steps to ensure the 
limitation of the threat to their internal security from the territory of Afghanistan.  
“Iran sees the U.S. as a direct threat to its security. Iranian officials believe that 
U.S. presence in the region can only strengthen the extremism and prevent Iran to 
have more close political and economic relations with Afghanistan. Tehran must 
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safeguard its economic and security interests in Afghanistan and Iran will 
challenge the presence of U.S. in Afghanistan in any possible way. Iran needs to 
continue its relations with government and other internal players, even with the 
Taliban and other military and political parties.” (M. W. T., personal interview, 23 
August 2017) 
Iran’s security concerns explain its deep involvement in western Afghanistan, 
which territorially is connected to Iran. By supporting a number of projects and charity 
activities in a formal (governmental level) realm and informally (among the people), 
Iranian officials possess significant influence in the western region of Afghanistan. 
“Iran has strong ties with governmental officials and with locals in Herat and 
provinces around. The western part of Afghanistan, especially Herat, is the 
battlefield of Iran and the US. Iran has ties with local Taliban and at the same time 
with local government. Each month Taliban and some local government officials 
are receiving money from the Iranians…” (K. K., personal interview, 24 October 
2016) 
Cooperation and competition from the realism stance are two alternatives which 
states may choose with regards to each other based on the existence or absence of the 
common interests in a particular context and the period of time (Adams, 2006). Both 
phenomena constitute the two faces of Iranian foreign policy, and it will most likely 
remain the same in post-US Afghanistan as well (Barzegar, 2014, p.120). Relations based 
in a cooperative manner with the Afghan government will also remain unchanged, not to 
mention competition with other regional and trans-regional actors which are involved in 
the ongoing political changes in the country (Barzegar, 2014, p.120). Although short-term 
cooperation was achieved between Iranian intelligence sources and the CIA in the post 
9/11 war on terrorism, this cooperation was to supply the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance 
forces and to exchange related data and information. However, such cooperation did not 
last for an extended period (Mishra, 2012, p.82). The cooperation between Iran and the 
U.S. started due to their similar interests, but for Iran, it was also important to have a pro-
Iranian government in Kabul. Additionally, a stable Afghanistan creates the opportunity 
for Iran to build its regional cooperation network. Last, but not least, Iran wanted to 
ensure that there was no security threat on its eastern border (Mishra, 2012, p.83). 
The shared interest of Iran and the U.S. created an optimistic view for reformists 
within the Iranian government. The reformists hoped for a long-term cooperation between 
both sides. Indeed, the cooperation in the “war on terror” after 2001 can be seen as a 
turning point in the creation of such a promising prospect. However, after the fall of the 
Taliban and the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan, Iran found itself in a 
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critical situation; especially after the U.S. President George W. Bush named Iran as a 
member of the “axis of evil,” alongside two other direct critics of the U.S. (Whitlock, 
2003, p.30). Following the involvement of international forces in Afghanistan, 
Washington leveled several accusations against Iran, some of which are listed below:  
- Iran financially supported a local warlord Ismail Khan in Herat and encouraged 
him to act independently from the central government in order to maintain 
Iran’s influence in the region. Ismail Khan had a remarkable influence in the 
western provinces of Afghanistan (Johnson, 2004). 
- Iran backed anti-US movements, specifically by supporting anti-US groups in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Weitz, 2014). 
- Iran gave shelter to the leader of Hizb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, whose fighters were involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan and 
is targeting local and international forces. In fact, Hikmatyar is a Sunni 
Mujahideen leader who was backed by Arabs during the war against the 
communist regime in Afghanistan (Howard, 2004). 
Among other issues of concern for Iran are the U.S - Afghan relations. This is not 
surprising since the “Memorandum of Understanding” was created between Afghanistan 
and the U.S. in 2005 and, later in the same year, a “strategic partnership” between the 
named parties, which allowed the U.S. military presence in the country, especially in the 
region bordering Iran (western Afghanistan). Such steps made Iran more concerned with 
its security and possible outreach of U.S. forces (Weinbaum, 2006, p.13). In his meeting 
with President Karzai in June 2011 in Tehran, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 
declared that for Tehran, the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan is a 
wish and is an important goal. Khamenei has stated that Iran is willing to find a regional 
solution to the Afghan crisis, where Afghans and regional players can handle the situation 
themselves (Office of the Leader, 2011). 
The view of the Iranian Supreme Leader should be taken as an important factor in 
Iran’s politics and foreign policy. In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought 
to conduct the necessary steps for the incorporation of the Leader’s view within the 
conception of foreign politics in Iran. It is not only the Supreme Leader who seeks 
regional mechanisms for a solution to the Afghan puzzle; his view is shared by other top-
ranking officials in Tehran (Omidi, 2013, p.4). 
Iranian Foreign Policy Interests in Afghanistan 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
113 
Drug trafficking, refugees, and border security are the main challenges, which Iran 
faces as a result of the Afghan crisis now and in the past. Iran’s concerns mostly arise 
from the cross-border security where Al-Qaeda and Jundullah terrorists are directly 
threatening the national security of Iran from its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Apart from the issues mentioned above, water is another issue of security concern 
for Iran. This is due to the fact that the Iranian border province Khozistani Rizavi is 
dependent on Afghan water, namely that flowing from the Helmand River. The Afghan 
government claims that Iran sabotaged the Salma hydroelectric dam project in Herat. 
Other disagreements between Tehran and Kabul exist on the water management issues 
(Peyrouse, 2014). Thus, when the Taliban government blocked the flow of water to Iran it 
had a significant impact on the economy of the region (Zentner, 2011, p.152). Moreover, 
the water crisis resulted in the migration of a large number of people from Iran’s Sistan-
Balochistan province (Aman, 2013). 
Issues related to security and the Iranian approaches within its foreign policy 
towards Afghanistan are also discussed within the following chapters of the study.  
5.3 Economic Interests 
Iran’s economic interest in Afghanistan is manifold. Afghanistan is a link to 
Central Asia and is situated on the crossroads between South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and 
Central Asia, and, therefore, provides easier trade between them (Kutty, 2014). Iran’s 
economic interests are not only in the internal market of Afghanistan. It is also related to 
the transit routes, which Afghanistan can provide for the transit of Iranian gas, oil, and 
goods to Central Asia and China and from there back to Iran. The Silk Road, Iranian gas 
pipeline, the railway to Central Asia and China, accessing the gas market in South Asia 
are the primary goals of Iranian economic policy in Afghanistan. Iranian economic 
projects in Afghanistan will be discussed in the next chapter (Iran’s economic policy 
towards Afghanistan).  
There are certain constraints to research on Iran’s economic policy with respect to 
Afghanistan. Only general information on economic ties between the two countries is 
accessible. Such information comes from sources in the government; however, 
information on trade and transit exchanged is often contracting, cannot be verified and is 
thus often questionable. 
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 The widespread corruption is an additional factor to the existing insurgency in 
Afghanistan. Thus, its already slow economic development is suppressed even more by 
the ongoing practices of corruption, which overall make Afghanistan politically unstable 
and insecure and even more vulnerable to the mistrust of the people in their government. 
Afghanistan is highly dependent on imports as it has had low internal economic 
growth, of just 1.5% in 2015, for example. At the same time, Afghanistan always has an 
important role in regional economic integration. Thus, the Silk Road, which crosses its 
territory, linking the Middle East to Central Asia, and Central Asia to South Asia are 
important regional routes.  
 In light of this, one should view Iran’s attempts to build relations with neighboring 
countries as part of an overarching aim to build regional cooperation between all of them, 
as will be examined below. Within this process of cooperation, Iran sees itself as the most 
important player. If this is going to be ensured, Iran must have its say on all issues of 
trade as well as other issues of regional concern. It is Tehran’s intention that this will re-
establish the order which existed historically within the region (Parsi, 2013). 
The statistics about the trade between the two countries is difficult to assess. This 
is because the governments of the respective countries cannot come to an agreement with 
regards to the statistics of their trade relations, the accounts they have in the various 
public documents and reports are quite different.  
According to the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA): “Iran's export to 
Afghanistan stands at 3 billion USD which accounts for 40 percent of Afghanistan's total 
import. The goods exported include consumer goods such as detergents, foodstuff, 
construction material, fuel, drugs, wood and plastic” (Islamic Republic News Agency, 
2016).  
Iran rates itself as one of the largest trading partners of Afghanistan (Jahanmal, 
2017). As a potential market for Iranian goods, Afghanistan is one of the biggest trade 
partners of Iran (Tasnim News, 2014). Nevertheless, trade between these two countries is 
not mutually beneficial, as Iran exports to Afghanistan more goods than it imports from 
this country. Iran enjoys a large trade surplus with Afghanistan, as imports from Iran 
cover half of the fuel requirements of Afghanistan. In 2011, this trade amounted to two 
billion U.S. Dollars while in 2013 the figure increased to five billion (Nader et al., 2014, 
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p.11). The dependence of Afghanistan on oil and fuel from Iran strengthens the 
relationship between the two countries (Kagan, Pletka and Kagan, 2008).  
As a result of the long-term international economic sanctions imposed on Iran, the 
attention of the country’s policymakers is focused on the possibilities of improvement of 
its economic situation. Therefore, Tehran’s foreign policy with regards to international 
economic relations is aimed at promoting the national economic development. In addition 
to this, a stronger economy is considered as a means to realize national interests.  
 The case of Iran’s economic policy towards in Afghanistan is an example of the 
realism approach, of how the increase of the economic potential can influence the policies 
by making them more confident and forceful. Thus, the economic policy of Iran 
demonstrates that the latter is a realist actor, with clear goals justified by the proper 
assessment of the balance of potential benefits and expenses, which may be necessary. 
The separate chapter of the present study (Chapter 7) will provide a thorough analysis of 
the economic relations, including the proper study of the data, objective factors (inter alia 
trade between the two countries, investment policy, and economic integration) and last 
but not least regional economic projects in which both countries are involved.  
 Iran’s intentions and willingness to be actively present in Afghanistan stretch far 
beyond its borders into the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. As Iran tries to 
increase its nuclear potential, the bridging of its interests in the Persian Gulf and Central 
Asia and South Asia has become one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. Therefore, 
another angle from which one must look at Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan is the long-
term goal of Iran with respect to the countries of the region that are linked to Afghanistan, 
which can be of interest to Iran in terms of the supply of energy (Mishra, 2012, pp.94-95). 
Finally, Afghanistan is also of great geostrategic importance to Iran. Therefore, as 
long as Iran is economically present in Afghanistan, it is certain that its economic 
interests in the region are duly observed (Haji-Yousefi, 2012, p.65). 
5.4 Iran’s Political Interests 
For Iran to reach its economic goals in Central and East Asia it needs political 
support in the Afghan government. Implementation of Iran’s big economic projects with 
regards to China and Central Asia depends on its influence on the Afghan government 
and policymakers. Tehran is aiming at least to balance the influence, which the U.S. has 
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on the Afghan government. For Iranian officials, U.S. influence on Afghan government 
can challenge the Iranian interests in Afghanistan.  
The political dimension of Tehran has its influence on the Afghan government’s 
decisions and on Afghan society. Thus, the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan, in a 
meeting with the Head of Afghan upper house, asked him to reject the strategic 
agreement with the US, stating that otherwise, the Iranian government will send back all 
of the Afghan refugees currently living in Iran (Farzad, 2012).  
Iranian diplomacy tries to make sure that Afghan government gives the first hand 
to Iran rather than Turkmenistan for its natural gas transport to South Asia. The Afghan 
government has recently explored the possibility of the Lajward (Lapis lazuli) Route, 
which will link Afghanistan to the Black Sea (through Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Georgia), which ultimately means entrance to the markets in the eastern and western 
European states.  
During the Taliban’s regime, Iran viewed the Taliban as a strategic adversary to its 
domestic security and interests in Afghanistan, and later on in the wider region. For 
Tehran, it is important not to have any radical Sunni government in Kabul, which is more 
likely going to be backed by Saudi Arabia with their radical Wahhabism ideology 
(International Crisis Group, 2005). In addition to maintaining a multi-ethnic government, 
Iran wants Afghanistan to be independent of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in terms of its 
foreign policy. Iran advocates for the rights of Shias. Iran remains consistent in its support 
to the multi-ethnicity of Kabul’s government (Dodge and Redman, 2011, pp.196-197). 
Iranian financial support to the Hazaras in the 2010 parliamentary elections added 
to the levels of distrust among the U.S. and some Afghans when 50 of 249 seats in the 
lower house went to Hazaras, which over-represents their population within the country. 
Even within a province, dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, 11 Hazara members from Ghazni 
province have taken seats in parliament (Mishra, 2012, p.88). 
The three angles of Iranian support to Afghan ethnic groups are as follows. Firstly, 
there is a culture-related approach to strengthening its influence, especially in western 
Afghanistan. This region has historically been considered the focal point for the 
implementation of such a policy, dating back to the period of the Anglo-Persian war of 
1856-1857 (Nader and Laha, 2011, p.3). 
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Nowadays, Iran supports media outlets to promote its cultural policy. This support 
goes to media groups, TV channels, and radio networks as well as to the newspapers 
(Houk, 2010). 
The second angle of Iran’s interests is to make sure that Afghan Shias are subject 
to the same rules and access to political life and changes within the country (Matinuddin, 
2000, p.151). By its constitution, Iran is committed to supporting and safeguarding the 
idea of Islamic Revolution worldwide as a principle of the Iranian Islamic Revolution 
(Article 3 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran). A political and 
governmental system where all ethnic groups can be represented, with the independent 
authority to shape its foreign policy and have friendly ties with Iran is Tehran’s goal. Its 
objectives are to support and to establish a multi-ethnic structure government in Kabul 
including Shia Hazaras (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p.41). 
The third angle of Iran’s interests lies in its competition with Saudi Arabia. Iran’s 
goal is to mobilize the Shia Hazara minority and Tajik ethnic group in Afghanistan. The 
aim is to provide a balance to counter other, anti-Iranian, elements that are backed by 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Milani, 2006). Moreover, Iran’s efforts to keep the bordering 
regions within Afghanistan under its influence is also a priority, as it would act as a 
contingency against any possibility that the regime in Kabul will take an unfriendly 
position towards Iran (Toscano, 2012). 
Thus, these three angles of Iranian support to Afghan ethnic groups contribute to 
understanding the specific characteristics of the strategy this country implements in 
pursuing its political interests in Afghanistan.  
5.5 Iranian local non-governmental partners and partner-individuals in 
Afghanistan 
5.5.1 Ideology, Religion, and Education 
The Iranian ideological aspiration of Shiism can create tensions between the Sunni 
majority in Afghanistan and a minority population of Shias there, where both are 
influenced by Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia in terms of Islamic principles. With 
Iranian support, the Islamic University of Khatam al-Naybe was built in the west of 
Kabul. The Madrasa (Islamic School) is a part of the Islamic University. Both the 
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Madrasa and the University teach the Shia version of Islam with the direct involvement 
and support of Iran (Behn, 2012). For example, one of the most famous Shia jurists and a 
former Mujahideen leader, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Mohseni, leads Khatam-al 
Nabye Islamic University. This University is one the most prominent landmarks in Kabul 
since it serves as a central locale for pro- Iranian activities and promoting the Velayat-e 
Faqih ideology of the Shia branch of Islam. Moreover, the University disseminates the 
ideology of the Iranian Revolution to Shia people which creates revolutionary groups 
such as Hizbullah and other groups and movements loyal to Iran. By providing aid to the 
University, Tehran aims to introduce new religious leaders into society who will carry on 
the Iranian version of politics and Islamic ideology (Nazar and Recknagel, 2010). 
Pragmatically, Iran funds and supports a number of religious, educational and 
media institutions. The purpose of this considerable help and support from Iran is to 
maintain an impressive position of influence in Afghanistan, particularly in the western 
part of the country. Upon the opening of the Iranian Center (Iranian Corner) in Kabul 
University, thousands of copies of books and magazines were provided to the center, and 
it was equipped with computers and access to the internet. 
Iran has provided thousands of books to a number of universities and schools in 
Afghanistan and has provided help for the construction and rebuilding of a notable 
number of schools as well. Most of these books and educational materials provided 
advance either a political or ideological agenda (Kagan, Kagan, and Pletka, 2008). 
5.5.2 Iranian links with Afghan Media and Civil Society Organizations 
To support various religious, media and cultural organizations, Iran spends 
USD100 million in Afghanistan on an annual basis (D. M., 2014). 
Iran also financially supports projects in education, media, and civil society. 
Media - including newspapers, broadcast media, and magazines - that is backed by Iran 
make up almost a third of all Afghan media. Among these, the Tamadon and Noor TV 
channels and Ensaf newspaper have been identified by the Afghan government as being 
in receipt of financial support from Iran and promoting the Iranian agenda, the latter in 
particular. Through its influence in the media and the Afghan Parliament, Iran seems to 
be targeting a specific set of objectives, for example conducting anti-US propaganda. 
While the provision of grants and the financing of the media and civil society by the UN, 
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USAID or other western donors looks very natural and positive, when it comes to similar 
Iranian support for the media and civil society the issue attracts more attention, and more 
negative connections are made. The Afghan government and U.S. officials are more 
concerned when Iran steps in and gives financial support to such institutions (Tadjbakhsh, 
2013, p.42). 
5.5.3 Afghan Individuals and Parties  
Iranian policymakers’ focus on the non-governmental actors dates back to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This will be explained in the next section (5.6) of this 
study. As soon as Iranian policymakers realized that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were 
supporting the Sunni Mujahideen groups and parties, in order to ensure its own political 
influence, Tehran focused on the Shia jihadists and minority in Afghanistan. This was not 
only due to the security and political interests but due to the ideological similarities of 
Shias in Afghanistan and the Shia regime of Iran as well.  
As explained before in chapter four of the study, the ideological element of Iranian 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan had shifted to a pragmatic approach in the course of 
the last three decades from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and then during 
the civil war in 1992 until the Taliban emergence in 1996.  
As was mentioned above, in December 2001, Iran played a supportive role in the 
Bonn conference on Afghanistan and had a positive attitude towards Afghanistan’s new 
leadership. Despite this, President Karzai was not seen as the first choice for the new 
leadership post in Afghanistan by Tehran. One can say that Iran’s foreign policy has 
subsequently become mostly “low-key” and friendly towards Karzai’s regime 
(Weinbaum, 2006 p.12). During its process of writing a new constitution and during the 
first presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004, Iran’s position was positive towards 
the transitional government in Afghanistan. Iran joined Russia and India in attempting to 
stop a Tajik political leader, Younis Qanuni, from contesting election against the 
ethnically Pashtun Karzai in October 2004, although these efforts were not successful. 
However, although these three countries had historically supported the Tajiks and 
Northern Alliance, in which Mr. Qanuni was an important player, they were hoping to 
gain more from a deal between him and Karzai if he (Mr. Qanuni) did not run for 
election. After the election was over, Iran convinced both the Hazara Shia leader and Mr. 
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Qanuni to accept the outcome of the election in which Karzai won (Weinbaum, 2006 
p.12). 
During this period and continuing after the elections, Iran made sure that its 
activities covered western areas of Afghanistan, namely Herat, Nimruz, and Farah. Iran 
has thus tried to ensure its full control in the educational, economic as well as social areas 
of these regions in the long run. By doing so, Iran believed it could make sure that Kabul 
administration adopts an Iran-friendly strategy (Kagan, Pletka and Kagan, 2008 p.37-56). 
Although at the outset Iran had concentrated its activities in these areas, which it 
deemed to be addressing Iran’s direct interests in Afghanistan, its attitude has 
subsequently evolved in a different way. Thus, its policy now disregards the ethnicity and 
language factor as long as the support of this or that segment of Afghanistan’s society 
provides a countermeasure against U.S. policies in the region.  
On 10 August 2010, at the end of President Karzai’s official visit to Iran, Omar 
Daudzai, the head of President Karzai’s office, reportedly received a bag of money, Euro 
notes from Feda Hussian Maliki, the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan. The money 
represented a "secret, steady stream of Iranian cash to buy the loyalty of Mr. Daudzai and 
promote Iran's interests in the presidential palace", the report said, citing Afghan and 
Western officials
, 
(BBC, 2010). 
Mr. Karzai has subsequently denied reports of having received money from Iran 
when an amount of USD2 million each year from Iran was mentioned. He emphasized 
that the cash is spent on governmental operational plans. "The government of Iran assists 
[the presidential] office," Karzai said… "Nothing is hidden... Cash payments are done by 
various friendly countries to help the presidential office, to help expenses in various 
ways." (Rosenberg, 2013). Cash payments to the President’s office started in 2003 
(Rosenberg, 2013). 
Recently, as the U.S. and Afghanistan have attempted to reach an agreement on 
Afghan-U.S. Strategic Partnership Pact, the pro-Iranian media gave a negative picture of 
the consequences of such an agreement. In addition to this, they have also made all 
possible efforts to argue against the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, 
Tehran’s political shadow can be seen in the Afghan government. Iran keeps top Afghan 
officials at the presidential office and ministries on its payroll, as well as some 
parliamentarians (Kagan et al., 2012, p.80-82). 
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Nevertheless, Iran’s ties and relations with the opposition groups, the Tajik 
Sayeds, MPs from Herat and Hazara MPs, are strong and are steadily cultivated 
(Fitzgerald and Vira, 2011, p.4). It is suspected that 44 parliamentary members out of 294 
are involved in the pro-Iranian activities within Afghan law-making and political 
activities (Bhatnagar, 2013, p.5). Iranian support for individuals led to charges being 
brought against the Second Vice President and leader of the Hazara party Hizb-e 
Wahddat-e Islami, M. Kharim Khalil, amid claims that he has been receiving direct 
financial support from Iran (Sarwary, 2010). Adopting such a policy by Iran to support 
the top ring of Afghan officials can result in more tensions and problems within the 
government itself. Thus, it can challenge the relations between Afghanistan and its 
western partners as well. 
Among its other involvements in Afghanistan’s affairs, Iran supports non-
governmental organizations, prominent Afghan politicians, and religious actors. Iran has 
also been accused of funding a powerful warlord and Afghan Vice President, Mr. Qasim 
Fahim (Nader et al., 2014, p.13). 
Analyzing such policy can explain two realities of Iran’s position: first that each 
Iranian institute (Office of the leader, IRGC, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has a 
different approach towards Afghanistan, and second that Tehran makes use of any 
possible way to safeguard its interests, among which mainly security and economic ones 
in Afghanistan.  
5.6 Shia factor 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country in the heart of Asia which links three of the 
most important cultural and geographic regions: the Indian subcontinent to the southeast, 
Central Asia to the north, and the Iranian Plateau in the west. 
In Afghanistan, the Hazara’s are the leading Shia community, the majority of 
whom have been residents in the Hazarajat, also called Hazarastan, since the 13
th
 century 
(Nader et al., 2014). 
 Since Iran is the only neighboring country of Afghanistan where the majority of 
the population are Shia with a Shia ideology based government, they and the Afghan 
Hazara Shias share a mixed relationship. However, this fact alone has not resulted in 
constructive relations between Iran and the Hazaras. Rather, this relationship is the result 
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of various factors, predominantly political and material support provided by Iran to the 
Hazara during the period of resistance to Soviet troops and later to the Taliban in the 1997 
military operation in Bamiyan (Gladstone, 2011, p.6).  
Over the years, Afghanistan’s relations with Iran have changed tremendously. Iran 
supported and assisted Afghanistan in combating diverse threats. In 1979, for example, 
Iran opposed the Soviet incursion and supported the Afghan effort by providing financial 
and military aid to resistance leaders who in turn vowed loyalty to the Iranian vision of 
Islamic revolution. Among these prominent Afghan rebel leaders, Ahmed Shah Massoud, 
leader of the Northern Alliance, was the most dominant (Fitzgerald and Vira, 2011, p.3). 
In order to oppose the plans of the communists to establish their rule over the 
Hazarajat, the Afghan Hazaras in September 1979 created an organization Shura-ye 
Enqelab-e Etefaq-e Eslami (Council for the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance). The 
organization consisted of the military and political wing and was operated by the Sayed 
Shia leaders. The political wing had Sayyed Ali Behishti as its political chief, while 
Sayyed Hassan was appointed a head of military operations of the Shura located in Waras 
in Bamiyan Province (Public Intelligence, 2002, p.5).  
Furthermore, to administer and arrange the Hazarajat territory following the 
Soviet incursion in 1979, the Shura created specialized administrative institutions in order 
to hire new people, ensure taxation, issue ID cards and passports; it has opened 
administrative centers in Iran’s capital Tehran and in Quetta, Pakistan. (Public 
Intelligence, 2002, p.5). 
The Shura defied the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) by 
working with other Afghan factions until the mid-1980s. However, in 1984, with the aid 
of the Pakistani government, most of the military and international assistance was 
allocated to the parties of the Sunni opposition, to the so-called Alliance of Seven (seven 
Pakistan-based parties). On the other hand, the Shia Hazaras were barred from this aid 
due to their alliance with Iran. Consequently, this initiated Sunni-Shia segregation within 
the Islamic resistance which was in opposition to the Soviets. Moreover, cohesive Hazara 
support for the Shura also played a part in the split, as the Afghan central government 
shifted its focus toward combating the Pakistan-based Sunni Mujahideen opposition 
movements, and thus posed less of a threat to the Hazarajat (Public Intelligence, 2002). 
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In the period from 1982 to 1989, the Hazarajat witnessed a critical phase as a 
prolonged struggle for dominance in that region. During nine years (1979-1988), five 
parties competed with the Shura to secure power over the Hazarajat area as well as 
securing the loyalty of the Hazaras. Of these five parties, four were based in Iran, namely: 
Hizbullah (Party of God), Harakat-e-Islami (Islamic Movement), Sepah-e Pasdaran 
(Revolutionary Guard Corps) and (Victory). The three parties: Sepah-e Pasdaran, 
Sazman-e-Nasr and Hizbullah adhered to the fundamentalist reading of Islam, while 
Harakat-e-Islami – on traditional stance. Beside the above parties, another party was 
based in Afghanistan itself. Unlike the previously mentioned ones this party, named 
Sazman-e-Mujaheddin-Mustazafin (Organization of Warriors of the Dispossessed), was 
more politically oriented, the religious goals were ousted by more militant ones. It turned 
out that this struggle for power exceeded losses of the struggle against the central 
government. In addition, the new conflict started after the alliance between the Islamist in 
Shura and Nasr party was achieved in 1982 (Public Intelligence, 2002, p.6). 
In view of the devastating consequences of internal fighting between the different 
groups, in 1987, the Iranian authorities sought to form the eight parties into an alliance to 
sort out the crisis. Accordingly, the four Iranian-founded Shia Islamist parties: Hizbullah, 
Harakat- e Islami, Nasr, and Pasdaran alongside the four smaller parties created an 
alliance of eight titled the Shura-e Ettelaf-e Islami Afghanistan/Council of Islamic 
Alliance of Afghanistan (Public Intelligence, 2002, p.6). However, in October 1987, it 
was renamed as Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-e Afghanistan/Islamic Unity Party of 
Afghanistan (Emadi, 2010 p.144). 
Iran’s Afghanistan policy became more and more organized under President 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–97) with the termination of the Iran–Iraq War, shifting 
the concerns in the direction of support for the establishment of a multi-ethnic 
government encompassing both Sunni and Shia representatives (Koepke, 2013). 
In the 1990s, with the rise of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan, it became 
undeniably apparent that fundamental Sunni Islamists were not merely anti-Western, but 
also anti-Shia and anti-Iranian. In fact, the Taliban (and afterwards al-Qaeda) promoted 
an Islamic revolutionary ideology that competes with Tehran’s philosophy. Thus, the 
spread of this hostile Sunni radical Islamic revolutionary ideology would not only 
confront Iran’s claim to guide the transnational Islamic revolutionary movement but 
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could even threaten Iran itself if the Sunni radicals acted upon their anti-Shia beliefs 
(Katz, 2012). 
Consequently, in view of the above, Iran started its assistance to all anti-Taliban 
factions. Iran’s attitude towards the Taliban as an acute threat to its national security was 
justified when they (the Taliban) on August 8, 1998, killed the diplomats and a journalist 
in the Mazar-i-Sharif Consulate of Iran (Koepke, 2013, p.7).  
The Iranian Government was initially divided regarding how to act in response to 
the prevailing situations. IRGC was insisting on retaliation by military means, however, 
other high-ranking officials saw danger in such intervention as it could, in their opinion, 
result in the further reciprocal actions, e.g. from those Sunni Islamists which are affiliated 
with the Taliban (Koepke, 2013). 
In 2001, since the ousting of the Taliban, the Hazara, who were always backed by 
Iran due to the religious similarity (Shiism), emerged as crucial social and political actors 
in Afghanistan. At present, Hazara politicians occupy key posts in the Afghan 
government and will most probably keep hold of them, particularly after the decrease of 
the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The leader of the Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, 
Karim Khalili (formerly the vice president of Afghanistan), was seen as one who would 
come into politics as a vital player in the Afghan post-2014 administration. The formerly 
persecuted by Taliban Hazaras have now become more explicit in the demonstration of 
their faith. As a consequence, the Afghan Hazaras have begun to enjoy their liberty and 
freedom of expression, which was once suppressed under the autocracy of Taliban 
Regime. For instance, public processions signifying Shia sacred days, formerly prohibited 
under the Taliban, have become much more frequent in Kabul and other cities (BBC, 
2009). 
Iran is most likely to make use of its links with the Hazara (and other Shia) in 
order to gain ground and exercise power in Afghanistan. According to a reliable source, 
around 55 parliament members in 2014 were Shia. They might turn out to have 
associations with Iran (Katzman, 2014). Moreover, a myriad of Afghan Shia leaders also 
believes in a special religious kinship with Iran. Indeed, some Shia clergymen in 
Afghanistan have to contrast with Velayat-e Faqih views. This, however, does not really 
influence the overall picture of Iranian influence in Afghanistan in the religious realm, 
since the number of those affiliated with Iran remains high. 
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Iran played a decisive role in defending the Shia Hazaras from numerous 
autocracies; it considers itself the guardian of the Shia Hazaras from the autocracy 
principally Sunni Taliban regime who are militantly anti-Shia. Consequently, various 
forces helped them achieve their aim of supporting Shia Hazaras, particularly the Hizb-i-
Wahdat (Nader et al., 2014, pp.7-8). 
Hizb-e Wahdat, the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, founded in 1989, has been 
a vital political and military actor in Afghanistan. The idea behind its foundation was to 
unite nine groups with very opposed military and ideological agendas under one 
umbrella. Moreover, the idea comes also from the time of the anti-Soviet experience of 
opposition movements in the 1980s. They had a significant role and were established as 
the agents of the interests of the Iranian regime in Afghanistan, to counter the interests of 
Pakistan, articulated through the Taliban. For that reason, Hezb-i-Wahdat is alleged to 
make available intelligence and agent provocateur forces to the Iranian regime (Nader et 
al., 2014, pp.7-8) 
During the same period, Tehran offered all possible support to factions that 
pursued Khomeini’s line. The Shia Ulema (Religious Scholars) of Afghanistan, at that 
point in time, advocated an array of views on the role of religion in government. 
Accordingly, quite a lot of Afghan Shia factions based in Iran were amalgamated Hezb-e 
Wahdat political party, dominated by Hazara (Mojde, 2010; Ibrahimi, 2006). However, to 
fulfill its purpose, Hezb-e Wahdat required not just Iran’s assistance in the energy and 
finance sector. The needed support also included media, schools run by Iran and mosques. 
Besides Kabul, an immense number of these activities and centers were pursued in 
western and northern Afghanistan (Majidyar and Alfoneh, 2010). 
Although the key focus of Iran’s power activities in Afghanistan was the Tajik and 
the Hazara, the Hazara were politically prominent and had many authoritative armed 
force figures who opposed the dictate of Iran. The wish to represent an independent 
ethnic and religious group within Afghanistan and avoid influence from the outside 
resulted in a certain coolness between Hazara leaders and Tehran. Additionally, several 
Hazara leaders arguably disliked Tehran’s progressing interference in Afghan affairs 
(Nader et al., 2014, p.17). 
To this end, a speaker of the holy institutions in Herat, Mir Farooq Hosseini, thus 
refers to the Iranian banners raised ahead of the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam 
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Hussein, "Each black flag is reflective of Iran's evil intentions in Afghanistan"(Latifi, 
2013). Even before the November 14 observances, Hosseini alleged that inside and 
outside political actors misuse Ashura for individual purposes, although he did not 
provide any substantiation for his allegations against Shias (Latifi, 2013). 
5.7 Iran and the Taliban 
As a strategic change, Iran aims to play an important role in Afghanistan to 
cement the achievements of its own security. For this to succeed, Afghanistan requires a 
stable government capable of enforcing security and bringing peace, which includes the 
Taliban as a part of the process. However, Iran prefers a pro-Iranian government in Kabul 
in order to prevent Saudi Arabia and Pakistan from playing any significant role in 
Afghanistan’s politics (Milani, 2011). It never recognized the Taliban government. Iran 
viewed the Taliban as an ideological enemy and a security threat created by Pakistan’s 
intelligence service with the financial support of Saudi Arabia, who sought partly to 
undercut Iran with their ideology of Wahhabism (Peiman, 2003). That said, the Taliban 
has been acknowledged as a reality and a constituent part of the security dilemma which 
cannot be ignored.  
During the war against the Taliban, the U.S. relied on the military groups of the 
Northern Alliance (backed by Iran) not only to defeat the Taliban but also to install a new 
government in Kabul. This period was seen as a honeymoon period in relations between 
Iran and the U.S, and they were pursuing the same interests in Afghanistan, i.e. the 
ousting of the Taliban and empowering the Iran-backed forces in the country. 
With the near elimination of the Taliban and the establishment of a new US-
backed government in Afghanistan, Iran changed its policy towards the Taliban. The 
current strategic aims of Iran and the Taliban have much in common as they both seek the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the foreign forces from Afghanistan, towards 
which both have different reasons for concern: one regional and the other local (Milani, 
2011). Iran does not just see the U.S. presence as a threat to its national security; it 
understands that the U.S. strategy is to assume an influential position in South and Central 
Asia as well as the Persian Gulf. As a result, Iran put political and economic pressure on 
Afghanistan in order to prevent it entering into the US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership 
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Agreement (SPA)
16
 which limits Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan (Barzegar, 2014 
p.120). 
In order to combat the presence of the U.S. in Afghanistan, Iran gives support to 
any groups and movements regardless of their background, ethnicity or religion. This 
represents a pragmatic change of Iranian policy since 2001 in Afghanistan. The escalation 
of insurgency in the border region and Shia-populated provinces in central Afghanistan is 
the outcome of Tehran’s strategy.  
“The presence of Iranian intelligence in the Taliban-influenced parts of Farah 
province has been reported; they often meet with the locals and offers financial 
support and military equipment to the Taliban to fight against international forces 
and destabilize the security situation in Farah province” (A. N., personal 
interview, 27 October 2015).  
To facilitate closer ties, Tehran allowed the Taliban to establish an office in the 
city of Zahedan, located near the Afghan border (Joscelyn, 2016). The Taliban’s Quetta 
Shura in Quetta, Pakistan, agreed to the establishment of the Zahedan office and to move 
some of their prominent members to Zahedan in Iran (Silinsky, 2014). Due to a direct 
transit link between the two cities, this could be more fruitful for relations between Iran 
and the Taliban (Habibi, 2012). 
Afghan and international forces have repeatedly blamed Iran for sending weapons 
to the Taliban (Adeel, 2015). Such accusations were made against Iran several times 
(Walsh, 2007). Following the discovery of arms by NATO forces in western Afghanistan, 
NATO forces blamed Iran for supplying these arms. In March 2010, another shipment of 
weapons was seized in Kandahar. In retaliation, the U.S. government issued an Executive 
Order against IRGC officers in Quds forces (Special Forces unit of Iran's Revolutionary 
Guards) in August 2010 for supporting the Taliban (Tawil, 2010). Following the 
discovery by ISAF forces in the Afghan province of Nimruz of a weapons convoy, the 
UK Foreign Secretary declared that “detailed technical analysis, together with the 
circumstances of the seizure, leave us in no doubt that the weaponry is recovered came 
from Iran” (Borger and Taylor, 2011). Moreover, top Afghan officials in the western city 
of Nimruz arrested five Taliban members who had received training in Iran as suicide 
bombers (Dodge and Redman, 2011, p.194). Iran’s strategic goal of supporting the 
Taliban is not aimed at bringing them back into power in Kabul and replacing the present 
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 This agreement enables U.S. to retain its troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, at the same times banning 
any U.S. military moves to other neighboring countries from Afghanistan.  
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Afghan government (Hairan, 2010). Rather, Iran sees the Taliban as a useful tool to 
challenge the interests of another strategic enemy, which in this case appears to be the 
United States. In view of this strategic goal, Iran’s denial and its refusal to acknowledge 
the behind-the-scenes support of the Taliban by its operatives should not be a matter of 
surprise, although such support is done in a limited manner in order to maintain the 
Taliban as a headache for the U.S. while avoiding any negative impact on Iran’s interests 
(Ahmad, 2013). 
Furthermore, Iranian officials accuse the U.S. of backing the Sunni insurgent 
group Jundullah, who are active in the Iranian part of Balochistan (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 
2012, p.226). Jundullah fighters are accused of killing a significant number of 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (Kutty, 2014). After the Jundullah leader, Abdul Malik Rigi, 
was arrested by the Iranian government, Tehran tried to prove its claims by publicizing 
statements made by him. Following his arrest in 2010, Rigi made a statement that was 
broadcast by the State television of Iran. In this statement, for the first time, he confessed 
that he had received support from the United States for his anti-governmental activities 
(Leverett and Leverett, 2010). The U.S. has never accepted this accusation and stated that 
the statement had been made under coercion. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Baluchi 
insurgency is going to continue into the future, which will have a direct impact on the 
way Iran will behave concerning the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Thus, one may clearly 
view the support of Afghan fighters by Iran as a counter-measure against the U.S. 
(Milani, 2011). 
The aid coming from Iran to Afghan insurgents and the assistance provided by the 
U.S. to Jundullah is on the rise (Larison, 2010). The latter is directly proportionate to the 
growth of the Baluchi insurgency. This situation may complicate the whole scenario of 
the support given by Iran to the Afghan fighters against the U.S. presence. Although Iran 
has never been on friendly terms with the Taliban, this may become irrelevant in light of 
greater goals. These scenarios are not to be underestimated (Nader and Laha, 2011). 
State sources do not agree on the direct support and involvement of the Iranian 
regime regarding the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Looking to organs such as the 
Revolutionary Guards (N.B. the structure of IRGC has been explained in Chapter Two), 
which are only accountable to the Supreme Leader, one sees that they can act 
independently from the Iranian regime’s National Army (“Artesh”) (Singh, 2005). This 
makes it possible that the same institutions are involved in arms trafficking (Tawil, 2010). 
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Because of the inability of Afghanistan to control its borders, arms-trafficking from Iran 
is simplified. One could argue the involvement of some elements within the IRGC is 
backing the Taliban without the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran 
(Hairan, 2010). However, taking into account the nature of Iranian support of the Taliban 
in such a critical situation, for some researchers it looks impossible to run such extensive 
operation without having the involvement of the majority of the institutions that are 
involved in the foreign policy-making process (The Institute for Middle Eastern 
Democracy, 2012). 
Iran is interested in taking part in peace talks between the Afghan government and 
the Taliban not only to make itself involved in regional security but also due to the fact 
that Pakistan, China, and the U.S. are involved. Its main concern is to safeguard their 
interest in the event that an agreement is reached with the Taliban.  
In his last visit, the Executive Director of the Afghan government to Iran was 
officially informed by the Iranian president that Iran should be part of the peace 
negotiations with the Taliban (Khaama Press, 2016). In late 2013, the Taliban were 
actively engaged with the media. Afghan and foreign governmental officials, as well as 
the Taliban, confirmed the visit of the Taliban to Iran. According to the Taliban’s official 
web page,  
“The Taliban’s visit to Iran on their invitation, their formal negotiations and then 
publicizing these diplomatic relations are considered a significant achievement for 
Taliban from political point of view because the nature of this visit and the 
language of the Taliban’s declaration prove that Taliban have not visited Iran as 
an insignificant party or group, rather they have been invited by the Iranian side as 
an independent political system and crucial issues have been brought under 
discussion” (Voice of Jihad, 2013). 
The Taliban visit to Tehran was reported by Tasnim News Agency, an agency 
which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Thus, Tasnim 
first reported the talks in Iran; however, the report did not cover the details and agenda of 
the meeting. Tasnim reported that the Taliban’s representative, after meeting with Iranian 
security officials, highlighted Iran’s commitment to bringing peace and stability to 
Afghanistan. They also covered the participation of the Taliban delegation in the annual 
Islamic Awakening Conference in Iran. It was reported that Sayyid Tayyab Agha, 
Mawlawi Shabuddin Delawar, and Shir Muhammad Abbas Stanekzai, were in the 
Taliban’s political delegation to Tehran (Tasnim News Agency, 2015a). 
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A member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission in the Iranian 
parliament Nozar Shafie, also reported on the visit, “The Taliban has influence and credit 
with the groups that are responsible for instability and chaos in the region. Therefore, they 
can play a role in managing the current regional developments and solving regional 
problems. This might be the reason why Iran has taken them into consideration.” 
(Qaidaari, 2015) . 
The Taliban are also committed to keeping their ties with Iran not only for the 
same strategic goals but also because the Taliban are seeking to build diplomatic leverage 
in the current political sphere. Bearing in mind the withdrawal of international military 
forces, it is highly likely that the Taliban are also trying to destabilize Tehran’s relations 
with Kabul and with other anti-Taliban groups and elements. Arguably, the Taliban will 
attempt to convince Iran to stop backing anti-Taliban forces in post-withdrawal 
Afghanistan. The Taliban have assured Iranian officials of the existence and maintenance 
of a multi-ethnic, religious and political group, which will be in the post-NATO political 
order in Afghanistan (Zambelis, 2013). 
Iran is backing Taliban not only to fight the U.S. but also to stop its new growing 
enemy in Afghanistan - the Islamic State, which has an anti-Iranian agenda. The clashes 
between the Taliban and ISIS in western Afghanistan show that ISIS is interested not only 
in the northern region bordering, at least, three central Asia countries but also in the 
western part of Afghanistan where it shares a notable border with Iran. It is important to 
know that due to the ethnic and historical elements Iran had control of western 
Afghanistan for many decades but it is questionable how ISIS would increase its interest 
in the western part of Afghanistan. Iran is concerned that ISIS, with the support of Saudi 
Arabia, will try to bring its Sunni extremist ideology to Shia Iran and fight against Iranian 
interests in the region, namely in Afghanistan. Reportedly, Iran has organized attacked on 
ISIS in this region. Thus, in his interview with The Daily Beast, Mullah Khan 
Muhammad Noorzai, an ISIS commander in western Afghanistan claimed: “I was not at 
the camp at the time of the attack, but the Iranians coordinated it. There were a few 
Iranians making films of the dead ISIS fighters” (Yousafzai, 2015). 
It remains paradoxical that Iran has been backing the Taliban. Among the various 
reasons to be cited, one should mention the antagonistic attitude of the Taliban towards 
the Shia population in general. In 1998 alone, nine Iranian diplomats were assassinated by 
the Taliban and hundreds of Shia civilians were massacred in Balkh province. However, 
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despite this loss, Tehran’s enmity towards the U.S. has quite significantly contributed to 
the strengthening of their relationship with the Taliban. The overall relations between Iran 
and Afghanistan remain rather weak, especially due to the sporadic support of the Taliban 
by Iran and because Afghanistan is unable to adequately provide Iran with the necessary 
means to achieve its aims within its borders, despite the number of reconstruction and 
economic enterprises there. Backing the Taliban by the Iranian government not only has a 
negative impact on U.S. policy in Afghanistan but also impacts security and political 
efforts by Afghanistan and other international partners at the same time (Agarwal, 2014, 
p.3). 
5.8 Summary 
The analysis conducted in the present chapter has revealed political, security and 
economic interests of Iran in Afghanistan, as the main ones pursued by Iran. The 
evidence provided above supports the argument of the study on the contradictory policies 
of Iran towards Afghanistan, by linking Iran’s foreign policy interests to the means, 
through which these interests are enforced, among which is the support provided to Shia 
and Taliban, as well as the links Iran has established with civil society organizations in 
Afghanistan, Afghan individuals and parties. 
As is becomes apparent from the analysis, the most important thing for Iranian 
foreign policy seems to be the security issue due to the number of domestic factors in 
Afghanistan, the presence of international troops, insurgency, Sunni-Shia competition of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran and drug-trafficking. For this reason, security is paramount for 
Iran. This explains Iran’s goal to be involved in Afghanistan politically, economically as 
well as ideologically.  
 As the chapter demonstrated, Iran has adopted a number of strategies to 
implement and safeguard its national interests in terms of security in Afghanistan. 
However, Tehran’s relations with Kabul, its economic support and investments, on the 
one hand, and its support given to the political opposition and the Shia minority 
population, on the other hand, creates security challenges for the Afghan government and 
its international partners.  
 It was determined herein that Iran’s primary concern is in the area of western 
Afghanistan. Iran and Afghanistan share the long border in this region which creates 
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incentives for the trade relations, construction projects, economic exchanges and counter-
trafficking measures to fight the drug trade. Therefore, most of Iran’s investments go to 
western Afghanistan. Through its economic relations and support for the local 
government, Iran ensures its influence in western Afghanistan to prevent security 
challenges from the neighbor and control drug-trafficking from Afghanistan to Iran. 
 Indeed, a number of security challenges exist on the border with Iran. The Taliban 
and various activities of ISIS, provide a challenge not only to the internal security of 
Afghanistan but also to that of Iran. Iran’s ties with the Taliban are peculiar, as they are 
not only meant to rein the later but also are intended to use the Taliban as a proxy to fight 
against the U.S. and ISIS. At the same time, Iran between 2001 and 2014 was financing a 
number of construction projects in Afghanistan, which contributed to the political and 
economic stability in Afghanistan. 
 Clearly, the foreign policies of Iran are complex and sometimes contradictory so it 
can be difficult to ascertain how they manifest in Afghanistan. However, Iran is a rational 
actor that pursues a realistic foreign policy to secure its national interests, especially when 
it comes to security issues and the presence of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Towards 
this end, Iran has also managed to keep its ties with the former Mujahideen leaders, who 
are still strongly present in the political decision-making in Afghanistan. In keeping with 
its aspiration to be a regional power, Iran aims to influence the decision–makers in 
Afghanistan when it comes to the Afghan-US and Afghan-Saudi Arabia relations. To 
conclude, Iran’s interests and objectives can be described as balancing between its 
economic, security and political interests. 
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Chapter 6. Iran’s policy in relation to Afghanistan:  
security and political aspects  
 
This chapter focuses on the Iranian institutions that implement Iran’s foreign 
policy in Afghanistan, in light of Iran’s security and political interests. It aims to describe, 
where possible, various events and incidents in Afghanistan and demonstrate their 
connection to the activities of these particular Iranian institutions. As has been presented 
in this study, many Iranian institutions, both formal and informal, are active in 
Afghanistan. They cover security, economy, charity, culture, education and the religious 
sphere. These are most dominant in western Afghanistan since Iran is building up a 
security zone there to thwart security threats associated with the U.S. presence, drug-
trafficking, and Sunni extremism. All these activities are related to the security interests 
of the IRI in Afghanistan.  
For outside experts and observers, Iran’s intervention in Afghanistan has been 
more a means of expanding its own sphere of influence and deflating and limiting U.S. 
influence in Afghanistan (Toscano, 2012). Thus, Iran’s soft power/hard power political 
tactics have been perceived as having “little to do with inflating Afghan interests as a 
nation state” and more with furthering of its own interests (Bhatnagar, 2013). Iranian-
Afghan interests in the post-2014 Afghanistan were in a correlation with the U.S. 
presence in Afghanistan. The aggravation of the Iran-US relations in the world should 
have had a definite impact on their relations in Afghanistan too. However, instead of 
direct confrontation, Iran, as was expected, followed a pragmatic approach, i.e. was 
concerned with the formation of a pro-Iranian government in Kabul and pursuing 
strategic interests, adoption of measures for border anti-trafficking, and enhancement of 
its influence there, especially after the expected exit of most of the foreign troops in 
2014.
17
  
In this context, a former senior Intelligence chief in Afghanistan, Amrullah Saleh, 
emphasizes that there is an institutional movement operated from Iran, which is working 
extensively with a view of endorsing this political and strategic agenda. According to 
                                                 
17
 This study does not analyse the new US-South Asia Security Policy, “America First” and the decision of 
the Trump administration to enhance the forces for direct fight with Taliban and Al-Qaeda rather than to 
leave Afghanistan, as was the Obama pledge, because the year 2017 lies outside the scope and timeframe of 
the present dissertation.  
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him, some of the Iranian institutions involved are: Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC), especially its secretive Quds Force, Ansar Base of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards Corps, the clerical establishment in Qom, the Ministry of Intelligence, Charity 
Organizations (Imam Khomeini Relief Committee) and the Supreme National Security 
Council (Saleh, 2013). 
Afghanistan has always been crucial for Iran’s national interests: for its economy, 
its security and for the cultural component of Iran’s politics in the region. However, Iran’s 
foreign policy implementation strategies in Afghanistan after 2001 have been rather 
contradictory. Iran has been supported the central power in Afghanistan, while its 
concerns with the presence of the western troops in the country have resulted in its 
simultaneous backing of various anti-governmental fighters including the Taliban, among 
others (Levkowitz, 2017). 
With this complexity and contradiction (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for more on 
the peculiarities of Iran’s foreign policy) of Iran's foreign policy implementation, it is 
hard to guess which institution is responsible for each particular act. Behind the 
construction and reconstruction projects and development aid, the Iranian government has 
security, economic, cultural and religious interests in Afghanistan. Thus, on the one hand, 
in foreign policy implementation, Iran uses intelligence and provides financial support to 
forces opposed to the Afghan government. On the other hand, it exploits development aid 
and economic support as a means of involving itself in the internal politics of Afghanistan 
(Bhatnagar, 2013). In this chapter, I elaborate in more detail on how Ian’s various 
institutions are involved in carrying out its foreign policy. 
This chapter starts from the analysis of the involvement of Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guards Corps (IRGC) in Afghanistan (section 6.1) and provides insights into the 
activities of its ground force at Ansar Base which is entrusted with certain special 
operations both inside and outside of Iranian borders (section 6.2). The presence of Iran in 
religious (including Shia factor) and educational spheres, as well as the media and civil 
society organizations of Afghanistan, are analyzed under the umbrella of the clerical 
establishment of Qom (section 6.3). The foreign policy implementation cannot be 
imagined without the activity of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (section 
6.4). Because the public opinion in Afghanistan is created at the very local level, the 
importance of the activities of the Iranian charity organizations, particularly the Imam 
Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC), should not be underestimated (section 6.5). Not an 
Iran’s policy in relation to Afghanistan: security and political aspects 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
135 
insignificant role in decision-making with regards to the policy towards Afghanistan 
belongs to the Council on Afghanistan in the office of the Supreme Leader (section 6.6). 
Last but not least, the Iranian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan are the conduit of the 
Iranian strategies towards its neighbor (section 6.7). The chapter concludes with the 
summary (section 6.8). 
6.1 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 
In the third chapter of this study, the structure and mandates of the IRGC have 
been explained. Its involvement in Afghanistan dates back decades, from the Russian 
invasion to the civil war and, later, to the period of the Taliban and the dramatic changes 
that followed the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The IRGC plays an important 
role in the implementation of IRI's foreign policy in Afghanistan. It uses both soft and 
hard power as it considers the U.S. presence in Afghanistan as one of its high-level 
targets. The IRGC has its representatives in every institution (diplomatic missions, charity 
organizations, cultural and economic) not only inside Iran but also outside. It considers 
Afghanistan’s security instability as being a threat to the very regime of Iran (Byman et 
al., 2001, p.71). 
The Global War on Terror, which began with the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan 
in 2001, has brought outside actors into the country, each with its well–calculated foreign 
policy agenda (Nader and Laha, 2011, p.9). For Iran, the Revolutionary Guards is one 
major organization that plays a significant role in the formulation and implementation of 
its foreign policy agenda as a branch of Iran’s Armed forces that ensures safeguarding 
Iran’s Islamic system from any outside foreign involvement (Nader and Laha 2011, p.9).  
Iranian financial as well as strategic assistance to the ideologically synchronized 
Shia community in Afghanistan has not only raised questions about this support from the 
outsider's perspective but also from within the stratified Shia community. Thus, Iranian 
economic and other kinds of support to the Shia have led to the division of the Shia 
Afghan community first during the Soviet period (Koepke, 2013, p.4). Thereafter, the 
IRGC, under the Shia ideology, continued its support to the Afghan Shia minorities 
(Roggio, 2010). The Afghan Shias, though, feel as if they were used by Iran. One of the 
Shia clerics of Herat describes the advantage of the Shia factor for Iran in the following 
way: 
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"Shia people in Afghanistan were used by Iran during the civil war in Afghanistan 
and are used even now with a different approach. During the civil war, Iran was 
using Shia to fight USSR, through Sepah Iran was providing military training to a 
number of Shia movements against the Soviet troops. But now they use Shia as an 
ideological instrument to build their influence and implement their anti-US 
agenda. Shias in Afghanistan and in other countries are used by Iran only for its 
own interests. Many Afghan Shia refugees are living in Iran, but people and the 
government of Iran don’t treat them as humans." (S. K., personal interview, 26 
August 2014) 
The shift in Iranian foreign policy after 2001 mandated the IRGC to focus not only 
on the Shia ideology but also to develop ties with other political parties, individuals and 
even with anti-governmental groups such as the Taliban. Although the evidence is 
difficult to obtain, various accounts, including the one coming from the member of 
Herat’s provincial council, allows one to emphasize such support with a great certainty: 
“Iran is using any tool to weaken the US, and Taliban are one of these tools, I 
can’t prove this fact 100% or reject such connections, but there is some evidence 
and signs in support of this. The international troops raised the issue many times, 
but such connections between Iran and Taliban are very complicated and secretive 
and for us, it is hard to prove it due to the policies of our central government 
[Author’s note: in Afghanistan]. But let me say that we do have the information 
that Iran is supporting the Taliban, but how exactly and up to which level, - it is 
hard for us to prove.” (M. Y., personal interview, 25 October 2016) 
However, what is more striking is that the Iran-Taliban ties are not denied in Iran, 
and the answer provided by the Iranian official and a university professor in Mashhad 
when that question was posed, clearly communicated, that: 
 “There is no dispute on Iran’s support provided to Afghan Taliban. It is clear and 
realistic. Pakistan and Arabs are supporting Taliban, and U.S. is supporting all of 
them against Iran. We [Author’s note: Iranians] need to manage Taliban and have 
relations with them, not only to protect our interests and security as a nation but 
also to be able to talk to them for the sake of the peace a process in Afghanistan. 
We have IS problems on our border with Afghanistan, and we know that the 
Afghan government is not able to control the situation. In such a context, we must 
take some adequate actions to defend ourselves. And it is also, actually, a help to 
Afghans.” (H. A., personal interview, 14 April 2017) 
Just like any other nation-state caught in a spiral of conflict for such a protracted 
period of time, Afghanistan represents an almost perfect specimen of a loose and porously 
bordered country. This porous nature of its borders makes the territory vulnerable to both 
welcoming and unwelcoming elements and people coming from outside. This can include 
secretive and clandestine groups or institutions from outside which operate in the country. 
To complicate things further, Afghanistan and Iran have a mutual visa waiver program for 
diplomats aimed at trouble-free movement between the two countries. The IRGC has 
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assigned two branches of its covert Quds Force, the Ansar Headquarters based in 
Mashhad and the 23rd Headquarters in Birjand, to carry out various subversive activities 
within the territory of Afghanistan. According to the former Intelligence Chief of 
Afghanistan, Amrullah Saleh, the free movement of diplomats gives IRGC officials the 
easiest possible means of entering Afghanistan by disguising themselves as businessmen, 
aid workers, journalists, etc. (Tisdall, 2010). 
Due to it being a neighboring country inhabited by a minority Shia Hazara 
community, Iran has been cognizant of various political and strategic developments 
taking place in Afghanistan. The increased international interest in Afghanistan during the 
current period, due in part to the U.S. presence in the country, included increased interest 
by Iran. According to one of the parliamentarians of the Farah province, “there is 
evidence that the state of Iran is sponsoring and proliferating terrorism in Afghanistan in 
an organized form as well as via unorganized non-state actors” (M. S. F., personal 
interview, 25 January 2018). He further highlighted in the interview that “a remarkable 
number of Iranian officials, working behind the curtain, aimed at toppling the government 
of Afghanistan or, at least, operate in a way which maximizes the influence of the pro-
Iranian agenda in the political machinery of Afghanistan” (M. S. F., personal interview, 
25 January 2018).  
In the west of Afghanistan, Iranian ties with local officials are well established. It 
starts from the governor's office and stretches to the heads of provincial and district police 
and other governmental and non-governmental institutions. Thus, in December 2012, the 
Afghan intelligence agency (National Department of Security) arrested the Executive 
Director of the Herat governor’s office on charges of spying for Iranian entities in 
Afghanistan (Kabul press, 2015). A year before this event, in December 2011, the IRCG 
announced that they had captured a U.S. drone that had entered the Iranian airspace from 
western Afghanistan (Farah province). But the Afghan officials in Farah reported that the 
drone, in fact, had crashed on Afghan soil in Farah province. Based on the very detailed 
information provided by the top-ranking official of the Intelligence Department of the 
Farah police, the peculiarities of the case were the following: "The drone has crashed in 
Farah province, but our border police put it in a police car ‘Ranger Ford’ car, carried it 
away and sold it to the IRGC because the IRGC is aware of everything happening in 
Farah and they have an everyday connection with our police and government officials." 
(N. Ah., personal interview, 30 August 2014) 
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According to information from one of the top-ranking officials of the Herat police, 
a number of Afghan officials in the western part Afghanistan faced various problems 
connected to the presence of Iranian diplomats and informal elements in their provinces. 
Iranian diplomats in the Iranian Consulate in Herat met Afghan officials without 
following the procedure and any Afghan officials who declined to do so, was grilled by 
his seniors because of Iranian influence on them: 
"Iran has good and supportive ties with our officials and governmental 
institutions, and they [Author’s note: Iranian officials] kept strong influence inside 
of our governmental organizations. Iranian Pasdaran force [Author’s note: IRGC] 
is spying and is very active in Herat and its border region. Iranian diplomats and 
unknown Iranians informally paying to the local police and local leaders at district 
and province levels and most of them are loyal to them. Iranians are here since 
long time ago, but starting from 2001 until now Iranian support to Taliban and 
their anti-American and anti-Afghanistan activities have increased, especially 
from 2008." (S. Q., personal interview, 19 August 2014) 
The involvement of IRGC is also mentioned on the U.S. list of global terrorists, 
although one has to remain skeptical of such information, when Iran, a US-enemy, is 
concerned. The U.S. government has increased the list of global terrorists by including in 
it some of IRGC’s special forces unit - Quds Force officers (Sayyed Kamal Musavi, 
Alireza Hemmati, Akbar Seyed Al-Hosseini, and Mahmud) and one "associate" (Afkhami 
Rashidi) who are believed to be part of a greater plot aimed at the "use of terrorism and 
intelligence operations as tools of influence against the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan” (Roggio, 2014). Parallel to the above operations, Iran exercised 
its influence over Afghan government in a more creative and discrete way. Thus, there 
have been several incidents of bribery against Afghan political officials initiated by 
various Iranian agents with a simple aim to strengthen its political base in the politically 
active Kabul (Roggio, 2014). 
Consequently, Iran has been suspected of creating security challenges in 
Afghanistan, especially in the western part of the country. By supporting insurgency and 
organizing attacks on governmental entities and even civilians, Iran is reported to have 
had the following objectives: arming those who oppose the U.S. presence in Afghanistan; 
pressurising the Afghan government to give a bigger space to Iran in the country’s 
political profile, and demonstrating its power before the U.S. as well as before the Afghan 
government. It meets these objectives, inter alia, by implementing the scheme described 
by one of the members of the provincial council in Farah province: “Whenever Iran's 
relations with the Western powers on its nuclear program are critical, Iran is trying to 
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push on the crisis in Afghanistan and use the situation in Afghanistan for its political and 
security relations with the West” (D. Q., personal interview, 12 March 2016). 
The results of efforts to influence the Afghan government by Iran and the U.S. are 
a direct and negative impact on the security as well as the economy in Afghanistan. This 
negative impact was highlighted by a high-ranking official of Herat province:  
"I can say 90% of the problems for Iran in Afghanistan are associated with the US. 
That is why Iran supports the Taliban, creating thereby security problems for the 
Afghans and Americans both. Precisely, Iran’s multi-pronged strategy is to create 
pressure while the U.S. exits Afghanistan. In my opinion, such a strategy, foul or 
fair, has negative effects on us. It can create a security problem for us and have an 
impact on our government and economy. Iran wants us not to cooperate with the 
U.S. and instead wants us to keep up such relations with Iran." (F.W., personal 
interview, 21 August 2014) 
Afghan officials and civil society activists have accused Iran (through, inter alia, 
it’s IRGC) of attempting to create hurdles for the works on the Salma dam project in 
western Afghanistan (8am Daily News Paper, 2017). Though all previous accusations on 
Iran’s involvement have been rejected by the Iranian Consul in Herat province, Mahmood 
Rashidi Afkhami (MFA of Iran, Herat Consulate 2015), however, the Senator from Herat 
province emphasized with certainty, that Iran went as far as trying to convince India to 
stop the Salma dam project financing. He further connects the military attacks on the 
Salma dam by some Afghan militant groups to Iran, by claiming IRGC is backing these 
groups (J. R., personal interview, 7 March 2016). Salma Dam is a hydroelectric and 
irrigation dam project located on the Hari River in Chishti Sharif District of Herat 
Province in western Afghanistan. This India-sponsored project of construction of Salma 
dam was worth about 275 million USD for the Indian government (Gulati and Saxena, 
2016). It was later renamed by the Afghan Cabinet as the Afghan-India Friendship 
Dam.
18
 Based on the statistics of the Ministry of Water and Energy of Afghanistan, the 
price of the water, which flows to Iran from Afghanistan, is estimated at around 1.5 
billion USD. (8am Daily News Paper, 2011). This justifies the concern of Iran about the 
construction of the Salma dam that was expressed by the Iranian leadership. Thus, 
Rouhani, at the International Conference on Combating Sand and Dust Storms: 
Challenges and Practical Solutions, highlighted the ecological threat this dam poses for 
Iranian provinces: Sistan, Baluchistan and Khurasane Rezawi (Iran Daily, 2017). 
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 This dam was finally completed and officially opened on June 4, 2016. 
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Another interest of Iran for security and stability in Afghanistan is connected to 
the pipeline projects of IRI itself in the region. Thus, Iran has built a 3400-km gas 
pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran for export to India via Karachi port of Pakistan. The 
goal was to sabotage the US-propelled TAPI Pipeline (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–
Pakistan–India) project which starts from Turkmenistan, crosses Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and then enters India (Nabizada, 2013). The Afghan officials have tried to find 
ways to engage Iran, but it did not work, as the Head of the technical support department 
of the Ministry of Water and Energy of Afghanistan explained it: 
“Iran wants to export its gas to South Asia and therefore it is clear that Iran would 
not support the TAPI project. Due to US-Iran unfriendly relations in Afghanistan, 
the Afghan government could not convince and even talk with Iranian officials on 
the possibility of construction of the projected works by some Iranian companies, 
which would be one of the ways from this deadlock situation. At the same time, 
Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide financial support to the project via 
Turkmenistan government and the Turkmen government welcomed Saudi’s 
support for the TAPI project. Due to the critical relations between Iran and Saudi, 
this constellation was also not welcomed by the Iranian government” (K. Sah., 
personal interview, 12 May 2017). 
The TAPI project is decreasing Iran’s role in the region, according to the expert 
opinion of Omid Shokri Kalehsar, the Senior Energy Security Analyst in Washington, 
which is what Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main regional competitor sought. He emphasized that 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia’s competition is due to their position as the major oil suppliers 
in the region. (Yazdani, 2018). Indeed, due to its strategic importance to Iran, the TAPI 
pipeline project was and still is under the great attention of Iran. What is, perhaps, more 
important though is that these countries’ economic interests are allegedly pursued through 
military means. Thus, according to one of the top members of the Afghan Security 
Council, Iran’s IRGC was and is “trying to undermine the TAPI project implementation”. 
He emphasized Iran’s concern with the project, that this country intended to be implanted 
within its own borders. It is Sepah, according to him, that was organizing the attack 
during the February 2018 project inauguration ceremony, while ten insurgents, caught by 
the Afghan Security forces after this attack were allegedly trained by Sepah in Iran (N. 
A., personal interview, 30 July 2018). 
Unlike Iran, the U.S. officially regards the pipeline project as an initiative that can 
foster trade cooperation between East Asia and Europe, by creating incentives for more 
investments in the rails and roads industry, trade and regional exchange, including the 
interconnection between the region of Central Asia and South Asia, and, thus, give their 
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approval for its (Narula, 2015). Obviously, Iran considers the U.S. to be trying to 
diminish the importance of Iran in the region by providing such support. This fact irritates 
Iran even greater and provokes it to exhaust the IRGC’s potential in Afghanistan towards 
creating impediments to this project. 
6.2 Ansar Base of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
From the Revolution in Iran onwards, the foreign policy of Iran towards 
Afghanistan is based more on the military approach than political use of the development 
agencies aid for creating influence or promoting economic ties with Afghanistan.  
Though the Soviet Afghan invasion pushed a lot of refugees into Iran, which 
meant an additional encumbrance onto the state of Iran, the state government in the form 
of its various organizations managed to yield some benefits from this misery. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran used various emerging organizations within the refugee population of 
Afghanistan to exert its influence over the Republic of Afghanistan (Nojumi, 2009, p.93). 
One such group is called Showra-ye E’telaf-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan [Allied Islamic 
Council of Afghanistan] and is made up of eight Shia jihadi groups (Alfoneh, 2012). The 
resultant Afghan Shia refugee population, trained and controlled in Iran within the 
premises of Ansar Base established by IRGC, was later used in Afghanistan overtly and 
covertly for operations (Alfoneh, 2012).  
Although the 1979 Iranian revolution finished the rule of the last Persian monarch, 
Iran experienced a certain amount of tribal unrest during the post-revolutionary period in 
the south-east region (Alfoneh, 2012). But Iran’s IRGC "Ansar Military Base" promptly 
quelled the turbulence in the southeastern part of the country. (Alfoneh and Fulton, 2012). 
Soon, however, the situation was exacerbated by the Soviet-Afghan occupation around 
the same period (1979). It followed the influx of bands of Afghani Shia refugees into Iran 
from its eastern neighbor Afghanistan (Majidyar and Alfoneh, 2010). 
According to U.S. analysts, the Ansar Base is responsible for Iranian involvement 
in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. It has a number of bases, Eshaq, Ranjvari, and 
Moqaddam, along with Iran's eastern border with Afghanistan, that secretly sponsor and 
support the various Shia Afghan groups in Iran and Afghanistan, apart from the Afghan 
Taliban, that since 2001 also have received Iran’s support (Gold and Cordesman, 2014, 
p.148). These Ansar-organised activities in Afghanistan are allegedly creating and 
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consolidating Iranian influence in Afghanistan (Alfoneh and Fulton, 2012). These 
accounts are further confirmed by the former head for the National Security Directorate 
of Afghanistan (NDS), Amrulah Saleh. The Head of Intelligence Service, Saleh ascertains 
that Ansar Base was ever present in Afghanistan since the Islamic Revolution (Saleh, 
2015). For this purpose, Iran is reported to have supplied arms and ammunition to its 
proxies in Afghanistan (BBC, 2011). Other means that Iran used to consolidate its 
influence in Afghanistan include broadcasting anti-US news on the Iranian Radio and TV 
channels, backing up former Afghan warlords and influencing the Afghan official clients, 
e.g., Ismail Khan, the Governor of Herat (Samii, 2002).  
It is important to note here, that Iran’s Ansar base could succeed in its activities 
due to the widespread corruption and other imperfections within Afghanistan itself. Thus, 
in order to combat the Iranian strategies to woo the Afghan population and create pro-
Iranian bands among them, the Afghan National Army led several military operations 
against all such nefarious elements in Herat in 2004. These operations resulted in the 
arrests of the number of people and marginalizing the anti-national and pro-Iranian 
activities of its governor, Ismail Khan. However, the fact that Ismail Khan was soon 
appointed as the Minister of Energy by the then President Hamid Karzai is a naked 
example of nepotism and corruption within Afghanistan itself.  
6.3 Clerical Establishment in Qom 
An idea about the religious foundations of the Iranian-Afghan foreign policy is 
exemplified by Iranian support to the Shia communities of Afghanistan. It has led to the 
creation of Iranian influence in the bordering regions of Afghanistan. Iranian influence 
has affected traditions related to the speaking of Afghan language in Iranian accent 
(Persian)
19
 as well as the wearing dresses (costume) and playing music in the Iranian 
style. However, this is done strategically, by providing financial aid and assistance to the 
Afghans and their government (Juneau and Razavi, 2013a, p.11) for infrastructure and 
other activities: the building of roads and mosques, the distribution of religious literature 
and the organization of special religious ceremonies (i.e. on the Ashura
20
 Day, and on the 
                                                 
19
 People in Afghanistan are speaking Dari which has a different accent and most of the times different 
terminology in comparison with the Persian Language spoken in Iran.  
20
 “The Day of Ashura is marked by Muslims as a whole, but for Shi’ites it is a major religious 
commemoration of the martyrdom the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, Hussain at Karbala. It falls on the 
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eve of Khomeini’s death and birth anniversary and on other Shia religious leaders as 
well). An Iranian institution, the Qom, is responsible for organizing and promoting these 
soft power activities in its bordering regions with Afghanistan. Doing anything to 
sabotage Qom initiatives implies deprivation of financial and other support to the 
defaulters (Saleh, 2013). 
As a soft power policy, a number of Iranian religious institutions are active in 
Afghanistan. The Iranian ideological aspiration of Shia Islam as a dynamic reality can 
create tensions between the Sunni majority in Afghanistan and a much smaller population 
of Shia there, where both are influenced by Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia in terms of 
Islamic principles accordingly. With Iranian support, the Islamic University of Khatam 
al-Nabye was built in the west of Kabul. The Madrassah (Islamic School) is a part of the 
Islamic University. Both Madrassa and the University teach the Shia version of Islam 
with the direct involvement and support of Iran (Behn, 2012). One of the most famous 
Shia jurists and a former Mujahideen leader, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Asef Mohseni, 
leads the Khatam-al Nabye Islamic University. This University is one the most prominent 
landmarks in Kabul since it serves as a central locale for pro-Iranian activities and 
promoting the Velayat-e Faghih ideology of the Shia branch of Islam. Moreover, the 
University disseminates the ideology of the Iranian Revolution to Shia people, which 
creates revolutionary groups such as Hizbullah and other groups and movements loyal to 
Iran. By providing aid to the University, Tehran aims to introduce new religious leaders 
into society who will carry on the Iranian version of politics and Islamic ideology (Nazar 
and Recknagel, 2010). 
Apart from building and sponsoring their own universities, Iran also organizes 
study centers on the basis of the Afghan universities, where one can deepen knowledge of 
Persian language and Islamic issues as seen from the Iranian perspective. One of the 
examples of such Iranian initiative is organized on the basis of the Syed Jamaluddin 
Afghan University in Asadabad, Kunar province of Afghanistan. (Sawahel, 2017) Iran 
also encourages Afghan students to study in universities in Iran by providing a range of 
scholarships for those who stand out in their knowledge. The above concerns, in 
particular, the postgraduate students of technological and natural science disciplines. 
                                                                                                                                                  
10th of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic lunar calendar. It is marked by Muslims with one-day of 
fasting, which commemorates the day Noah left the Ark, and the day that Moses was saved from the 
Egyptians by God. For Shia Muslims, Ashura is a solemn day of mourning the martyrdom of Hussein in 
680 AD at Karbala in modern-day Iraq.” (BBC, 2011) 
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(Sawahel, 2017) Further, some universities of Iran also established branches in 
Afghanistan, where Afghan students, are issued diplomas and certificates of the Iranian 
university. Among the universities of Iran that have opened their branches in Afghanistan 
are: Al-Mustafa International University (widely spreading the ideology of Iran in the 
Islamic countries) with a branch in Kabul, the Ferdowsi University of Mashhad (one of 
the largest universities of Iran) with a branch in Herat, named Khajeh Abdollah Ansari 
University. At the time of conducting this study, more branches of Iranian universities in 
Afghanistan were scheduled to open. (Sawahel, 2017) According to the Islamic Republic 
News Agency, the number of the Afghans pursuing their education in the Iranian 
universities is estimated at around 15,000. (Islamic Republic News Agency, 2017) 
Pragmatically, Iran funds and supports a number of religious, educational and 
media institutions. The purpose of this considerable help and support from Iran is to 
maintain an impressive position of influence in Afghanistan, particularly in the western 
part of the country (Fox News, 2011). For instance, upon opening of the Iranian Center 
(Iranian Corner) in Kabul University, thousands of copies of books and magazines were 
provided to the center, and it was equipped with computers and access to the internet. An 
interesting fact is that there is no restriction on access to web pages, even those that are 
blocked in Iran by its government (Rohde, 2006). 
Iran has provided thousands of books to a number of universities and schools in 
Afghanistan as well as help for the construction and rebuilding of a notable number of 
schools. One should, of course, not forget that most of these books and educational 
materials advance either a political or ideological agenda (Kagan, Kagan, and Pletka, 
2008). In 2017, around 250,000 students were enrolled in the universities of Afghanistan, 
according to information provided by the spokesmen of the Ministry of Higher Education 
of Afghanistan, Faisal Amin. As of 2017, there were 32 state universities and 82 private 
higher education institutes/universities (Khabarnameh News Agency, 2017). 
Of course, Iran is not the only regional power to use this soft power tool. For 
instance, Saudi Arabia’s funded educational projects estimate around USD 500 million 
alone for the Islamic University of Afghanistan in Nangarhar. The funding to 
Afghanistan’s universities thus comes from two opposite Islamic powers: Sunni Saudi 
Arabia and Shia Iran, making Afghanistan generally, and its universities, in particular, an 
arena for the proxy competition. (Sawahel, 2017)  
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Iran’s regional agenda encompassing its political, ideological and cultural 
aspirations as a Shia-dominated country is clearly focused on enhancing its position as a 
center connecting Asia with the Middle East and making this position sustainable, where 
Afghanistan is allocated a special role (Sawahel, 2017). 
6.3.1 Iranian links with Afghan Media and Civil Society Organizations 
The link between the soft power activities organized by Qom can be also 
established with regards to the support of various religious, media and cultural 
organizations. Thus, according to the head of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies 
(AISS), Iran spends around 100 million USD in Afghanistan on a yearly basis in this 
sector, because it sees Afghan media and civil society organizations as the conduit for its 
soft power activities (D. M., personal interview, 12 March 2016). 
The involvement of Iran in the media sector is indeed considerable, based on the 
various accounts coming from media employees. One of the representatives from the 
Afghan media asserted that in fact, one-third of media agencies in Afghanistan receive 
financial support from Iran (W. P., personal interview, 23 October 2016). Most likely, 
such support can induce these media agencies to facilitate Tehran’s anti-American 
propaganda in Afghanistan.  
The projects supported by Iran are in areas such as education, media, and certain 
projects within some civil society organizations. As it was highlighted above, almost a 
third of all Afghan media, including newspapers, broadcast media, and magazines are 
backed by Iran, which allows one to assess the involvement of Iran in this sector as 
substantial. Among these, the Tamadon and Noor TV channels, as well as Ensaf 
newspaper, have been identified by the Afghan government as being in receipt of 
financial support from Iran and promoting the Iranian agenda in their programs and 
articles. Through its influence in the media and in the Afghan Parliament, Iran seems to 
be targeting a specific set of objectives, among which the most crucial one is conducting 
anti-US propaganda. While the provision of grants and the financing of the media and 
civil society sector by the UN, USAID or other western donors looks very natural and is 
generally assessed as positive when it comes to similar Iranian support of the media and 
civil society the issue raises numerous concerns. This is often seen as having negative 
consequences of such involvement for the overall freedom of expression in Afghanistan - 
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a side effect of such foreign country’s financing of an important so-called fourth branch 
of the power (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p.42). This inevitably leads to the justified concerns of 
the Afghan government with such overt and covert steps Iran takes in controlling the 
dissemination of information and public opinion in Afghanistan, let alone the U.S 
officials being anxious about the situation which collides with their own objectives. 
6.4 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security 
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is strongly involved in foreign 
intelligence activities of Iran in Afghanistan. It is a “key player in Iran’s global efforts to 
export its revolution” whereby "most of the MOIS work is oriented towards building 
power outside Iran” (Modell and Asher, 2013) and creating an influence of various sorts. 
According to Amrullah Saleh, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security assign the task of collecting intelligence reports to its Iranian 
clients in Afghanistan (Majidyar, 2013). These relationships are publically as well as 
secretly organized, through literature distribution, offering bribery and gifts etc. (Saleh, 
2013). The MOIS officers and Iranian embassies operationalize such programmes 
“through their cultural centers, reconstruction committees, non-governmental 
organizations and real businesses" (Modell and Asher, 2013). Beyond that, the MOIS in 
close connection with the Qods Force, manage relationships with the Taliban insurgents 
and some smuggling networks in Afghanistan (Joscelyn, 2013). 
6.5 Charity Organizations (Imam Khomeini Relief Committee: IKRC) 
Besides other initiatives of Iran to dominate in various spheres of neighboring 
Afghanistan, the U.S. feels threatened by the soft power tactics organized by charity 
foundations like the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC) in Afghanistan. The 
IKRC has a well-defined and institutionalized mode of operation across Afghanistan. It 
has many offices and 45 branches in Afghanistan (Kutty, 2014), the main are in Kabul, 
Herat, Zaranj -the capital of Nimruz in western Afghanistan and in Mazar-e Sharif of the 
Balkh province in the North of Afghanistan. Their stated primary objective is to provide 
basic aid in the form of food, shelter, clothing and health facilities to the needy, however, 
their ultimate objective is to influence people’s religion, culture, education etc. (Kutty, 
2014). Recent statistics reveal that nearly 32,000 Afghans from over 7,000 families have 
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benefitted from the IKRC aid and educational programs (Riecke and Francke, 2013, 
p.118). It is not only the U.S. that suspects Iran’s soft power strategies to be behind the 
various programs of IKRC. The Afghan government also accuses the IKRC of being 
involved in the espionage activity and in furtherance of Iran’s multi-pronged interests, 
under the cover of IKRC. The Afghan government’s accusations have been echoed by the 
information, communicated to me by one of the Afghan parliament members from Farah, 
who has named the IKRC as “the most important generator of the IRGC soft power in 
Afghanistan.” He further emphasized that in his view “IKRC is the organization where 
Iranian intelligence is working covertly under the purpose of humanitarian aid.” (B. R., 
personal interview, 11 March 2016) 
The Imam Khomeini Relief Committee became active across Afghanistan in the 
1990’s. The IKRC’s diversified program is not limited to Iran’s Afghan borders but 
stretches beyond (Modell and Asher, 2013). However, its action plan remains largely 
intended for the Shia communities in major Afghan cities and provinces, most 
importantly in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif and Bamyan province. On the Taliban’s 
assumption, its operational offices were shifted from Kabul to Pul-e Khomri, the capital 
of the northern Baghlan Province, and to the Punjab district in Bamyan Province. It had to 
close many of its offices because of Taliban threats across the country though it continued 
with its assistance programs in the Tajikistan-bordering Northern Afghan provinces. This 
mode of proxy programming, involving a third country (Tajikistan), alters Iran's 
intervention into a classic tool of soft power in Afghanistan (Alfoneh and Majidyar, 
2010). 
It must be once again highlighted that the organizations, such as the Imam 
Khomeini Relief Committee are under the control and supervision of Iran's Supreme 
Leader. The IKRC also happens to be a very rich and ostensibly respectable committee, 
primarily because it survives on government funding, huge donations from inside and 
outside of Iran from both private and public individuals and communities, religious taxes, 
fundraising activities and its money and assets (belongings of the committee). The IKRC, 
as an integral part of Iran's greater objective of using soft tactics to wield increasing 
influence on the territory of Afghanistan, has been actively promoting Iran's ideological 
and political mandates beyond the borders of Iran (Alfoneh and Majidyar, 2010). 
In his interview to Afghan Voice News Agency, Raza Salm Abadi, the Chair of 
IKRC said that the IKRC has four central offices, which manage the work of other local 
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offices around the country (Afghanistan): in Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Kabul, and Nimroz. 
Salm Abadi. He provided interesting statistics that “the IKRC provides humanitarian aid 
and provisional training to 170 thousand persons who come from 70 thousand families. 
IKRC provides families with a so-called ‘coupon book’ and based on this document they 
receive the aid from the IKRC” (Afghan Voice Agency, 2014). 
Although IKRC is the main actor involved in the above activities, according to the 
head of the NGO department of the Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan, “…apart from 
IKRC, there are three more Iranian humanitarian aid organizations which are working in 
some parts of Afghanistan: the first one is “Sabz-e Parsian” in Kabul, Herat and Takhar 
provinces, which provides health facilities. The second organization is “Basir” and the 
third one is “Hami”, which focuses on women and children” (R. B., personal interview, 
16 March 2015). It was not possible to trace the affiliations of these three organizations 
with IKRC, although there are also no accounts that would speak against the existence of 
such connections, either. 
Apart from the above activities, the IKRC makes its presence felt by organizing 
events on the occasions of the Iranian Revolutionary Day, Quds Day
21
, Khomeini’s death 
anniversary, Ashura and Ramadan. It also conducts certain events to show solidarity with 
and express concern about the tyranny and oppression of their fellow Muslims across the 
world. Both common people and the local ruling elites of Afghanistan participate in such 
events (Alfoneh and Majidyar, 2010). 
The IKRC has a profile of providing aid and assistance to the Afghans 
(approximately to 170,000 all over Afghanistan). It organizes vocational training 
programs for men and women in Herat, Farah, and Nimroz. Each year IKRC supplying 
10,000 thousand books and stationery to school children in western Afghanistan and 
provided scholarships worth 1000 Afs. (equal to about 20 USD) to each student. It 
organized marriages of orphans and helped each such family with 220 USD for meeting 
their immediate needs (Afghan voice agency, 2014). On the birthday of Fatima Zahra (the 
daughter of Prophet Mohammad), the IKRC managed the marriage of 22 couples in Herat 
province. Thus, IKRC ensures Iran’s presence at the very core of the Afghan society – in 
the lives of the separately taken families and individuals.  
                                                 
21
 Official day in Islamic calendar, last day of Ramadan to show the unity with Palestinians. 
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The effects of the charity work of IKRC as one of the most powerful institution of 
Iran implementing soft power policies is enormous due to its vast financial sources and 
due to the wide spectrum of activities it is involved in, covering not only educational and 
religious spheres but also personal lives of Afghan population, which increases 
sympathies among vulnerable Shia population and sometimes even beyond. This often 
creates an atmosphere of trust, encouraging Afghans to willingly share valuable 
information Iran might be interested in, as a gratitude for Iranian charity activities.  
6.6 Council on Afghanistan in the Office of the Supreme Leader 
The Council on Afghanistan in the Office of the Supreme Leader is another major 
appendage in Iranian policy-making towards Afghanistan. This council played a 
tremendous role during the civil war in Afghanistan. Indeed, its role is diversified: 
mobilizing Hazara ethnic groups, organizing cultural events, providing economic support 
and collecting data for the office of the Supreme Leader. In addition, it is involved in 
some research-oriented projects meant for data collection and social mapping of Shia 
groups in Afghanistan (Bakhtyari, 2003, p.250). Due to the fact, that this Council is under 
the immediate supervision of the Supreme Leader, it is quite difficult to find out about it 
in more detail, although some information could be obtained from Afghan sources. Thus, 
according to information, provided to me by a former Afghan diplomat in Iran: 
“The Council [Author’s note: The Council on Afghanistan in the Office of 
Supreme Leader] was most active during the Jihad in Afghanistan [Author’s note: 
1979-1991, during the time of the Soviet occupation] and later on during the civil 
war (from 1991 to 2001). The council provided information to the Leader and 
delivered the Leader’s views and guidelines to other institutions within Iran to 
organize their activities and involvement, based on it. The Council also 
coordinated meetings between Iranian officials and Afghan Mujahideen leaders in 
order to provide Afghan fighters with financial support during the Russians 
[Author’s note: during the Soviet occupation] and later on for the fight with 
Taliban. Members of the Council have good relations, I would say even; - close 
ties with the Shia clerics in Afghanistan”. (K. N., personal interview, 09 April 
2017)  
For the reasons stated above, it is not possible to cross-check this information but 
based on the demeanor of the interview partner and the circumstances surrounding my 
interview, I found the source to be credible.  
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6.7 Iranian diplomatic missions 
Afghanistan began its diplomatic relationship with Iran following the declaration 
of independence in 1919. The Friendship and Neutrality Treaty was signed between Iran 
and Afghanistan on June 22, 1921 (Hoshang, 1996, p.37). In the same year, Iran 
established its embassy in Kabul (Babahi and Riza, 1996, p.325). In the same year, King 
Amanullah Khan of the Kingdom of Afghanistan sent a delegation headed by Abdul Aziz 
Khan on a diplomatic mission to Iran.  
The Friendship and Neutrality Treaty declared that: 1. Afghanistan and Iran would 
keep friendly relations; 2. The trade relations between Iran and Afghanistan are hence 
established; 3. Apart from the embassy in Tehran, Afghanistan will open a consular office 
in the Iranian city – Mashhad; and 4. Both countries would build strong political relations 
and these relations would be at the level of embassies (Mojda, 2010). The Treaty thus has 
placed a strong emphasis on the building of sustainable diplomatic ties that would enable 
the two states to build the political and economic, inter alia trade, cooperation.  
Indeed, as the treaty foresaw, during the reign of the last King of Afghanistan, 
Mohammad Zahir Shah, Iran had a stable economic and political relationship with 
Afghanistan. When the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran and the new leadership with 
the Islamic ideology came to power, Iran’s foreign policy changed, especially towards 
Afghanistan. The political regime of Afghanistan has also undergone transformation and 
Imam Khomeini opposed the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, calling it a historical 
mistake. Consequently, Iran supported Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against the Red 
Army (Mazari, 2009). Later on, such support was provided to the Taliban. This support, 
though certainly never confirmed by the Iranian diplomatic missions, is nevertheless 
evidenced by the manner in which Iran’s diplomats comment on the issue. Thus, in 2016 
the Ambassador of Iran to Afghanistan Mohammad Reza Behrami clearly admitted that 
“Iran maintains contacts with the Taliban” (News Desk, 2017), though explained Iran’s 
objectives as “intelligence purposes”. It seems that the diplomat was quite modest in 
explaining the real nature of such existing ties, because, even Iranian media Jahan News 
reported that the Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour (before he was 
killed in Pakistan in a U.S. drone strike in 2016) had not only spent two months in Iran 
but also held intensive meetings with various Iranian authorities (Majidiyar, 2017). 
However, the link between the Taliban and Iran was “formalized” much earlier, already 
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in 2014, when the Taliban were allowed to establish their representative premises in Iran 
(News Desk, 2017). 
Today, apart from the Iranian embassy in Kabul, the consulate departments of IRI 
are open in Balkh, Herat, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces. According to embassy and 
consulate officials, Iran issues one thousand visas to Afghans on a daily basis. (Bakhtar 
News Agency, 2017) 
Iranian diplomatic missions, allegedly, actively interfere in the political decision-
making process in Afghanistan using various means of leverage at their disposal. There 
are accounts on IRGC’s presence in the diplomatic representations of Iran, with an aim to 
ensure the goals of Revolutionary Guards. Thus, according to the head of the Afghan 
political party, Hambastagii Milli (National Unity Party),  
“most the members of embassy and other Iranian agencies in Afghanistan are 
Sepah members, they are operating and enjoying the diplomatic immunity and 
meeting Afghan officials, politicians and other relevant actors under the name of 
Iranian diplomats. When the Taliban killed nine Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-
Sharif in 1998, later it became clear that they were also Sepah members.” (N. K., 
personal interview, 22 March 2018).  
The IRGC presence in the diplomatic corps of Iran is concerned, above all, with 
the decisions taken in Afghanistan with regards to the issues that Iran sees as threatening 
its own security, even at the expense of Afghanistan’s political interests. Any interference 
in the decision-making processes to address this concern is, arguably, undermining 
Afghanistan’s sovereignty as an independent state and leading to internal instability and it 
has a negative impact on Kabul’s political will. 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter has elaborated on the security and political aspects of Iran’s foreign 
policy with regards to Afghanistan. Towards this end, several institutions of Iran were 
discussed and their role in the implementation of security and political interests of Iran 
was analyzed. 
It was demonstrated that Iran has a complex and often overlapping institutional 
setup. Some of these institutions are meant to execute foreign policy in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere, while the others focus primarily on Afghanistan. Their job profile is varied 
and ranges from Iran’s political, diplomatic and strategic relations to trade, cultural and 
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scientific ties with Afghanistan. Their activities are overt in some cases and secretive and 
covert when it comes to security issues. The choice is substantiated by the aims in Iran’s 
foreign policy agenda in the particular moment. The funds allocated by the Iranian 
government serve the purpose of dissemination of certain information and views in favor 
of Iran and its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan. 
While one cannot provide an exhaustive list with all possible Iranian institutions 
involved in the security and political aspects of the foreign policy implementation in 
Afghanistan, it became evident in the course of analysis that there are several 
entities/categories of institutions, which are the most crucial. All of them have been 
analyzed above in relation to the activities they engage in or to which they contribute. 
 The security and political interests Iran pursues in Afghanistan, as this chapter 
was able to convey and demonstrate, are in alignment with the argument of the present 
study, in that they are the main interests of Iran’s foreign policy towards its neighbor and 
their interplay often contributes to the contradictory policies Iran pursues. 
 To conclude, Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan is based on two 
interrelated factors: the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, which Iran sees as a direct 
threat to its national security, and the Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul, which has 
relied on strong relations with the U.S. and with Saudi Arabia – Iran’s well-known rival. 
As a result, Iran in forced to constantly check its moves against any possible risks that 
may run in contradiction with its aspirations as a realist state. This fact shapes Iran’s 
course of policy towards Afghanistan and is rooted in its geostrategic and security threats 
concerns as well as geopolitical considerations. Despite the fact that there are instances 
where interests of Tehran and Washington may coincide in Afghanistan, Iran still 
considers the U.S. as its major rival when it comes to its own security interests, which 
leads to the fact that some of the political interests of Iran in Afghanistan may suffer from 
such circumstances. This is because Iran is also concerned by the political chaos in 
Afghanistan, the sphere of concern where it might have created an alliance with the US, 
but security concerns do prevail greatly over the political ones. 
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Chapter 7. Iran’s Economic Policy in Relation to Afghanistan 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the main aspects of Iran’s economic policy in relation to 
Afghanistan from 2001 through 2014 and beyond to 2016 when the information is 
relevant to the discussion. The analysis of Iran’s economic policy has been done through 
empirical investigation and normative exposition. Iran’s economic policy towards 
Afghanistan has been defined by the mosaic of internal developments, by its economic 
relations with Afghanistan and the political competitive relations with the regional and 
international players in Afghanistan predominantly the political exhibitionism of the 
United States in Afghanistan. 
The significance of Afghanistan in economic terms for various regional, as well as 
inter-regional state and non-state actors, is reflected by the fact that Afghanistan is closely 
surrounded by two of the major economic corridors and a potential third corridor 
developing in the region. On its South lies the famous Gwadar port located in the 
Baluchistan province of Pakistan and known to feature prominently in the much-
anticipated China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is also considered to be a link 
between the One Belt One Road and Maritime Silk Road projects. On the other hand, 
Chabahar port lies on the South Western side of Afghanistan which serves as Iran’s only 
oceanic port and it is developed jointly by Iran and India, for latter is developing 
Chabahar port to open a trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia without crossing 
over Pakistan. Chabahar port is also expected to act as a counter to the Gwadar port in 
Pakistan, barely 100km away, which is being developed by China (Srivastava, 2017). On 
the North-Eastern side of Afghanistan lies Wakhan Corridor in the Badakshan province, 
which connects Afghanistan to China and has historically been used exclusively for trade 
and by travelers. Energy-dependent China has eyes on the unexplored mineral and 
hydrocarbon reserves of Afghanistan and there has been speculation that China might use 
Wakhan Corridor to fulfill its ever-growing energy needs.  
The study interprets Iran’s economic behavior towards Afghanistan on the basis of 
realism. Iran can be described as a realist, goal-oriented agent. Iran’s actions are based on 
cost-benefit calculations albeit the costs are purely economic in nature yet the benefits are 
both economic as well as political in nature. In order to understand Iran’s economic 
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policy regarding Afghanistan, it is important to study material objectives and factors and 
the available data, such as the trade relations between the two countries, Iranian 
investment in Afghanistan, the importance of economic relations between the two 
countries and the geo-economic importance of Afghanistan to Iran’s regional economic 
goals. This chapter is more focused on the realist variables – trade, resources and 
economic power. Relevant information on the trade volume and its changes, foreign 
direct investment in Afghanistan in general and the mutual relative importance of trade 
between Afghanistan and Iran unfold in the course of the present chapter. 
In accordance with the realism approach, more economic power leads to more 
assertive policies, and this can be observed in the case of Iranian economic policy 
towards Afghanistan and other regional countries. Although the Iranian state and private 
businesses were influenced by the international sanctions, the Iranian government 
managed to improve its internal industry and economic relations with Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, China, and India at the regional level. 
This chapter unfolds in the following way: Section 7.1 is an introduction to Iran’s 
economic policy in relation to Afghanistan, which includes the key findings. The 
subsequent sections explain the main important dimensions of Iran’s economic policy 
towards Afghanistan. Thus, Section 7.2 provides the general description of Iran’s 
economic policy towards Afghanistan. Section 7.3 analyzes the road infrastructure. 
Section 7.4 focuses on the railway network. The Iranian development aid is elaborated on 
in Section 7.5, whereas it is focused on the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Iran’s Trade 
relationship with Afghanistan’s western region (Herat, Farah, and Nimroz provinces) is 
discussed in Section 7.6. Challenges for the local Afghan traders at the ground level are 
analyzed in Section 7.7. Finally, Section 7.8 summarizes the outcomes of the chapter. 
Subsequently, this chapter is internally structured in two parts. The first part will 
explain the economic involvement of Iran in Afghanistan from 2001 (Macro-Economic), 
development aid for construction and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan after the fall 
of the Taliban in 2001, the largest Iranian construction and reconstruction projects, with a 
focus on the bordering region of Afghanistan with Iran. The second part will shed light on 
the ongoing daily trade, Iranian economic interests, its presence in the region (Herat, 
Nimroz, and Farah provinces) and trade exchange (Micro-economics) at the border area. 
Since we are talking about daily trade here and, a country does daily trade usually with 
areas closer to it and that is the case with provinces like Nimroz, Herat and Farah located 
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on the western side of Afghanistan bordering Iran. Iran’s foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan has largely been defined by historical and cultural factors in addition to the 
ideological affiliation with the minority Tajiks and Hazaras. Today’s Afghanistan has 
periodically been ruled by the erstwhile Persian and Sassanid empires over a period of 
2000 years and some historians still consider western Afghanistan as part of Iran. After 
the loss in the Anglo-Persian War (1856-1857) Iran had to give up its demand on the 
return of Herat. Many Iranians continue to view western Afghanistan as part of Iran’s 
natural sphere of cultural, religious, and political influence since a significant number of 
Afghans follow Persian cultural traditions like the Nowruz (Persian New Year) and speak 
Dari language, which is very similar to the Farsi language aside from the dialectical 
intonation (Nader and Laha, 2011). 
The chapter’s main aim is to provide a general economic intervention of Iran in 
Afghanistan rather than to compile a precise and comprehensive economic report. The 
chapter concludes with an analytical interpretation in the form of its political motivations 
and repercussions. 
7.2 Iran’s Economic policy towards Afghanistan: General description 
This section summarizes the main concepts of the Iranian economic policy in 
relations to Afghanistan. The section is also based on empirical data collected both in 
Afghanistan and Iran (interviews) and information released by the officials in Kabul, 
Herat, Nimroz, Farah, provinces of Afghanistan, Mashhad and Tehran in Iran. Iranian 
economic policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan can be described by the domestic political and 
security developments in both Iran and Afghanistan. 
The fall of the Taliban in 2001 provided refurbished opportunity not only for Iran 
but also for international and regional players to invest in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s 
GDP (from 2001 to 2014) was very much influenced by the Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) in Afghanistan’s economy. The Figure 2 below, “Total Foreign Direct Investment 
and Gross Domestic Product of Afghanistan”, demonstrates the direct dependence 
between the foreign direct investment and the economic growth (GDP per capita) in 
Afghanistan. 
For Afghanistan, it is important to have close economic and trade relations with 
Iran among other regional countries. Iran is one of the biggest regional players investing 
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in Afghanistan and running large-scale developmental projects in Afghanistan. 
Surprisingly, there is no information available on Iran’s FDI in Afghanistan, as a separate 
country, in the publicly available sources including from the common points of reference 
such as the World Bank and the IMF. The only information one is able to obtain is the 
overall FDI in Afghanistan which is demonstrated in the Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2. FDI and GDP of Afghanistan 
 
Source: Tahiri, 2017, p.10. 
 
Figure 3. Afghanistan - Foreign Direct Investment (billion USD) 
 
Source: The Global Economy, 2016. 
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If one interprets the above graph, it appears that the total FDI was the lowest in 
2013 and 2014, which, according to, the Head of Afghanistan Investment Supporting 
Agency, was due to the “aggravation of the security situation in Afghanistan in light of 
the international troops withdrawal, lack of strategies within Afghanistan for creation of 
favorable climate for foreign investments and corruption within the Afghan government”, 
he also identifies “poor infrastructure and lack of industrial park” among the challenges. 
(Q. H., personal interview, 22 April 2016) 
Due to the lack of necessary information (FDI per countries), we cannot state 
beyond a doubt that Iran is the biggest investor in Afghanistan, neither can we compare 
the volume of investments of Iran with other countries. Nevertheless, Iran is a significant 
trade partner of Afghanistan today and was between 2008 and 2016. The below several 
diagrams demonstrate the trade relations of Afghanistan not only with Iran but also with 
other states, which reveals the relative importance of the trade with Iran in comparison to 
other countries. Iran clearly leads when it comes to trade imports from this country in 
comparison to other trade partners of Afghanistan from 2014 onwards which is illustrated 
in the graph below. 
 
Figure 4. Afghanistan Imports by Year (2008-2016) (in USD Millions) 
 
Note: Author’s compilation. Data derived from World Integrated Trade Solution, 2016b.  
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The next chart also clearly demonstrates that the total volume of imports from Iran 
between 2008 and 2016 was second highest after Pakistan, which allows one to conclude 
that Iran was Afghanistan’s most important trade partner during the timeframe 2008-
2016, at the very least. 
 
Figure 5. Afghanistan Imports by Country (2008-2016) (in USD Millions) 
 
Note: Author’s compilation. Data derived from World Integrated Trade Solution, 2016b. 
 
Afghanistan’s exports to Iran were very much lower than the imports from Iran as 
the Figure 6 demonstrates, although Iran still ranks as the third country to which 
Afghanistan exports, after Pakistan and India. 
This trade imbalance justifies the necessity to analyze Iran-Afghanistan’s trade 
relations and Iran’s economic policy towards Afghanistan in the present chapter, as 
influencing overall foreign policy of Iran with regards to Afghanistan. 
Iran has a lot at stake in Afghanistan vis-à-vis the former’s economic expansion 
and also in the form of the substantial market that Afghanistan, with its total population of 
approximately 34 million, provides for goods and services from Iran. Furthermore, for 
Iran, Afghanistan is the transit of its “Look to the East” strategy, which mainly seeks 
increased energy and economic relations between Iran and eastern neighbors, both near 
and far, including India, Pakistan, China and Japan. A stable Afghanistan means a stable 
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impact on the economic policy of Iran at least towards its eastern fronts. As a result, Iran 
has been part of almost all state building measures in post-Taliban Afghanistan within 
this time period.  
 
Figure 6. Afghanistan Exports by Country (2008-2016) (in USD Millions) 
 
Note: Author’s compilation. Data derived from World Integrated Trade Solution, 2016a. 
 
The presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani in Iran is a characteristic of the time when 
pragmatism came to serve the interests of the country by substituting the former idealism 
approach. Islamic values are a matter that the statesmen consider while shaping this 
pragmatic course of foreign policy and fulfilling economic needs of Iran, not the other 
way around. Under his leadership, the country managed to make use of its potential, thus 
aiming to fulfill the deficiencies that such nature of the state may have in the international 
arena (Sarmadi and Badri, 2017). In relation to the tenure of the presidency of Rafsanjani, 
Iran made substantial use of its economic reformism in order to focus on the much needed 
state building from a modernist perspective. At the forefront of its foreign policy, it 
placed the national and regional interests (including a significat focus on Afghanistan) 
while trying to avoid any confrontations with the foreign counterparts. Thus, the 
geopolitical era of the Rafsanjani presidency enabled Iran to reconnect to the rest of the 
world after years of isolation, brought about by the Islamic revolution (Sarmadi and 
Badri, 2017).  
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The economic relationship between Iran and Afghanistan is in a way imbalanced 
from a neutral perspective. The trade relationship between the two countries is symbolic 
of the trade surplus on part of Iran and the trade deficit on the part of Afghanistan. A 
trade surplus means that exports are higher than imports and a trade deficit means that 
imports are higher than exports. In the case of the Iran-Afghanistan trading relationship, 
both the trade surplus and the trade deficit are very high which is a cause of concern 
particularly for Afghanistan. From an economic perspective, and for an emerging market 
like Afghanistan, a trade deficit might not be that disturbing because of the fact that for an 
emerging market much needs to be imported to upgrade its market infrastructure and 
product diversification. Usually, a uniform, gradual increase in the exports (of the weaker 
country) will eventually mean a uniform reduction in the import-export ratio, which is 
characteristic of a progressive economic relationship between two countries. But, as the 
analysis demonstrates, in the case of the Iran-Afghanistan trade relationship, the trade 
deficit for Afghanistan has shown no uniform progress but rather has non-uniform 
irregularities. 
 
Table 1. Iran’s trade with Afghanistan (in USD Millions) 
Fiscal Year Export Import Surplus 
March 2005-2006 497 6 491 
March 06-07 515 9 506 
March 07-08 539 9 530 
March 08-09 633 11 622 
March 09-10 1002 15 987 
March 10-11 1362 12 1350 
March 11-12 2179 10 2169 
March 12-13 2874 2 2872 
March 13-14 2417 32 2385 
March 14-15 2376 13 2363 
March 15-16 2582 26 2556 
Source: Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA
22
), 2017. 
                                                 
22
 ISNA was established in December 1999 in order to report on news from Iranian universities. It now 
covers a variety of national and international topics. Editors and correspondents are themselves students in a 
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The statistical representation of the trade between Iran and Afghanistan above is 
clearly illustrative of the economic dominance of Iran. The massive import –export 
surplus in favor of Iran and to a large extent against Afghanistan has been perceived as a 
threat for their future relationship from an Afghan perspective as articulated by former 
Secretary-General of Iran-Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and 
Trade Mozaffar Alikhani. In summarizing its interview with Mr. Alikhani, the Financial 
Tribune reported that,  
“Afghans are unhappy about the ongoing trend in bilateral ties which, in his 
opinion, is expected to harm Iran’s economic ties with the neighboring country in 
the long run. In a meeting with Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of his swearing-in 
ceremony as Iran’s president for the second term, Alikhani said Afghan President 
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai expressed concern and dissatisfaction with the current 
trend of economic exchanges between the two nations, stressing the importance of 
doing trade in a more ‘bilateral’ and ‘balanced’ manner”. (Shirdelian, 2017).  
A very interesting observation revealed through the table above (Iran-Afghan 
Trade) reflects that since 2005-2006, there has been a uniform and progressive increase in 
the imports from Iran to Afghanistan, beginning with 497 million USD to 2582 million 
USD up to the year 2015-2016. On the contrary, the picture is totally different from an 
Afghan perspective. The exports from Afghanistan to Iran beginning from the financial 
year 2005-2006 were 6 million USD and then, 32 million USD in 2013-2014, 13 million 
USD in 2014-2015 and 26 million USD in 2015-2016. 
It is quite surprising to see the exports of Afghanistan to Iran at such a low when 
compared to the overall exports of Afghanistan in general and to other regional countries, 
as demonstrated by the following statistical depictions. 
As per the reports of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) the top export 
destinations of Afghanistan (2016) are: India (220 million USD), Pakistan (199 million 
USD), Iran (15.1 million USD), Iraq (10.1 million USD) and Turkey (9.1 million USD) 
(The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2016a). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
variety of subjects, many of them are volunteers (nearly 1000). ISNA is considered by Western media to be 
one of the most independent and moderate media organizations in Iran, and is often quoted. "While taking a 
reformist view of events, ISNA has managed to remain politically independent. It has, however, maintained 
its loyalty to the former president and carries a section devoted to "Khatami's perspectives". Although it is 
generally considered independent, the ISNA is financially supported in part by the Iranian government and 
is supported by ACECR (Academic Center for Education, Culture and Research), another student 
organization. 
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Figure 7. Afghanistan Exports (in USD Millions) 
 
Source: Trading Economics, 2018. 
 
Reflecting upon the mosaic of hurdles that characterize the negative trade balance 
between Iran and Afghanistan from an Afghan perspective, Alikhani emphasized the 
issues that revolve around the notion of “Technical Health Certificates”. He stated that,  
“Iranian authorities are super strict when it comes to issuing the Certificate of 
Veterinary Inspection to allow the import of livestock and related products, noting 
that Afghan products often do not meet the requirements set out by the Iran 
Veterinary Organization. A CVI, also known as a Health Certificate, is an official 
document issued by a federal, state, tribal or accredited veterinarian certifying that 
the animals identified on the document have been inspected and were found to 
satisfy the regulations pertaining to their intended movement–within the same 
state, between states, or internationally” (Shirdelian, 2017).  
As per Alikhani, visa issuance is another major contributory factor for this 
significant import-export imbalance (negative trade balance) as the procedures are very 
strict and complex. In furtherance, he also emphasizes that Iran should not merely see 
Afghanistan as a consumer market rather must maintain the balance of import-export ratio 
so that both countries benefit from each other. (Shirdelian, 2017). Another major reason 
could be the growing political and diplomatic proximity between Afghanistan and India 
(since India happens to be the major export destination of Afghanistan as revealed in the 
stats aforementioned) or the low tariffs imposed upon the goods by the other countries. It 
is also very interesting to mention here that the products usually exported by Afghanistan 
are in less demand in the Iranian markets since the latter also has a substantial production 
of such products. For example, as per the reports of OEC, the top exports of Afghanistan 
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are Grapes (96.4 million USD), Vegetable Saps (85.9 million USD), Other Nuts (55.9 
million USD), Knotted Carpets (39 million USD) and Tropical Fruits (33.9 million USD), 
using the 1992 revision of the HS (Harmonized System) classification (The Observatory 
of Economic Complexity, 2016a) and Iran already has a domestic potential for a 
significant production of such items. As per the reports of OEC, the most dominant 
products that are imported from outside include (2015): Cars (3.3%), Corn (2.1%), 
Vehicle Parts (2.1%), Rolled Steel (2.0%), Jewellery (2.0%), Rice (1.8%), Wheat (1.6%), 
Soya beans (1.4%). (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2016b). 
Besides, Afghanistan with a low industrial potential as compared to Iran is also 
one of the reasons for this economic lag on part of the former. Even though the magnitude 
of trade is not that substantial, yet as per the reports of the Afghanistan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries (ACCI) Iran retained its position as the country’s largest trade 
partner for 2016. Statistics by the ACCI shows that Iran’s trade value with Afghanistan 
for 2016 was 1.8 billion USD. However, trade volumes between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan for 2016 dropped by 1.2 billion USD in the backdrop of the strict border 
management process initiated by Pakistan in the form of closure of key crossings in the 
Afghan-Pak border and fresh border restrictions imposed. (Jahanmal, 2017) Based on the 
ACCI’s statistics, trade volumes between Afghanistan and Iran is estimated to total 
almost 2 billion USD, with Pakistan at 1.3 billion USD, China at 1 billion USD, 
Turkmenistan at 700 million USD and with Kazakhstan at 500 million USD, and this 
statistical representation clearly reflects that Iran is the most important trading partner for 
Afghanistan. (Jahanmal, 2017). 
One of the major prerequisites for the development of trade between the two 
countries is the connection through roads and maritime, and most importantly how 
developed is their respective infrastructure. Considering that Afghanistan is a landlocked 
country with no direct access to sea, construction and development of roads and other 
related routes are of tremendous significance. Consequently, the next part of this chapter 
deals with the status of road infrastructure between the two countries and how this 
development has significantly led to more progressive economic interaction between the 
two countries. The role of India in the development of road infrastructure in Afghanistan 
and also Iran (in the form of the Chabahar Port) is inevitable since the former has invested 
a lot of money and manpower in doing so. Therefore, arguably India also plays a 
significant role in the development of trade and economic relations between Iran and 
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Afghanistan, not to forget there are a number of national interests at stake as far as India 
is concerned. 
7.3 Road infrastructure 
In January 2005, a new 122-kilometre highway was inaugurated (Moradi and 
Abolfathi, 2012). The highway, connecting Herat with Iran, was constructed by Iran. In 
addition, to connect western Afghanistan with the Iranian port of Chabahar which is 
located in the Gulf of Oman in southwestern Iran, Iran is constructing a railway system 
and a road jointly with India; this will create some competition with the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar (Weinbaum, 2006, p.13; Rubin, 2008, p.5). 
Delaram-Zaranj Highway, also known as Route 606A, a 218 km roadway in the 
Nimruz province of Afghanistan connecting the Delaram district of Farah province in 
Afghanistan to the border of Iran, was initiated in the year 2005 jointly by the 
governments of Afghanistan and India. Delaram-Zaranj is a two lane road in Afghanistan 
that connects the Afghan-Iranian border with the Kandahar-Herat highway in Delaram, 
thus acting as the main source of connection with the remainder of the country along its 
major cities (The Hindu, 2009). The distance between the two districts Delaram and 
Zaranj is covered in only 2 hours as opposed to the 12-14 hours it took prior to the 
operationalization of Delaram-Zaranj highway. From Zaranj onwards, the diverse 
roadway connects to Zabol across the border to Iran which further ends up at the port of 
Chabahar. 
The Figure 8 below not only demonstrates the diversity of routes (both land and 
maritime) across this very significant economic crossroad but clearly reflects the 
Delaram-Zaranj highway and all its enroute areas unto Chabahar, like, Zabol in Iran. The 
yellow representation clearly reflects the complex roadways across Pakistan and Iran 
going across intermediary Afghanistan. 
This complex network of roadways has led to the diversification of Afghan access 
to the outside world as previously Afghanistan was solely dependent on Karachi Port of 
Pakistan for their economic adventurism into the outside world. “The road is much 
shorter and more stable than any of the routes in Pakistan, making it perhaps the most 
efficient means of reaching Afghanistan” (Padukone, 2012). Delaram-Zaranj highway 
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was inaugurated by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee in 2009. 
 
Figure 8. Indo-Iranian Trade Routes 
 
Source: Stratfor Enterprises LLC, 2014. 
 
The government of Iran provided Afghan exporters a ninety percent concession on 
port fees and a fifty percent discount on warehousing fees. In addition, Afghan vehicles 
were given full transit rights on the Iranian roads. One of many significant consequences 
of this road is that it reduces the prominence of Karachi-Kandahar road
23
. The Karachi-
Kandahar road was the only route to the international market for a long time. However, 
Afghans are now able to transmit their goods through Chabahar instead of Karachi 
(Institute for the Study of War, 2010). Furthermore, this highway reduces the distance 
from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan. Iran’s reconstruction projects also include the 
asphalting of more than sixty kilometers of a highway that leads north and paving fifty 
percent of the streets in Herat (Varner, 2008). 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Karachi port is in Pakistan and most of the goods from Pakistan come to Afghanistan by Karachi port. 
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Figure 9. Afghanistan Ring Road – Laman to Qeysar 
 
Source: Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2018. 
 
Infrastructure development projects that are funded by Iran are mostly designed to 
build a link between Iran’s Gulf ports and Afghanistan. This is to be done in two major 
steps: by connecting Bandar Abbas and Chabahar to Dogharun and by connecting the two 
earlier ports to Milak (Sistan Baluchistan). In addition, another project which is in 
progress will link Khaf, South Khorasan with Herat (Koepke, 2013, p.13). According to 
the Afghan government, the transit and trade-related issues with Pakistan are having an 
adverse impact on the economy in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is, therefore, trying to 
establish ties and supportive trade relations with Iran to have access to Chabahar port as 
an “alternative transit route to decrease dependency on Pakistan” (Jahanmal, 2013). 
Thus, for instance, the cost of a cargo truck coming to Afghanistan via Pakistani 
territory is approximately 3000 USD for 40 tons of the goods. Meanwhile, the same 
amount of goods, if brought to Afghanistan, avoiding the territory of Pakistan will be 
estimated only 200 USD. Not only price but also uneasy political and security issues 
between the two countries made Afghanistan look for alternatives. One of such solutions 
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to become more independent from Pakistan for Afghanistan is to bring the goods through 
the Chabahar city of Iran (Iran Review, 2016). 
Based on the Trade and Transport Agreement among the three countries (Iran, 
India, and Afghanistan), Zahidan-Zaranj-Delaram route of the province Nimroz will link 
Afghanistan to India and enable import and export to and from Central Asian states. In 
particular, it will be beneficial for the trade with Tajikistan. 
Iran responded to the efforts made by the Afghan government by agreeing to a 
30% discount on customs tariffs for Afghan traders and offered 50 hectares of land to 
establish a new transportation company jointly between Afghans and Iranians at 
Chabahar port. Iran has also made a commitment to allow Afghan traders to unload up to 
50,000 tons of goods at Chabahar, a notable change from the 5,000 tons that they were 
previously allowed (Kagan et al., 2012, p.80-81). 
 
Figure 10. Chabahar and Gwadar Ports 
 
Source: Tasnim News Agency, 2018. 
7.4 Railway Projects 
Railway network in Afghanistan is developing across different borders into its 
neighboring countries and it is undoubtedly a sign of optimism and progression as far as 
connectivity and trade enhancement across Afghanistan is concerned. The post war 
reconstruction in Afghanistan has an important component of railway development and it 
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is a significant gesture by both the neighboring and other regional actors to come forward 
and collectively carry forward this great adventure into its logical conclusion.  
On March 2012, during the fifth trilateral summit between Iran, Afghanistan, and 
Tajikistan in Dushanbe, the presidents of the three countries signed a joint agreement to 
improve their relations. As a result, Tehran is part of a railway and ‘energy lines’ project 
that will connect the three countries to one another (Reuters, 2012). Serhetabad 
(Turkmenistan)-Torghundi (Afghanistan) The railway project is going on at a brisk pace 
and will make huge inroads to connect Central Asia through Herat to South and West 
Asia (Railways of Afghanistan, 2018). There is serious speculation and great interest 
shown by Pakistan to revive the Khyber Pass railway project or more specifically, the 
Peshawar (Pakistan)-Torkham (Afghanistan) railway track, as reported in the Express 
Tribune. Similarly, in June 2017 Afghanistan and China signed a memorandum “for a 
Chinese-funded feasibility study to be conducted within the next 12 months for a railway 
line which would run from Sher Khan Bandar on the border with Tajikistan to Herat” 
(Railways of Afghanistan, 2018). This initiative by China is part of the greater “One Belt 
One Road” manifestation with an aim to promote regional cooperation through economic 
intervention (Railways of Afghanistan, 2018). 
Other than these projects, the most important railway project which has caught the 
attention of most of the people is the Khaf-Herat railway project between Iran and 
Afghanistan. Over the period of time, the project has seen both signs of progression and 
periodic interruption due to security related issues and financial shortages. 
7.4.1 Project Outline 
“From the eastern corridor of Iran originates a railway which begins from 
Chabahar port and through Dogharoun connects to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
China railway networks. Khaf-Sangan-Harat
24
 [sic] is a part of the east corridor 
which is 191 km long. 2 [sic] parts of this rail lines are in Iran’s territory and 2 
parts are located in Afghanistan. Considering the location of Sangan ore mine in 
Khaf, a major part of ore is being transported through this railway so the 
development of railway from Khaf toward southern parts of the country is 
considered as one of the government principle programs in this field. From an 
international perspective since Afghanistan is a country gifted with many 
minerals, particularly the extension of Sangan mine, importance of using railway 
system as to reach to the open water highlighted. Khaf-Harat [sic] railway project, 
                                                 
24
 “Harat” refers to Herat, mistake was in the original source. 
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which is a single line with 76.8 km length starts from 24th km of Sangan-Torbat 
Heydarieh railway and from the 55th, is located along the border and at 78+800 
reaches Shamtigh border point. This railway is designed based on axial load of 25 
tons and 160 km/h speed” (Railways of Afghanistan, 2018). 
The Khaf-Herat Railway project is a key connectivity project that connects 
Afghanistan to the international railway networks through Iran. The Herat-Khaf railway 
project started in 2007 and was planned to be finished by 2009. After the project was 
postponed several times, the governor of Herat requested in 2014 that the Iranian side 
speed up the construction of the project, for the good of trade relations between both 
parties. Iran is currently working on the two parts of the project on the Afghan side. The 
first phase of the project finished in 2011, and it is continuing. The Afghan government 
requested the investment of USD75 million by Iran on the project, and annually USD 
200-300 million will be the outcome of the trade exchanges via the railway (Wadsam, 
2015). If Iran connects the railway to its national railway network, Afghanistan will also 
have access to Turkey and European markets in the future (Oskarsson, 2013, p.4). In fact, 
The Khaf- Herat Railway project is a key connectivity project that connects Afghanistan 
to the international railway networks through Iran. 
By implementing the railway project from Herat to Shirkhan Bander (Afghan 
border zone with Tajikistan), Herat will be linked to Central and South Asia, the Middle 
East via Iran and onwards to the Caucasus (Jafarov, 2015). Bulk and non-perishable 
cargo, namely cement, bitumen for road construction, cotton, oil and fuel, processed 
foods and agricultural equipment will make up the major transits by the railway. This rail 
line will cross the north of Afghanistan and will provide opportunities for Tajik and 
Uzbek goods to reach the Persian Gulf without passing Turkmenistan and will play a 
significant role in regional transportation (Oskarsson, 2013). 
7.5 Iran’s Development Aid to Post-Taliban Afghanistan 
Iran undoubtedly remains one of the biggest aid donors for Afghanistan in a 
pledge to reconstruct the post-Taliban Afghanistan. This is observable through Iran’s 
activities in Afghanistan, inter alia, direct implementation of the projects by Iranian 
companies and direct governmental initiatives through its ministries. Since the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001, Iran accounts for USD 1 billion in financial aid provided to Afghanistan 
(Katzman, 2013). In the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan Recovery and Reconstruction 
in 2002, of a total of USD 4.5 billion in reconstruction assistance, Iran pledged USD 560 
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million in aid to Afghanistan to be disbursed over five years between 2002 and 2007 
(Bikdeli, 2006). Moreover, an additional USD 100 million in aid was announced by Iran 
at the London Conference on Afghanistan Reconstruction in 2006. In the same 
conference, Iran declared that the final installment of the initial USD 560 million would 
be paid out by the end of 2006 (Milani, 2006, pp.235-256). Iran’s contribution and aid 
were considerably lower in the period 2007-2013, averaging around USD 50 million per 
year. In this period, the aid provided was mostly used to finish ongoing projects (Koepke, 
2013). 
As reported by the National Defense Research Institute, the former Iranian 
representative to the United Nations Danish Yazdi in making his statement to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 2007 has told “Iran had spent more than 270 millions USD 
of its pledge on ‘mutually agreed projects in the areas of infrastructure, technical and 
educational services and financial and in-kind assistance’ ” (Nader and Laha, 2011). 
Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce stated that “2,000 Iranian private firms, 
many financed by the Iranian government, operate in Afghanistan” (Gardesh, 2006). A 
large number of these enterprises were in Herat, whereby they contributed greatly to the 
economic reconstruction of this province after 2001. Further, the government of Iran 
allocated finds for the reconstruction of the transportation and energy sector in this 
province (Nader and Laha, 2011). This railroad is expected to foster the trade between 
Mashhad and Herat and contribute to the increase of the Iranian imports to Afghanistan. 
Indeed, Herat, due to its proximity to financially stable in comparison to its Afghan 
neighbor Iran, is one of the most economically developed provinces of Afghanistan 
(Nader and Laha, 2011; Mulrine, 2010). 
The budget of Iran’s aid for the reconstruction of Afghanistan was approved by 
the Iranian legislature after the proposal made by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Finance of Iran in 2002. The five working groups under the Committee on the 
Reconstruction of Afghanistan planned to implement more than 100 projects on issues 
related to economic, cultural, social, and scientific and educational matters (Abbasi, 2011, 
p.184). 
One of the most important assignments of the economic group under the 
Committee was to prioritize the projects to be implemented in different economic sectors, 
namely industry, agriculture, technical service, and commerce. The economic group was 
also assigned to manage all the commercial, industrial, economic, mining and service 
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activities of all other organizations involved in the Committee. It is worth mentioning 
here that these are high priority areas for the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Abbasi, 2011, 
pp.184-185). 
The Ministries of Industries and of Roads and Transportation, and the Ministries 
of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Organization of Management and Planning, 
Communications and Information Technology as well as the Governors of the provinces 
of Sistan, Baluchistan as well as Khorasan-Razavi, were the members of the economic 
group headed by the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs. Within the economic 
working group, 18 projects were planned by the Ministry of Agriculture, three projects by 
the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and eight projects by the 
Ministry of Roads. It is important to mention that all of the above-planned projects 
received the relevant budget from the Iranian government (Abbasi, 2011, p.185). 
Financial assistance focuses on water supply, healthcare, energy, road 
construction, agriculture, customs and trade whereas assistance in political and security 
affairs have been in the form of cooperation with the state agencies specialized in 
combating drug-trafficking and assistance provided in the border issues. The major role in 
the above-listed financial assistance can be attributed to Imam Khomeini Relief 
Foundation and Iranian Red Crescent Society, as well to various religious organizations, 
such as bonyads and IRGC among others (Abbasi and Potzel, 2010, p.12). 
7.6 Iran’s Trade relationship with Afghanistan’s western region (Herat, 
Farah and Nimroz provinces) 
Iran’s constructive involvement in Afghanistan is substantial in terms of gaining 
Tehran’s stabilizing objectives moving toward its post-war goals, and to solidify its 
support base around the country. Iranian aid and financial support to Afghanistan have 
been focused on infrastructure projects, such as transportation connections to link 
Afghanistan and the Central Asia region to Iran. Such links can create platforms for a 
greater integration and a greater economic market for Iranian goods (D’Souza, 2011, p.5). 
Moreover, Tehran’s agenda is to become involved with any project which persuades 
towards regional integration by aiming to link the Persian Gulf to the Central Asia region 
via Afghanistan. Those projects are more likely to be related to railways, pipeline 
projects, and roads. Iran’s interest is not only in those projects under implementation, but 
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also in those projects that are under negotiation, and which are likely to enhance trade, 
energy, and industry, as well as cement the region as a part of Iran’s eastern tendency. It 
is also highly likely that Iran wants to safeguard its involvement in Afghanistan and not to 
be cut out of the Afghan political and economic agenda. Due to the tensions between 
India and Pakistan, Iran enjoys the support of India as well, keeping a balance of interests 
among Afghan politicians (Dodge and Redman, 2011, p.195). As mentioned earlier, the 
three provinces of Herat, Farah and Nimroz share the border with Iran (see the Iran-
Afghanistan border map below) and thus symbolize the higher relevance in terms of any 
sort of economic interaction between the two countries. 
 
Figure 11. Map of border provinces between Afghanistan and Iran 
 
Source: International Organization for Migration, 2017.  
7.6.1 Herat Province 
Herat is one of the most important provinces of Afghanistan in terms of its 
strategic position and economic importance since it shares a border with Iran on its west 
and Turkmenistan on its north. The significance of this third largest city of Afghanistan is 
evident by the fact that it is part of a complex connectivity network both within 
Afghanistan and outside it. For example, Herat is linked with Kandahar and Mazar-e-
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Sharif via one of the biggest national highways across Afghanistan and linked to the city 
of Mashhad, Iran through the border town of Islam Qala, and the border town of 
Torghundi with neighboring Turkmenistan. Herat also has a very rich history of 
connecting Middle-East, South and Central Asia and in contemporary times serves as a 
regional business hub in western Afghanistan. Being the gateway to Iran for the latter’s 
entry into Afghanistan, Herat collects massive amounts of customs revenue for 
Afghanistan from any Iranian entry into Afghanistan, be it the people, goods, capital or 
any kind of service.  
Islam Qala is located in the western part of Herat city. It is a border town and an 
official custom point between Iran and Afghanistan. Islam Qala is under the 
administration of Kohistan district of Herat province. The highway of 110 km links Islam 
Qala with the Herat city center. It enables transportation of the Iranian goods, entering 
Afghanistan via Islam Qala, to Herat and other cities by the Islam Qala Highway.  
 
Figure 12. Islam Qala border point in Herat Province 
 
Source: The New York Times, 2006. 
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Iran focuses mostly on provincial development in Herat. At the same time, Iran 
has achieved notable influence on local officials in Herat due to frequent movement of 
goods and people across the border into Afghanistan. Generally speaking, even though 
the movement of goods and services across the border into Herat has progressively 
contributed to enhancing the economic domain of both countries, there are certain 
deficiencies and issues alongside. This movement of Iranian products and goods has also 
led to the strangulation of local businesses to some extent which will be discussed in the 
next section of this chapter. Iranian financial support diversifies beyond the purely 
economic dimension as it has also extended its intervention into earning the indigenous 
recognition and favors. For example, Iran has built several industrial and recreational 
parks, roads, community halls and mosques in the region. It harkens back to what the 
Mughal empire did with strategic institutional motives, which led to, first to provide 
employment to the local populace and secondly leave a cultural legacy that allows it to 
push its political ascendancy into the system. 
According to Nazir Ahmad Haidar, the head of Herat’s provincial council, “Iran 
has influence in every sphere: economic, social, political and daily life. When someone 
gives so much money, people fall into their way of thinking. It is not just a matter of 
being neighborly” (King, 2010). 
Herat is highly dependent on Iranian goods. Due to the proximity of the Iranian 
market and lower transportation costs, these goods are cheaper than those of other origin 
and easily accessible in the Herat market. “About 90% of the food products of Herat 
come from Iran. During the civil war in Afghanistan, most of the people from Herat 
migrated to Iran and they know the products there and their quality very well. This fact 
has a huge impact on the trade between Iran and Afghanistan” (Kh. M., personal 
interview, 15 December 2016) 
The widespread corruption, lack of control over the imports, existence of the 
illegal border routes (apart from the official customs points) are the reasons that make it 
very easy to bring any kind of goods, while quality does not constitute a big issue. The 
low standard of living of the people in Afghanistan allows them to be concerned only 
with the price, not the quality. These complex factors have a negative impact on the 
Afghan internal industry. According to the Head of Herat’s Industrial Union: 
“Same as the political influence of Iran in Afghanistan one can see a strong 
economic impact as well, especially in the bordering region. Iranian goods are 
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well presented at a high level in the region namely Herat province as the entry 
point for it. On one hand, it is good to have better trade relations with Iran, but 
Iranian goods have a negative impact on the domestic production in Afghanistan 
particularly in Herat. Local industry has been strongly affected by Iranian goods in 
the last years. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, many Afghans invested in the 
industry in Herat and it has the biggest industry after Kabul. But in the last few 
years, the higher percentage of Iranian goods caused many domestic investors to 
not invest in the region and other bordering areas with Iran. It is both due to the 
free markets and weak government in Afghanistan especially in the western 
border regions with Iran, that the indigenous production lag has affected the 
industrial investments in Herat" (H. Kh., personal interview, 15 December 2014). 
Many Afghans are crossing the border into Iran for daily trade. Upon registering a 
company in Afghanistan, the procedure, which costs less than 100 USD, the Afghan 
government issues a business passport to those who own a company (small scale or large 
scale). Having a business passport makes the process of getting an Iranian visa much 
easier. Thus, local businessmen from the western provinces, in particular from Herat, and 
people who run supermarkets bring most of their goods from Iran. 
“Business with Iran is based on a very simple mechanism, it is very easy to bring 
goods from there to Afghanistan. There are two categories of trade going on with 
Iran: the large-scale businesses and small-scale business with a very low capital. 
In case of a very small capital, even if you have 200 USD, you can cross the 
border and bring something to the market. Iranians are issuing the visa to the 
people who are involved in the trade and business without any problem. Due to 
the short distance between Mashhad (center for the bordering region with 
Afghanistan in Iran) and Herat (biggest Afghan province on the border with Iran) 
people are traveling across the border on a daily basis.” (H. Kh., personal 
interview, 15 December 2014). 
Other than the purely economic investment in Afghanistan, infrastructure 
development has been another significant priority for Iran. The head of the Iranian 
consulate announced in February 2012 that his government will extend a gas pipeline 
from Iran to Herat. (Afghan Information Network, 2013). The agreement was signed by 
Herat’s Chamber of Commerce with Iranian investors from Markazi province. Based on 
this agreement, they agreed to bring machinery and new technology to Afghanistan for 
economic purposes (Yarmand, 2012). 
Some of the main economic projects implemented by Iran in Herat province of 
Afghanistan are analyzed below: 
Other than the aforementioned major projects like the Khaf-Herat railway project, 
another significant economic project initiated by Iran in the Herat province of 
Afghanistan was the much anticipated Cement Factory. The project was inked down in 
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the year 2012 between the Ministry of Mines Afghanistan and Iranian company Sanat-i-
Majad, wherein the latter pledged to invest 150 million USD to establish the project in the 
Zendeh Jan district of the Herat province. In the same year, the former Minister of Mines, 
Wahidullah Shahrani said the project would boost Afghanistan’s annual revenue by 10 
million USD since the agreement between the two meant the firm (Sanat-i-majad) would 
give the Afghan government a royalty of two dollars per ton of cement production and 
also 20% of the factory income in tax. “The company would extract coal from the 
Pahlawanan mine for use in cement production that would start in two years and a half, 
the minister said, adding that the pact would be valid for 30 years” (Siddiqui, 2010). What 
made the project more promising was not only the cement factory itself but other 
obligations on the Iranian firm. Thus, according to Shahrani, the firm had to provide 
employment to Afghans,  
“establish a clinic and construct houses for workers and a mosque in the area. A 
recreational park was also supposed to be created and education facilities provided 
for workers’ children. The construction of an 11-km road was among the 
company’s responsibilities. The government has obtained a 1.5 million USD 
guarantee from the firm, which was selected from amongst 13 bidders” (Siddiqui, 
2012).  
Unfortunately, the project did sustain but the Iranian involvement did not, as the 
Ministry of Mines spokesman Ahmad Tamim Asi announced in the year 2013, "The 
Iranian company could not address the articles in the contract and its commitments in due 
time. Following review and discussions, the Ministry of Mines terminated the contract 
with this company" (Siddiqui, 2012). In fact, Herat cement factory along with other two 
major cement factories in Afghanistan, Jabul Saraj in Parwan province and Ghori in 
Baghlan province, were tendered afresh after the termination of the Iranian company. 
7.6.2 Nimroz province 
Nimroz is one of the western Afghan provinces with a 220km border with Iran on 
the west and a 221km border with Pakistan on the south. Nimroz lies to the east of the 
Sistan and Baluchestan Province of Iran and north of Balochistan, which makes this 
province one of the most volatile provinces of Afghanistan. Both Iran and Pakistan have a 
substantial population of ethnic Balochs, and over the peirod of time Balochs in both 
countries, have started a political and armed insurgency against the governments for a 
separate and sovereign Balochistan. The insurgency and secession movement is more 
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significant in Pakistan and a bit lesser in Iran and there have been serious speculations 
that the U.S. might play a role in flaring up the insurgency and that is one of the reasons 
why Iran sees U.S. presence in Afghanistan as a big threat to its territorial integrity.  
In terms of land area, Nimroz is one of the largest provinces of Afghanistan but 
also one of the sparsely populated regions as well, since a large part of its area is covered 
under the desert. Zaranj is the provincial capital of Nimroz which is one of the pivotal 
areas as far as the trade relationship between Iran and Afghanistan is concerned.  
Like other western provinces in Afghanistan, the economic market of Nimroz is 
dependent on Iranian goods. Nimroz has an official custom point (Melik) with Iran in 
Khorasan Jonobi. A direct link between Nimroz and Khorasani Jonobi via Melik border 
point makes trade between the two provinces easy. Nimroz has two joint cross-border 
bazaars with Khorasan province of Iran, where locals can find any type of goods for their 
daily life. These cross-border bazaars, which are located partially on the territories of both 
countries, are managed by Iranian government (the local government in Khorasan 
province of Iran). The currency in the bazaar expectedly is the Toman due to the market 
dominance of Iranian products and even in Zaranj (center of Nimroz province) the 
denomination of capital remains the same (Toman) as endorsed by one of the respondents 
interviewed in Zaranj: “It is very usual to pay with Tomans (Iranian currency) in Nirmoz 
province of Afghanistan. If you go to buy something from any shop, they prefer if you 
pay with Tomans. As we bring all our goods from Iran and there we pay with Tomans, it 
is easier and even more advantageous for us to receive Tomans from our customers” (Z. 
Kh., personal interview, 2 April 2016). 
Iranian cell phone companies have lot of customers in Nimroz, as it is much easier 
to buy an Iranian sim card for the cell phone and benefit from its high speed internet and 
calling offers (as compared to Afghanistan sim cards and subsidiary offers). One of the 
reasons is the presence of at least one of the Afghan members of each Nimroz family 
living in Iran or working or studying there.  
“For many years already, people from Nimroz are travelling to Iran in search of 
work opportunities. During the war in Afghanistan and now due to the low work 
offers, Afghan young people are crossing the border illegally and working in Iran 
in order to support their families in Afghanistan. Although, a big number of our 
youth is killed by the Iranian border security officers while crossing the border to 
Iran, the truth is that at the same time, most of the families have to fully rely and 
depend on the support of their family members, who are working in Iran” (S. Ah., 
personal interview, 02 April 2016). 
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On a daily basis, goods are coming from Iran to Zaranj in most of the local shops 
in the form of clothes, food, non-alcoholic drinks, and even bread is coming from Iran 
which is cheaper than the bread coming from Kabul or North Afghanistan. Such flow of 
goods from Iran has a strong cultural influence on the locals as well. Women dress the 
same way (Iranian Hijab) in Zaranj, the Persian accent, music, TV channels, Radio and 
the decoration of the houses and offices are mostly the same as in Iran.  
According to a local bread-maker, Iranian bread which comes to Zaranj has a 
negative impact on the local bread business: “Iranian bread comes via illegal ways to 
Zaranj and no one is controlling it, it is much cheaper and has no quality at all compared 
to our bread, and it can make my business fail, I may have to stop it. If the bread will 
continue to come from other countries like Iran… I might have to find something else to 
do”. (Samad, personal interview, 04 April 2016). 
According to Mohammad Ali Piri, Head of Harimand district of Northern Sistan 
province of Iran: “In a daily base around 500 vehicles are crossing the border from Iran to 
Afghanistan and back by Melik custom point” (Fars News Agency, 2016). He further 
says that food, plastic goods, carpets, cement, clothing and health care material, potato, 
tomato, water pumps, canned beans, water coolers, salt, water, bitumen, and coal are the 
Iranian exports to Nimroz province.  
Nimroz is not only dependent on Iranian goods but also on the energy supplies 
from this country and even the labor market in Nimroz is dependent on various small 
scale labor projects sponsored by Iran. Most importantly most parts of Nimroz get 
electricity from Iran. This dependency was especially felt by the province in 2011, when 
in the absence of the electricity supply from neighboring Iran, it had a total blackout, not 
able to substitute the Iranian electricity with any other supplies (Pajhwok Afghan News, 
2011). 
The stagnant economy in general and in the province, in particular, provides no 
option for its citizens other than leaving their country and settling instead to work as day 
laborers in Iran.  
“According to those who have made the journey, it costs about 500 USD per 
traveler, which can be earned back in a month as a construction worker, 
bricklayer, or fruit picker in Iran. That is more than twice the salary of an Afghan 
soldier on the front line. There are risks that come with this trade-off. Once 
migrants make it to Iran, they often face mistreatment from employers. And many 
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young Afghans pick up drug habits in Iran, which has the world’s largest demand 
for opiates” (Rasmussen, 2017). 
Some of the officials in Nimroz and local smugglers are involved in the drug 
trafficking across the borders into Iran and then into Europe. Due to a massive 
geographical interface with Iran and the poorly managed border, the province of Nimroz 
provides an optimum environment for drug cartels and trafficking across the region. 
Pertinently, “Nimruz’s provincial capital, Zaranj, is like no other Afghan town in terms of 
its wild and rough habitat and thus a higher degree of security lags. As Afghanistan’s 
smuggling capital, it houses about 160,000 permanent residents, but its contours are 
shaped by streams of passers-through and torrents of money flowing from drug barons, 
arms dealers, and human smugglers” (Rasmussen, 2017) Subsequently, The Head of 
Nimroz police Mr. Qasim Jangal Bagh, in his interview with Fars News in Kabul, 
admitted that 50% of drugs indeed go specifically via Nimroz to Iran due to the long 
border of the country with Iran in Nimroz province (Fars News Agency, 2015). 
7.6.3 Farah province 
The province is surrounded on the north by Herat, on the northeast by Ghor, the 
southeast by Helmand, the south by Nimroz, and on the west by Iran. The total population 
of Farah province is about 925,016 (Naval Postgraduate School, 2009) which is a 
predominately tribal and rural society. More than 80% of the province consists of ethnic 
Pashtuns (excluding Kuchi nomads) followed by Tajiks as the second largest group 
residing mainly in Farah city and Baluchis as a third group (Naval Postgraduate School, 
2009).  
In terms of the relevance of the economic and strategic interaction with Iran, 
Khoja Abu Nasr-i Farahi in Farah province of Afghanistan and Maheroad in South 
Khorasan province of Iran is the third custom point between the two countries (Iran and 
Afghanistan). The daily capacity of the customs service is to process 250 transportation 
trucks out of which 105 transport oil and gas. The border with Iran was opened in 2009 
and the distance between Iranian borders to the center of Farah is 121km. The Iranian 
government started a project to asphalt the highway in order to boost trade, however, the 
project has been stopped due to the security problems in the last year as endorsed by the 
following statement. According to the Spokesman for Farah province governor:  
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“After the hostage of 12 Iranian workers by the armed men in Farah, (April 2011) 
and even though in a very short duration of time the Iranian workers were 
released, the Iranian company (Rahabadan Pars) stopped working on the project 
for a brief period of time until the tensions settled down. There was probability of 
restoration of work by the Iranian company, but the company could not start its 
activities due to some technical underestimations. The first part of the project 
which is 50km was constructed by the company but after the observation of the 
project by Afghan experts, the Afghan government did not permit to continue the 
project, due to the low quality of the material used. We don’t know the exact cost 
of the project, but we believe it to be equal to around 120 Million U.S. dollars” (N. 
ME., personal interview, 07 April 2015). 
The same Iranian company started another construction work of the highway 
linking Farah to Khorasan province of Iran in 2015. This project is estimated to be 
completed by the end of the year 2018. 
Farah is the nearest Afghan province to Chabahar port. The Indian government 
completed the construction of a 219km Zaranj-Delaram highway with the cost of 136 
million USD. According to the Farah governor, “Chabhar Port has a significant impact on 
the economic development of Farah province. As the closest point to Chabahar, the 
Afghan government agreed to transport 30% of all the goods via Farah to other parts of 
Afghanistan” (A. N., personal interview, 08 July 2015) 
7.7 Challenges for the local Afghan traders at the ground level 
Generally speaking, many problems still exist in the economic relations between 
Iran and Afghanistan, especially in trade. Afghanistan still remains a weak country in 
terms of economic, political and security stability. Kabul government is not yet able to 
control corruption. There is a lack of rule of law, insufficient transparency and 
accountability, militant insurgency, the clash of interests between the foreign players 
(especially U.S. and Iran and now growing India-Pakistan) and lack of support from the 
internal public and private institutions. The lack of economic policies and developmental 
plans in Afghanistan and surplus dependency on imports gives chances to neighboring 
countries like Iran and other regional state actors to control Afghan markets without 
facing significant barriers.  
On the ground, the situation is not good, especially for the traders and commuters 
from Afghanistan intending to cross over to Iran. The pragmatic and more specific on 
ground problems faced by the traders include security problems and the most glaring 
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issue being the widespread corruption. A truck driver who was interviewed narrated the 
following series of issues: 
“We have a number of the problems on the Afghan side. If such problems will not 
be solved, all the drivers will stop working and will not allow a single truck to 
cross. One great problem we are facing every day is that we are paying in two 
different ways for our activity: one payment is the legal tax and one is the 
payment which we are forced to pay as a bribe to the Afghan border police and to 
other governmental officials. Recently, the price of the road pass has also been 
increased by the Afghan embassy in Tehran. We used to pay 450 USD for the visa 
and for border post and could cross 9 times during 3 months, but now for the same 
service we need to pay a double price” (Kako, personal interview, 09 April 2016). 
A local trader from Herat province of Afghanistan projects these problems on a 
more general economic level, whereby he highlights especially the widespread corruption 
problem: 
 “Lack of the necessary economic regulations and the implementation of the sound 
economic policy are the major challenges for the Afghan government. The Afghan 
government needs to setup policies and secure our economic borders. We have 
two official customs border posts with Iran, but there are many other border points 
(illegal ones). Daily, a huge number of goods are smuggled from Iran to 
Afghanistan. They don’t pay taxes and bringing goods of a very low quality. Of 
course, this has a negative impact not only on local industry but also on the trade 
with Iran and overall economy of Afghanistan” (S. A., personal interview, 19 
August 2014). 
The serious gravity of corruption is again demonstrated by the following 
interview:  
“Most of the imported goods come via the unofficial borders in an illegal way. 
Trucks, full of goods, coming to Herat, Farah, Nimruz or any other province in 
Afghanistan from Iran mostly pay no taxes at any border. Corrupted officials 
allow them to transport goods by paying a bribe at any destination point” (S. A., 
personal interview, 19 August 2014). 
The illegal flow of goods from Iran is, however, not only a concern for the 
businessmen but is also voiced by the Afghan government as being a damaging factor for 
the local industry. Meanwhile, some of the local businessmen are, in their turn, accusing 
the local authorities of not controlling this flow of illegal imports to Afghanistan and they 
believe it to be due to the corrupted officials, responsible for controlling the border issues: 
“There are still joint markets on the Afghan side with Iran (Bazar-e Mushtarak) 
and they are opened two times a week. Goods to such markets are coming by the 
illegal ways and in large quantities. The border police officers are bribed by the 
businessmen, enabling them to cross through illegal corridors without any 
problems. The existence of the illegal border points (Kalat-e Nazar and Mili 73) is 
making a very negative impact on domestic production and the overall economy 
Iran’s Economic Policy in Relation to Afghanistan 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
182 
of Afghanistan. Not only such joint markets and the illegal border points are used 
by smugglers, sometimes their operations also happen at the legal custom point in 
Islam Qala port. A huge number of trucks enter on a daily basis. Iranian side is 
even providing the facilities to any kind of export to Afghanistan for any type of 
trade” (H. Kh., personal interview, 15 December 2014). 
These interviews reveal the baseline information not only about the existence of 
illegal and distortive trade markets in western Afghanistan but also how various state 
institutions like police and security forces pay a safe way for such economic mis-
adventurism. The level of corruption and its relevance to porous borders between the two 
countries not only feeds the illegal trade into Afghanistan but also leads to other structural 
and operational inefficiencies like illegal trafficking of goods and the infamous opium 
that threatens Iranian society as well.  
On the other hand, the use of economic power (development aid included) for Iran 
in Afghanistan is to promote its political and security interests. All the way since the fall 
of Taliban in 2001, even though Iran has actively been involved in the reconstruction of 
post-Taliban Afghanistan, it has opposed the presence of any foreign forces in 
Afghanistan primarily U.S. forces. If Iran loses influence in Afghanistan, the anti-Iranian 
influence (consolidation of U.S. and anti-Iran ideological sentiments) will likely grow, 
and this will reduce Iran’s influence and power. Within its economic policy, Tehran aims 
to keep its influence in Afghanistan especially in the western part of the country.  
Based on the realist approach, more economic power means more assertive 
policies and this can be seen in the economic policy of Iran in relation to Afghanistan. 
The Iranian government and private sector are actively participating in the export of 
goods into Afghanistan. The large presence of Iranian goods and services is perceived by 
Tehran as an active means of acquiring influence and political control in Afghanistan.  
Even if Afghanistan has fewer trade opportunities with major actors like the U.S. 
and the EU, as compared to regional actors like Iran, Pakistan and India, the political 
influence of the U.S. on the Afghan government is substantial. The U.S. influence is 
undoubtedly due to significant developmental assistance in the post war Afghanistan and 
mostly due to U.S. dominance. But Iran perceives this growing U.S. influence in the 
region as a threat to their national interests and territorial integrity. 
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7.8 Summary 
In the course of this chapter, it became evident that it would be inapt to view 
Iran’s economic policy (inclusive of the development aid as well) towards Afghanistan as 
holistically hegemonic with an intention to completely dominate the institutional and 
structural operationalization in Afghanistan. Iran’s Afghan foreign policy in general and 
economic policy, in particular, is very complex and based on addressing multi-faceted 
interests like securing its volatile eastern border of Iran with Afghanistan. 
It was revealed in the course of the chapter that although trade relations are 
growing, they are not balanced, imports from Iran to its neighbor are much higher than 
the exports from the later. Afghanistan, nevertheless, is benefiting from the relations as 
the country’s GDP remains to be low and there is a lack of industries to fulfill the needs 
of the population.  
The increase in the economic cooperation and trade relations with Iran is 
influenced by various factors, among which aggravation of Afghanistan’s relations with 
Pakistan. Another reason for the enhancement of relations is opening of Chabahar port.  
Iran, as this chapter has communicated in the provided graphs, in its economic 
relations and policy towards Afghanistan is prone to changes, sometimes even dramatic, 
influenced by the tensions with the U.S. and the competition with Saudi Arabia and in 
order to ensure its political influence and security interests in Afghanistan. This reveals 
quite a dependency between Iran’s economic policy towards its neighbor and its security 
and political interests in Afghanistan, elaborated on in the previous chapter (see chapter 
6). 
Iran’s focus on the western Afghanistan was analyzed in the chapter in light of the 
fact that Iran considers this area as a buffer zone. The two countries’ common border 
simplifies the trade between the Afghan western provinces and Iran and creates 
opportunities for the movement of goods, transport and the people. 
Another important observation that can be distilled from the chapter is the 
tendency of the recent years: the economic relations between Iran and Afghanistan are 
expected to grow, due to the number of the projects Iran supports in Afghanistan. The 
main perception of the Iranian foreign policy towards Afghanistan can be visualized 
through a government in Kabul, which looks for a regional economic and political 
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communion rather than an extra-regional strategic cooperation with great powers (like the 
US) to solve its problems (Haji-Yousefi, 2012). But amidst all this complex economic 
intervention in Afghanistan, there is an uncertainty regarding the economic relationship 
between the two countries. The operational predicament of the economic assistance to the 
Afghan governmental projects on one side and to the anti-state elements like the Taliban 
on the other side is a reflection of duality and a great cause of concern. Even though 
Tehran rejects the accusation of assisting the Taliban, there is evidence that support these 
allegations. With the passage of time, there have been increased attempts formulated as 
well as implemented by Iran to undermine the relationship between Afghanistan and the 
U.S. thus impeding the joint commitment between Afghanistan and U.S. to reconstruct 
and stabilize the former. Moreover, Iranian leadership at all levels has exploited the 
periodic hairline fractures in the relationship between Afghanistan and the U.S. with an 
aim to diminish U.S. influence in the region, albeit at the cost of destabilizing 
Afghanistan. 
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Conclusion 
 
The foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan has changed not only due to the 
political developments of Afghanistan but also based on the dynamics of decision-making 
within Iran that are complex but as a result of the present analysis are discernible.  
This analysis had the goal to understand and explain Iran’s foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan in the timeframe from 2001 to 2014. Every chapter had an aim to elucidate 
this matter by looking at different dimensions, aspects, layers, factors – different corners 
of Iran-Afghanistan relations that reveal peculiarities of Iran’s contradictory external 
policies regarding its neighboring country.  
This final chapter aims to discuss the results of the study and draw a 
comprehensive conclusion. These are two constituent parts of this chapter, but of course 
one cannot really separate one from another, therefore they go hand in hand in the 
sections below. I will recapitulate the main findings and relate them to the overall 
thesis/argument and the questions presented in the introduction (section 8.1). After that, 
the self-critical reflections and reflections on shortcomings of the study at the stage of 
data collection and its processing will be presented (section 8.2). The section will be 
followed by a retrospective view of the theory of realism with an aim to assess its 
explanatory role in addressing the main argument and eventually distilling the 
theoretical/conceptual and empirical contribution this study has made (section 8.3). This 
chapter’s pre-final remarks will be meant to initiate further academic investigation, 
whereby several suggestions will be presented (section 8.4). Finally, I will try to sketch 
some future prospects of the Iran-Afghanistan relationship that may be of interest for 
those who conduct a study situated in the realm of the present research (section 8.5). 
Restatement of the argument and the main findings: recap 
In this conclusion, one finally comes to the point, when the answer to the overall 
research question “What is the nature of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 
2001 to 2014?” and its sub-questions (section 1.4) raised in the introduction of the study, 
as well as the explanation corresponding to the overall thesis/argument (presented in 
section 1.1) is provided.  
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Recapitulation of the results of the research will be done through presentation of 
the key results that help to answer the research question on the nature of Iran’s FP 
towards Afghanistan and check the assertions made as part of the central argument of this 
study: on the contradictory character of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the 
time frame from 2001 to 2014. 
The foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan underwent changes from 2001 to 
2014, but also before 2001 – in the history of the relations of these countries as chapter 2 
of the study demonstrated. The paradigm shifts in the relations before 2001 have 
coincided with the internal dynamics in Afghanistan. They include such major historical 
events as the independence of Afghanistan form the British Empire (1919), the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan (1979) and, later on, Soviet troop pull-out (1989), the break 
out of civil war (1991), the establishment of the Taliban regime (1994) and its fall (2001). 
The foreign policy of Iran towards Afghanistan before 2001 changed also due to the 
dynamic internal settings within Iran itself. In this regard, the end of the Pahlavi era and 
the Islamic revolution (1979) in Iran stand out as the major events that had an enormous 
effect on Iran’s Afghanistan policy. The external regional and global dynamics also led to 
the reshaping of Iran’s foreign policy in light of the new challenges to its economy and 
national security. They include such events as the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) that exposed 
economic issues in Iran, U.S. sanctions (after the hostage crisis and the sanctions that 
followed), the U.S. sanctions post-2001 and UN-mandated sanctions in relation to Iran’s 
nuclear program, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan (2001) as well as the unrest in the 
Middle East and the Arab spring (from 2010 onward). 
The ebb and flow in relations between Iran and Afghanistan throughout its history 
and prior to the Islamic revolution were associated mostly with water and land issues. 
These were the major areas of concern (Chapter 2). However, after the Islamic revolution 
and the Soviet troop withdrawal, there was a radical change in the foreign policy 
approach, because sectarian and ethnic issues started to prevail, this is the time when Iran 
draws particular attention in its foreign policy to support non-Pashtuns, specifically Shia 
Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks, those who made up the Northern Alliance. The security 
concerns came to light as the Taliban attained political power in Afghanistan and due to 
the ongoing Saudi-Iran competition for regional domination. After 2001, Iran saw threats 
to its national security coming from the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, which brought a 
new turn in the foreign policy: Iran began backing the Taliban. The analysis demonstrates 
Conclusion 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
187 
(in Chapters 3 through 7) that this backing was by no means constant, as the Taliban were 
known to be in conflict with Iran’s aspirations as a Shia-state with pretensions to regional 
domination. It should be mentioned here that the advancement of the cause of the Islamic 
revolution by Iran in its foreign policy towards Afghanistan was premised on the notion 
that Iran and Afghanistan shared values and ideas coming from Islam, when in reality, as 
was observed in the analysis, it was the elevation of the Shia Muslims above other sects 
of Muslims. In other words, Iran positioned itself as a state that stands for all Muslims, 
but in reality, Iran stands before all, for the Shia Muslims, not all Muslims, at least in the 
case of Afghanistan where the Shia factor is concerned. This analysis was not an attempt 
to dig deeper into the historical differences and religious aspects of the two branches of 
Islam (Sunni and Shia), but it was necessary to explore the Shia factor, as Iran is home to 
a Shia majority population while Shia is a minority within Islam, whereby Iran takes extra 
measure to offer aid, assistance and protection to the Shia population around the world, 
including in Afghanistan. This is where ideological concerns start to conflict with the 
pragmatic ones – this fact contains the major clue to understanding the contradictory 
policies and moves Iran was making in its foreign policy towards Afghanistan under its 
three last presidents (Chapter 4). Add to this the Saudi and IS triggered anti-Shia mood in 
Iran’s neighborhood as causes for Iran to rethink its Taliban policy and discontinue the 
support to this movement (Chapter 4). But, generally, the pragmatic approach was 
prevailing. The foreign policy fluctuated based on the goal and objectives of a particular 
time, subject to Iran’s internal and external concerns (Chapter 4). The goals and 
objectives were narrowed down in this study to the following three: security interests that 
often imply undermining the U.S. presence in Afghanistan; building ties with the political 
parties and individuals in Afghanistan; and safeguarding the Shia minority rights (Chapter 
4). They were motivated by the three major groups of interests that Iran, as a realist actor, 
has in Afghanistan: security, political and economic (Chapter 5). To enforce these 
interests, Iran was urged to bring its foreign policy behaviour in response to specific 
issues of the time. Thus, it made Iran constantly change the direction of support between 
the Shia and the Taliban, its economic support and investments focus, its political support 
to Kabul on the one hand and the opposition, including Shia leaders, on the other. 
Meanwhile, Iran was sporadically creating obstacles and challenges to Afghanistan’s 
government and its partners.  
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It became evident in the course of the analysis that the major focus of Iran lies in 
western Afghanistan, and Iran’s economic foreign policy is concerned predominantly 
with this region as well. By providing support to the western provinces, Iran is hoping to 
prevent the security threats (from Taliban and IS) and the drug-trafficking (Chapter 5). As 
a rational actor Iran, ultimately, needs to secure its national interests, this is when the 
presence of the U.S. troops began to influence Iran’s foreign policy – namely, Iran at 
varying times, tried to keep and maintain ties first with Mujahedeen and then with the 
Taliban. Thus, the nature of the foreign policy can be characterized as an attempt to 
balance its security, economic and political interests (Chapter 5). It was demonstrated that 
the foreign policy of Iran was (and continues to be) implemented in Afghanistan by the 
various formal and informal institutions (analysed in Chapter 3). The analysis of the 
Iran’s unique institutional structure that combines state and non-state actors, formal and 
informal institutions in shaping its internal and external policies, with the Supreme 
Leader as its most powerful element and the main driver, left no doubt as to who de facto 
guides and advises the various institutions in internal and external policy-shaping. The 
study shows that his personal involvement should not be overestimated in everyday issues 
such as trade and drug-trafficking or at the middle and bottom level relationships where 
relevant institutions of Iran are involved. However, his guidance on issues such as the 
U.S. presence in Afghanistan and other issues of immediate national interests is as a 
direct order and every institution and actor in Iran is unconditionally bound by this fact. 
The analysis of the different norms of the Iranian constitution has revealed the 
tensions between the religious and republican components in governance. This allows one 
to regard this as the de jure Achilles’ heel that contributes to the contradictory character 
of Iran’s FP (Chapter 3). Iran’s foreign policy is contradictory in many aspects, yet the 
economic aspect analyzed in this study (Chapter 7) revealed among the most 
controversial actions undertaken by Iran with regard to Afghanistan. Apart from the 
security interests and political considerations, economic interests serve as another, 
perhaps the greatest impetus for Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The analysis 
of the economic foreign policy of Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan has revealed that its nature is 
not lacking in complexity either. It is intertwined with other dimensions: security, 
political, hydro-political, where I also imply the US-presence in Afghanistan. Although 
trade relations have been growing they are by no means balanced. Iran sees Afghanistan 
as a market for its goods and investments and is much less interested in Afghan goods. 
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This is because Iran’s economic policy is also checked against what is good and what is 
not for Iran, in light of its anti-US agenda and competition with Saudi Arabia. Thus, in a 
way, economic policy has developed a dependency on security policy. It is, therefore, 
ultimately, the security considerations that motivate Iran to involve economically in 
Afghanistan and particularly in the western part of the country, the area of Iran’s security 
interests (due to the shared border). This explains the duality of Iran’s assistance to 
Afghanistan as dubiously shifting from assisting the governmental projects to providing 
aid to the anti-governmental elements, as far as the Taliban are concerned. (Chapter 7) 
These key findings have enabled one to provide the answers to all sub-questions of the 
central research question and brought one closer to understanding of: “What is the nature 
of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014?” 
The discussion of the key findings allows one to emphasize the central argument 
(thesis) on Iran’s contradictory foreign policy towards Afghanistan with a high degree of 
certainty. This central claim presented at the beginning of the study was assessed as 
reasonable in the course of the analysis and thorough study of the relevant literature 
(section 1.2). Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the time frame from 2001 to 
2014 is contradictory indeed. This is because, on the one hand, Iran acts as a rational 
realist player (by advancing its security, political and economic interests), but on the other 
enforces the agendas that do not fit within the realism paradigm (the cultural and ethnical 
aspects of its foreign policy).  
If it is easy to justify some of Iran’s behavior in pursuing its national security and 
political interests due to the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, insurgency and drug 
trafficking, it is much harder to explain the other moves, like backing the Shia-known 
rival Taliban, that Iran regards as a force posing a threat to its national security. The 
economic agenda in Afghanistan is part of the attainment of the larger national and 
security interests in Iran’s foreign policy. This explains why Iran has a rather regional 
approach that is not focused solely on Afghanistan when it comes to Iran’s economic 
involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, it explains why and how Iran uses economic 
relations as leverage to exercise some control over Afghan politics. 
Various factors have been analyzed and assessed as contributing to Iran’s 
contradictory foreign policies in Afghanistan, among them: historical patterns of relations 
(chapter 2), complex and controversial institutional structure within Iran (chapter 3), 
mixture of pragmatic and ideological moves with contained complexities (chapter 4), 
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Iran’s simultaneous links with the Afghan Shia and the Afghan Taliban (chapter 5); 
political and security interests (chapter 6) and economic policy of Iran as a means to 
advance its national (political and security) interests (chapter 7). This is a combination of 
all these settings, factors and events that make Iran’s foreign policy so sophisticated. 
Thus, Iran’s foreign policy was determined to be full of contradictions that stem from two 
significant facts: on the one hand, Iran has pragmatic economic interests as a realist actor, 
which it pursues in Afghanistan while on the other hand its actions follow out of the 
national security concerns. Countering U.S. influence in Afghanistan leads to moves like 
backing Taliban that is counterproductive to Iran’s economic interest and more than other 
moves, can hardly be explained by the theory of realism since they are fueled by the 
religious agenda (support of Shia).  
Self-critical reflections 
In this section, I would like to elaborate on some concerns I have had along the 
way.  
The first issue is concerned with the fact that I was not able to go deeper into the 
terminology issues in my work, I wonder whether delving deeper into the history of the 
Taliban and analysis of various Taliban factions and the existing differences between 
them could lead to the emergence of new themes in this research. It strikes me as an area 
that may have had an influence on the course of analysis, especially now after the 
completion of the study and after the research has demonstrated the importance of the 
Iran-Taliban nexus in its foreign policy formulation towards Afghanistan. 
Another self-critical concern is that I left aside thorough elaboration on the 
cultural aspect of Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. This was not because I 
considered it unimportant but because it would have had a big effect on the research 
design, especially as the theoretical foundation is concerned. It would have also required 
much more time spent in the field where only with the use of ethnographic methodology 
could the links between Iran and Afghan Shia be better observed and fully explained. 
Yet another critical question to consider is whether one could go deeper into the 
analysis of the religious and secular aspects of Iran’s foreign policy shaping by having a 
closer look into the dichotomy of secular versus Islamic and the inherent characteristics 
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of Velayat-e faqih, a theory in Shia Islam on the custodianship given to the Islamic Jurist, 
with its complex theological peculiarities. 
However, the reason I decided not to address the above issues was because they 
would have pushed me outside the theoretical paradigm I chose as substantiated at the 
beginning of my research – the realism theory. Nevertheless, I consider the above issues 
as quite interesting for closer analysis. Perhaps had I thought about this midway through, 
I might have decided to incorporate these points, even at risk of expanding the workload, 
but as these ideas came towards the end of the financial period and other obligations to 
finalize the research, I had to make the pragmatic decision to eliminate these issues from 
closer analysis in this particular study. I hope further studies will cover for these gaps. 
The other shortcomings of the research pertain to specific chapters (research 
areas). This led to the fact that some parts of the analysis may seem less convincing, as 
one lacks the evidence and has to work with the assumptions. It concerns especially the 
economic analysis, where important information does not exist in the publicly available 
domain. Thus, for example, while I could get access to the information on the FDI in 
Afghanistan as an aggregate, there is no information on the FDI of Iran taken separately 
in Afghanistan. The lack of this information also signals the discreet nature of Iran’s 
investments in Afghanistan, not least due to this country’s nontransparent foreign policy 
decision-making, which made it hard for one to follow and explain the actual decision-
making in Iran. However, this is not very surprising as Iran is not the only country where 
this applies – it is quite hard to explain how the actual decision–making works in practice 
in much more open and allegedly transparent democracies in the western world. Such 
precise data, however, is absolutely necessary for the economic studies which may be 
conducted in future, as Iran becomes more economically and politically significant for its 
neighboring Afghanistan. However, the objective of the present study was to analyze the 
political impact that economic factors have on Iran’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. 
Since the purpose of the present study was not in preparing an economic report, the 
information that I was able to access seemed to suffice for the analysis of the economic 
factors of the foreign policy of Iran and the above lack of the statistical clarity cannot be 
seen as influencing the results of this research.  
The insufficient access to information was indeed a limitation, a fault that might 
have restricted the richness of description in this analysis. It can be particularly attributed 
to finding the supporting evidence for the information provided by the interview partners. 
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Often, I had to deal with information communicated to me, that is not contained 
elsewhere in a written, audio or video recorded form, but that was allegedly very well 
known to the interviewed persons due to the special positions they held or the nature of 
their activity. 
Another point of concern is the timeframe. The timeframe 2001-2014 was chosen 
because, at the time of commencement of this research in 2013, the withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Afghanistan was still a prospect. However, many things in the planned 
scenario went differently after 2014. Operation Enduring Freedom was officially ended in 
2014 and 2015 saw the initiation of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Iran’s behavior in its 
foreign policy was again influenced by this shift. This turn should be taken into 
consideration in future research since it can give more clues as to how and why Iran acts 
that way it does towards Afghanistan.  
The last important remark to be made in this section is that, unfortunately, some of 
the interesting thoughts communicated to me in the interviews did not or could not 
become part of this thesis because they were not relevant for the chosen theoretical 
framework. Some of the information contained highly sensitive material which, due to the 
high level of security risks in Afghanistan and the nature of Iran’s regime, could not be 
revealed here as well. The peculiarity of the field research in Iran was due to the nature of 
the regime, which often left me with an impression that people interviewed were 
censoring the themes that may be regarded as particularly sensitive. 
Nevertheless, many things did work nicely and despite the security problems, I 
was able to conduct all planned interviews in Iran and Afghanistan as well as to conduct 
the follow-up interviews and access the materials in the Ministerial archives in 
Afghanistan. This was not least due to my own characteristics and my background and 
personal connections I had in Afghanistan, being an Afghan my myself – that I could get 
access to the materials and people, that would be normally reluctant to speak with 
foreigners. On the other hand, conducting the field trips as part of the German academia 
also had a positive impact on the people in these two countries that seem to be more open 
to German researchers by comparison than to those coming from the US, for instance. I 
am grateful that all these factors enabled me to provide the evidence and the first-hand 
information on the events of the analytical import.  
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Realism theory in retrospect: the empirical contribution 
Iranian foreign policy towards Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 can be 
explained by the realism theory, especially its security, political and economic 
dimensions. Iran, as a rational state, is highly concerned with its security interests and 
political influence in the region and promotion of the economic development of Iran.  
As discussed in the thesis, Iran sees the presence of the U.S. in Afghanistan as a 
direct threat to its national security, therefore it takes pragmatic measures to secure its 
regime and fulfill its security interests. After the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had critical economic 
and political issues, which Iranian revolutionary idealism could not address. As an 
example, the realistic and pragmatic shift in Iran’s FP promoted Iran-Russian relations. 
Taking the realist approach, Iran has invested in its military power, which could only be 
described by realism. 
As the analysis of the literature (section 1.2) has revealed, there has been as of 
today no thorough foreign policy analysis of what constitutes the power politics 
(Realpolitik) of Iran in relation to Afghanistan, that considers all domestic factors in Iran 
and assesses their role with regard to Afghanistan within the framework of Realism.  
The corpus of the previous literature demonstrated that Iran’s foreign policy 
despite its theocratic regime is far from being purely sectarian. This justifies my choice of 
Realism as a theoretical framework equipping me with the necessary tools to analyze the 
national security interests and economic interests. Indeed, today, I can regard realism as 
having been an appropriate tool to analyze the above in my study. 
Meanwhile, it may seem at first glance less clear whether and how realism could 
explain the ideological moves Iran undertook regarding, among others, the support of the 
Shia minorities and its charity programs in Afghanistan. While realism does not provide 
the answer as to why Iran acted in this manner, it does allow one to see how ideology 
was/is used by Iran for attainment of its pragmatic goals and pursuit of its realistic 
interests - the misuse (abuse) of religious power (Velayat-e faqih, in case of Iran) for 
enforcement of the secular power, manifested in national security interests, political and 
economic interests. In this study, this was done by drawing links between these two 
aspects of Iranian foreign policy-making, namely by relating the empirical data on 
support of Shia to the pragmatic foreign policy agendas, in line with Realism theory, Iran 
had in a particular time. While the Shia factor, as an element in the constructivist 
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approach of Rahbar (the Grand Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini) to elevate Shiism 
over Sunnism (section 4.2) was in previous studies often approached with a theory of 
constructivism, this approach is applicable only to the Khomeini era in Iran (section 4.3). 
The previous studies have already highlighted the inseparability of ideology and 
pragmatism (section 1.2 in particular Posch, 2013 and Wastnidge, 2014). It was closely 
analyzed and explained in my study (chapter 4) why the realism approach (and not 
constructivism, for instance) seems to be the most appropriate one to analyze Iran’s 
foreign policy, including the use of the Shia factor between 2001 and 2014 and the above 
interdependency. In this particular timeframe, pragmatism was using ideology (the 
revolutionary rhetoric) rather than depended on it, thus the interdependency is weakened 
and there is a visible preponderance of pragmatism. During this time, ideology was used 
by Iran for the sake of increasing power and enhancing its position within the 
international system – something that realism as an approach is concerned with – which 
made this approach the best choice for the present analysis. 
The practical contribution of the study (perhaps the most important) is in the 
advancement of the knowledge accrued in previous studies on Iran’s foreign policy in 
general and with regard to Afghanistan, in particular, it allowed much deeper insight in 
the case study than was done before. Thus, this study represents the most encompassing 
study on domestic sources of the foreign policy of Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan today and 
may be used by the policy-makers in Afghanistan and in Iran, as well as outside these 
countries’ borders. 
A few words must be said about the possibility of generalization beyond this case. 
Under certain conditions, the results of this study may be generalized to broader contexts. 
This particular case, therefore, has another contribution for studies on international 
relations, at least when foreign policy analysis and the analysis of the domestic factors 
and realism are concerned. It contributes to the general understanding of how the state’s 
domestic policies and institutional structure may be reflected in the shaping of its foreign 
policy towards the neighboring countries. Of course, the peculiar context of Iran makes 
this case of Iran-Afghanistan relations also of relevance to studies concerned with the 
Sunni-Shia divide, US-Iran relations and Saudi-Iran competition, at the very least. 
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Suggestions for further research 
This case study and the results it has produced allow one to make suggestions for 
further research. As previously mentioned in the sections above, this research like all 
studies has its limitations (section 8.2). It may be assumed that filling in the gaps 
articulated in sections above in future studies could open up new angles on analyzing 
Iran’s economic dimension of the foreign policy (in case if more information on Iran’s 
FDI in Afghanistan will become more transparent). Further, despite the fact that in this 
case study realism was indeed able to explain interdependency between the idealism and 
pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy, one could try to combine the realism theory with the 
theory of constructivism or idealism in the studies on Iran that try to explain Iran’s 
support of the Shia in Afghanistan. Perhaps one more suggestion could be made with 
regard to the methodology. The study on Iran-Afghanistan trade relations in the three 
western provinces could be enriched and deepened through the use of ethnographic 
methods when a longer stay by researchers in Afghanistan on the border with Iran 
becomes reasonably safe in future. I very much hope that the present research can and 
will be used by other researchers to build upon the data analyzed herein to produce new 
studies in response to this one. 
The future prospects 
The present analysis of Iran’s foreign policy covers the period from 2001 to 2014. 
Any event that has happened beyond 2014, was not analyzed here unless it was 
particularly relevant to the above timeframe. However, one cannot achieve full 
abstraction from the events of the recent past as well as from anticipated events. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to touch upon a few of such future prospects, that justify the choice 
of this topic, as well as highlight the practical value of this study. 
The literature review, the thorough historical analysis and the first-hand 
knowledge of the political settings in the region, suggests that Iran will continue to be an 
influential player in Afghanistan. As Iran's role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is 
likely to increase, and as more Iranian-educated Afghan refugees return to Afghanistan, 
Iran's influence is likely to increase in coming years. 
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Iran will continue to ensure that it remains economically important for 
Afghanistan. The economic relations between Iran and Afghanistan are expected to 
increase, due to the political problems of the Afghan government with Pakistan, which 
makes Iran a good alternative partner Afghanistan. Iran will continue its efforts to take 
advantage of the possibility of using Afghanistan as a transit route to Central and South 
Asia.  
As Iranian officials have expressed their interest to officially take part in the peace 
talks in Afghanistan, Iran will maintain its influence over the Taliban as well as to 
continue to enhance its relations with Afghan politicians in order to play an important role 
in the Afghan peace process. The aim behind that is to safeguard Iran’s own national 
interests. Iran’s interest in the Afghan peace-process is primarily connected with its aim 
to defeat the IS, including the Sunni militant fighters who fight under the name of the 
Taliban and receive support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Secondly, Iran wants to 
keep its political influence within the Afghan government, to ensure that the Afghan 
government does not become a totally pro-US neighbor of Iran.  
One can assume that Afghanistan’s geostrategic importance for Iran will only 
continue to grow for the numerous reasons mentioned above. In addition, Afghanistan 
contributes to the expansion of the dominant power of influence Iran has as a Shia-
governed state, it provides Iran with the instruments of influence in various issues in the 
South- and Central Asian regions, and last but not least, it provides Iran with leverage 
against the U.S. presence in the region. 
It is important to note that another Afghan neighbor, Pakistan, will most likely 
continue to regard Iran’s presence in Afghanistan as competition to its own presence in 
Afghanistan. This will very much instigate Pakistan to continue its participation in the 
Afghan vs Taliban negotiations, also due to the competition with Iran, since Iran’s 
participation in such negotiations has recently increased.  
Compared to other aspects of its foreign policy towards other countries, Iran's 
policy toward Afghanistan has been relatively moderate. That policy is likely to change, 
however, if there is a discernable increase in the level of animosity between Iran and the 
United States. As this study repeatedly emphasized, Iran regards itself as being caught in 
the scenario plotted by the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran. As a counterstrategy, 
Iran tries to enhance its relations with other countries, among which are Russia, China, 
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and India. It will be interesting to observe in the future how far Iran will push with this 
inter-state cooperation considering that India is a strong U.S. partner. 
These final paragraphs, I hope will inspire interesting new research projects on 
Iran and Afghanistan in future.  
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8.  H. J. Head of the International study of 
Herat University 
24 October 2016, 
Herat 
9.  H. Kh. Head the industrial union of 
Herat province 
15 December 2014, 
Herat 
10.  H. P. Head of the Amir Kabir research 
center in Mashhad 
09 April 2017, Tehran 
11.  J. R. Member of Senate (Afghan 
Parliament Upper House) 
7 March 2016, Kabul 
12.  Kako Head of a local private transport 
company in Herat 
09 April 2016, Zaranj 
13.  K. K. Former Taliban commander  24 October 2016, 
Herat 
14.  K. N. Former Iranian Diplomat in 
Kabul 
09 April 2017, Tehran 
15.  K. S. Former Mujahideen commander 19 April 2016, Kabul 
16.  K. Sah. Adviser for the minister of water 
and energy of Afghanistan 
12 May 2017, Kabul  
17.  Kh. M. Local businessman in Herat 15 December 2016, 
Herat 
18.  M. S. F. Afghan parliamentarian 25 January 2018, Farah 
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19.  M. W. T. Member of Afghan parliament 23 August 2017, Kabul 
20.  M. Y. National security officer in Farah 
province 
25 October 2016, 
Farah 
21.  N. A. Member of Afghan national 
security department 
30 July 2018, Kabul 
22.  N. A. K. Head of the printing department 
of Herat (Line ministry of 
information and cultural affairs) 
27 October 2016, 
Herat 
23.  N. Ah. Local police officer in Farah 30 August 2014, Farah 
24.  N. K. Head of Hezb-i-Musharikat Milli 
political party 
22 March 2018, Kabul 
25.  N. M. Professor at Balkh University 17 March 2015, Kabul 
26.  N. ME. Spokesman for Farah province 
governor 
07 April 2015, Farah 
27.  Q. H. Head of Afghanistan Investment 
Supporting Agency 
22 April 2016, Kabul 
28.  R. B. Member of National security 
department of Afghanistan 
16 March 2015, Kabul 
29.  S. A. Local businessman in Herat 19 August 2014, Herat  
30.  S. Ah. Local businessman 02 April 2016, Zaranj 
31.  S. K. Shia cleric in Herat province 26 August 2014, Herat 
32.  S. Q. Head of the Police department of 
Herat province 
19 August 2014, Herat 
33.  Samad Local bread-maker 04 April 2016, Zaranj 
34.  W. P. Head of “8am News Daily” 
newspaper in Herat 
23 October 2016, 
Herat 
35.  Z. Kh. Foreign currency trader in Zaranj 02 April 2016, Zaranj 
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